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36,3


- managers

19

22

12

9

13

16

9

16

18

10

12,1

15


- collective trust

-

-

3

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-


2. Outsiders, total

10

16

33

21

33

34

22

33

33,6

31,7

41,3

45,3


2.1. Juridical persons

23

11

21

25

-

23

24,52

20,7

23,6

22,8


- banks

-

-

2

-

1,5

-

-

1

1,6

1,6

1,2

1,7


- investment funds

3

5

5

-

6

-

-

6

5

7,2

4

5,2


- suppliers, buyers, other firms

-

-

3

-

3

-

-

5

3

8,1

12,9

11,8


- holdings and FIGs

-

-

3

-

1

-

-

1

2,6

3,5

4,9

3,4


- others

-

-

10

-

9,5

-

-

10

12,32

0,3

0,6

0,7


2.2. Individuals

3

6

8

10

11

9

-

9

6

9,6

13,2

15,6


2.3. Foreign investors

-

-

2

-

1

-

-

1

1,6

1,7

5,1

7,6


3. State

20

12

9

17

11

10

13

13

9

9,5

6,5

2,7


Total*

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100


(1) - The survey of 1994 covered 88 privatized enterprises of Moscow, St.Petersburg, Urals and Nizhny Novgorod. The survey of the fourth quarter of 1995-first quarter of 1996 covered 312 privatized enterprises (from 12 branches of industry) of Moscow, St.Petersburg, Urals and Nizhny Novgorod. Collective trust was not mentioned in other surveys for other years as well. The data of the University of Nottingham. Source: , , , 1997, . 87. (2) - The summary evaluation of the author on the basis of the results of 1994-1996 surveys conducted by the RF State Property Committee (400 enterprises), FCSM and the securities market monitoring group of FCSM (250 and 889 enterprises), IET (174 enterprises) which together covered all the regions of Russia. In the lines legal persons and individuals the real data on large and small outside shareholders are shown. It should be remembered that in 1994 and 1995 small shareholders meant less than 5% of the equity; in 1996 – up to 1% of shares. The figures in the table were calculated as unweighted arithmetic average but the absence of weights should not, presumably, play any significant role since the size of the enterprises in the sample is about comparable (no small and largest companies were included). For more details see: , , , 1995; Radygin, 1996b). (3) - Surveys of the Blasi group of 1994 (143 enterprises), 1995 (172 enterprises), 1996. Sources: , 1996b; Blasi, Kroumova, Kruse, 1997, p. 193. Data for 1995 differ according to the quarters, here the fourth quarter data are shown: see FCSM, 1996b. (4) - Surveys of the Russian Economic Barometer in 1995 covered 138 industrial enterprises (conducted upon request of IET), in 1997 – 139 (out of which 46 were present in both surveys), 1999 – the respondents’ forecast. Source: Aukutsionek, Kapeliushnikov, Zhukov, 1998.

* Strictly speaking many of the figures are not consistent from the standpoint of analysis of the annual changes of ownership structure since even the annual data are based on different (in survey (1)) data bases or data bases with little repeated coverage (surveys (2) and (4)). As regards survey (3) there is no exact information about the used annual samples. Nevertheless considerable coincidence of the results for one and the same period in different surveys allows us to draw a conclusion about a high degree of reliability of these figures summarized in the table from the standpoint of the general trends in the changes of ownership of stocks at the large and medium privatized enterprises in Russia. It also important that all the above-mentioned surveys focused mainly on the typical Russian industrial enterprises (medium and large) which also allows us to extrapolate (with some reservations) these trends to the whole Russian industry.

Table 4. Standard elements of the corporate law and their presence in some transition economy countries, as of the end of 1996.*

Russia

Czech Rep.

Hungary

Bulgaria

Poland

Romania

Main legal acts

Civil code (1994),

Law on JSC (1995)

Commercial code (1991)

Law VI on commercial societies (1988)

Commercial law of 1991 and 1994

Commercial code (1934 with amend.)

No data

(1) Clear distribution of decision-making authority

Weak

Exists

Exists

Weak

Exists

Weak

(2) Governance structure (two-tier, i.e. management and board of directors)

Two-tier if more than 50 share-holders

Always two-tier

Always two-tier

According to share- holders decision

Two-tier if capital is more than 50mln zloty

According to share-holders decision

(3) Nomination of directors (necessary number of votes)

More than 50%

More than 50%

More than 50%

More than 50%

n.m. - some directors can be appointed by large share-holders

Compe-tence of the board

(4) Removal of directors

More than 50%

More than 50%

More than 50%

More than 50%

More than 50%

More than 50%

(5) Control over votes (proxies)**

Exists

Exists

Exists

Exists

Exists

Exists

(6) Rules for disclosure of information and audit

Standards rapidly developing

Low level

High standards

Low level

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