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Annex 1. Dynamics of Overdue Indebtedness

Figure 1. Dynamics of overdue indebtedness (share in GDP, end-period).

Figure 2. Dynamics of nominal accumulated overdue credit indebtedness and debtor indebtedness (Rub. billion.)

Figure 1. Dynamics of CPI deflated accumulated overdue creditor indebtedness and overdue debtor indebtedness (base period 1.1.1997, Rub. billion).

Figure 2. Dynamics of CPI deflated increments in overdue creditor indebtedness (base period 1.1.1997, Rub. billion).

Figure 3. Real Ruble exchange rate dynamics (in terms Rub./$, 100=1.1.1995, source: authors’ calculations, Goskomstat, IFS)

Figure 4. Difference between actual and target indicators of the federal budget.

Figure 5. Dynamics of real money supply and CPI deflated increments in indebtedness (base period 1.1.1997, Rub. billion).

Amounts of written off overdue indebtedness

Table 17. Indebtedness written off to financial results.

Note: the figures for 1997 are based on the data from four key sectors of the economy (industry, agriculture, transport, construction). The figures for 1998 through 2000 are based on the data from all sectors of the economy.

Source: RF Goskomstat.

As the table reveals, the amounts of overdue indebtedness written off to financial results are relatively small in comparison to its overall amount, however, they demonstrate a certain propensity to grow. At the same time, the amount of written off indebtedness is rather considerable relatively to the increments. It is especially true for the debtor indebtedness. Its value was over 17 per cent of the increments in the overdue indebtedness (write-offs included) in 1999 through 2000. In other words, the increments registered over these periods would have been by 20 per cent higher without write-offs.

Annex 2. Results of Evaluation of Models

Figure 6. Results of the Jarque-Bera test for normality of residuals, model (2.1), OLS.

Figure 7. Results of the Jarque-Bera test for normality of residuals, model (2.1), OLS with excluded outliers.

Figure 8. Regression residuals of model (2.1) with excluded outliers.

Table 18. White Heteroskedasticity Test, model (2.1).

F-statistic

23.285

Probability

0.000

Obs*R-squared

188.287

Probability

0.000

Table 19. Quarter-based evaluation of standard errors in the explained variable (increment in non-payments ).

Figure 9. Results of the Jarque-Bera test for normality of residuals, model (2.1), WLS.

Figure 10. Results of the Jarque-Bera test for normality of residuals, model (2.1), WLS with excluded outliers.

Table 20. Results of the evaluation of model (2.1) with excluded outliers, WLS with “exponential” weights, I/19961995-IV/2000.

Figure 11. Results of the Jarque-Bera test for normality of residuals, model (2.1) with excluded outliers, WLS with “exponential weights.”

Table 21. Results of the evaluation of model (2.1) with lagged real interest rates and excluded outliers, WLS with “exponential” weights, I/19956-IV/2000.

Table 22. White Heteroskedasticity Test, equation (4.1).

F-statistic

14.492

Probability

0.000

Obs*R-squared

28.581

Probability

0.000

Table 23. Results of the evaluation of model (5.1) with lagged variables, WLS, White, I/1995-IV/2000.

EQ21_LAG

Table 24. Results of the evaluation of model (5.1) with lagged variables and dummies, WLS, White, I/1995-IV/2000.

EQ21_LAG_s

Table 25. Results of the evaluation of model (5.1) with dummies, WLS, White, IV/1994-IV/2000.

EQ22

Table 26. Results of the evaluation of model (5.1) with dummies and excluded outliers, WLS, White, IV/1994-IV/2000.

EQ22_SELECT

1) Х - прирост кредиторской просроченная задолженность

Таблица 27

2) Х - недоимка в федеральный бюджет

Таблица 28

3) Х - недоимка в региональный бюджет

Таблица 29

Annex 3. Length of Production Cycle, Capital Productivity and Per Capita Product

The hypothesis about the significance of the length of the production cycle as a factor behind the generation of payment arrears is tested below. The following model is evaluated:

, (11.1)

is the fixed assets of enterprises and organizations in the i-th region in the period t;

is the per capita product in the i-th region (characterizes the mean product of labor).

In the accordance with used indicators the hypothesis under testing may be also formulated via capital productivity. The higher is the product of capital, the higher is the profitability of production, and the less is the probability of payment arrears (Model 3). The similar reasoning may apply to the product of labor.

For the results of the model evaluation see Table 30.

Table 30. The results of the evaluation of model (11.1), OLS.

According to the obtained results the majority of coefficients are statistically significant. Therefore, the higher product of capital is registered in the region, the less payment arrears the region generates, and the higher is the value of the per capita product in the region, the higher is the increment in non-payments. The positively signed per capita product may be best explained by the fact that this indicator characterizes the sectoral structures of regions. Accordingly, regions with higher levels of economic activity generate more payment arrears.

Annex 4. Offset Practices in the Russian Federation

The problem of financing budgetary expenditures in the situation characterized by growing amounts of tax revenue arrears resulted in the emergence of monetary and non-monetary offsets in the process of budget administration. The arrears of budgetary obligations related to state procurement, social expenditures deprive budget recipients of the possibility to settle with their creditors and suppliers, therefore the latter experience difficulties in the course of their operations and can not settle with the budget. Enterprises refrain from paying taxes, since the budget and budget recipients did not settle with them. Budgetary revenues decline, therefore the budget can not repay its obligations. The vicious circle is complete. In this situation it is impossible to find out who was the initial defaulter.

Special instruments were designed to carry out offsets at the federal level. By end-1994 there were issued treasury bills (Russ. abbr. KOs, a type of government securities with interest rates below the market levels, which were endorsed by a certain minimal number of private enterprises). KOs were primarily aimed to restructure budgetary debts to recipients. KOs could be either repaid in cash or exchanged for the treasury tax exemption certificates (Russ. abbr. KNOs), which entitled KNOs owners to offset their tax liabilities at par value. In 1996 the Finance Ministry started to issue KNOs to directly finance certain federal expenditures.

Generally speaking, the use of KNOs had a mixed impact on the budget. First, issuing KNOs at below-the-market interest the state in fact transferred the burden to service a part of the public debt to the budget recipients, who receiving from the government KNOs in stead of cash payments could sell them immediately only at a price considerably below the placement price. The second, and perhaps the most serious problem encountered by the government in relation to KNOs and KOs was that enterprises used them to repay the arrears they deliberately accumulated in order to settle them later with these securities. In this relation the most illustrative example is the seasonal financing of the agriculture in 1995 through 1996. The government used KNOs to secure the commodity credit (fuels and lubricants), which oil companies granted to agricultural enterprises. Taking into account the fact that KNOs were used without relevant checking of tax arrears amounts, it created direct incentives for oil companies to accumulate their budgetary payment arrears.

A new generation of offsets emerged in end-1996, which had some advantages in contradistinction to the previous instruments: first, these offsets were carried out in monetary form and, second, the chain of offsets was determined in advance. In brief outline the offset procedure looked as follows: the taxpayer in tax arrears settled them with the state at the expense of a bank loan, in its turn the state settled its obligations to budget recipients. Moving along the payment chain these funds ultimately reached the taxpayer, who could then repaid the bank loan.

In the fourth quarter of 1997 the government approved the procedure of “inverse monetary offset”: at the first state the Finance Ministry settled with budget recipients, who could then repay their debts to the creditors. In their turn the creditors settled with the budget.

It shall be noted that a large number of violations and imperfect procedures governing monetary offsets (especially in case budget recipients transferred their obligations) accounted for a rather low effectiveness of these offsets. Besides, similarly to KNOs offsets created the incentives to accumulate budgetary payment arrears in order to settle them later in the course of an offset.

Since 1999 offsets has been suspended at the federal level. Certainly, the favorable economic situation and high budgetary revenues contributed to this development. For the first time since 1995 actual budgetary expenditures have exceeded targets. Therefore, offsets became unnecessary.

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