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2. As to my own approach, I shalltry to avoid any politicised evaluations or recommendations. I would liketo note that - and it is quite important methodologically - to me privatisationshould be viewed in a narrow sense as a process of sale (transfer) fully orpartially of the property (assets) of state-owned enterprises to the privatesector (physical persons and non-state legal entities). This definitionis quite characteristic of the ideology which is built into the Russianmodel. In a broad sense the term `privatisation' means, of course, aprocess of modification of the management model of the state enterprise withoutalienation of the property rights on the basis of a team contract, lease,contract, full or partial change of the legal and financial status of a stateenterprise. The latter is more characteristic for the privatisationtechnique of Western countries and is not taken seriously as a method ofprivatisation by Russian ideologists.

3. The vast literature on thetopic which is already available means we do not need to analyse in detail thequestions of the necessity of privatisation or the general goals ofprivatisation as an element of the systemic transformation in the transitioneconomy, nor the problems of techniques and methods of privatisation ingeneral. I would like to mention in this connection only somepapers: Aslund (1994), Aslund & Layard (eds) (1993), Blanchard,Dornbusch, Krugman, Layard & Summers (1991), Dhanji & Milanovic (1990),Frydman, Rapaczynski & Earl (1993), Kikeri, Nellis & Shirley (1992),Kornai (1990), Lewandowski & Szomburg (1989), Lipton & Sachs (1990),Vuylsteke (1988).

4. It is a paradox but in thiscontext a process of spontaneous privatisation becomes an inalienableprerequisite with regard to effective execution of the official privatisationprogrammes which, as a rule, are launched only when a spontaneous process picksup speed.

5. For details see Malle (1994),Aslund (1994), Boiko & Shleifer (1993), Boiko, Shleifer & Vishny(1994), Dabrowski et al. (1993), McFaul & Bernstein (1993), Radygin(1992).

6. In particular, see Bohm &Simoneti (eds) (1993, 1994), Earl, Frydman, Rapaczynski et al. (1993), Im,Jalali & Saghir (1993), McFaul & Bernstein (1993), OECD (1993), Sachs(1992), Scott & Kroll (1993). I am grateful to Georgy Malginov forthe preparation of useful material for this analysis.

7. In particular, see CEC (1991),IMF et al (1991).

8. See `Main Directions...'(1990), `Transition toward the market' (1990), Programme... (1991a-c),Decree... (1990), Ryzhkov (1989), Ryzhkov (1990), `Accord for a Chance' (1991),IV Congress... (1990).

9. It is curious that later onsome economists of the Soviet school (especially those close to pro-communistcircles) became vicious critics of free distribution and many of those orientedto the West started that kind of distribution in practice or backed such apolicy.

10. It is important to note thatbecause the selected criterion is connected first of all with the techniques ofprivatisation, adherence to one or other type of approach does not alwaysdirectly show the social and political aspirations of the authors (especiallyif we take into account the fact that most economists admit the possibility ofcombining various forms of privatisation). Yet a more thorough analysisof the differences in the interpretation of the essence and prospects of themethods suggested allows us to arrive at more accurate judgements on the entirespectrum of opinions before the first law on privatisation was adopted inRussia. When writing this paragraph I relied on the work of ElenaZhuravskaya, who has done a lot in the area of>

11. See Popova (1991a-b), Tarasov(1991), et al.

12. See Bunich (1990), Glaziev(1991), Zaichenko (1991).

13. See Glaziev (1991), Grigoriev(1990a-b), `Transition toward a market' (1990), Selyunin (1990).

14. See Assekritov (1991), Melikyan(1990), Popova (1991a-b).

15. See Bunich (1990), Filippov(1991), Piyasheva (1990), Rutgaizer & Shpilko (1990).

16. See Alekseev (1990), Grigoriev(1990a-b), Grigoriev & Yasin (1991), Popova (1991a-b).

17. See Isaev et al. (1992),Piyasheva et al. (1992), Selyunin (1992).

18. The following ideas were usedas key ideas for this conception: (1) buyout of a portion of stocksecured against the fixed assets and working capital, due to the monetaryassets and a part of the shares with a security in the form of a plot of landof the enterprise, through the use of privatisation vouchers; (2) 90% ofthe common shares on a stage-by-stage basis (for 3-5 years) to be bought out bya work collective, actually through the use of resources of the enterpriseitself.

19. For detailed estimate see IMFet al. (1991, Vol. 1-2).

20. See Chapter 2, as well as IMFet al., (1991, Vol. 2), Johnson & Kroll (1991), Radygin (1991), Radygin(1992).

21. In this chapter and in furtherreferences to the normative acts on privatisation in Russia see `Privatisationof state and municipal enterprises...' (1993-1994), official publications inRossiiskaya Gazeta aswell as CEC, EBRD, GKI (1993).

22. After the dissolution of theSupreme Soviet in 1993 the Russian Federal Property Fund was put under thecommand of the executive branch (government) of Russia.

23. A detailed analysis of thesereasons was carried out by E. Gaidar in his lectures at the conference on`Privatisation: the next stage', organised by the Heritage Foundation(USA) in Moscow in January 1994, and at the workshop on the problems of Russianprivatisation and business organised by the Centre for Research into CommunistEconomies (Great Britain) in London in April 1994.

24. In the course of debates beforethe programme was adopted the Communist factions imposed the `second option ofbenefits' (51% of shares for the enterprise personnel) but in return theyabandoned a demand to create only closed joint stock companies. In abroader perspective it was the forced agreement of GKI to this version thatallowed the entire privatisation model to be switched.

25. Norilsk may serve as a goodexample; the social infrastructure depends wholly on the activities of theNorilsk Mining Integrated Works. Moreover, the payments from the RussianJoint Stock Company Norilsk Nickel, of which the Integrated Works forms part,make up one-third of the entire revenue of the budget of the Krasnoyarsk regionof Russia.

26. Here and in other sections ofthe book, to analyse quantitative results of privatisation, I use statisticaldata up to 1 July 1994 inclusive, for this date marked the official completionof the first stage of Russia's privatisation.

27. It should be stressed that sucha calculation is not quite correct for here we contrast the number ofprivatised enterprises with the number of state enterprises on the samedate. In our view, it would have been better policy to determine thisindicator as the ratio of the number of privatised enterprises to the sum ofprivatised enterprises and state enterprises with an independent balance sheeton the same date. In this case we get 41% privatised enterprises by 1July 1994 (see Table 9).

28. Here we speak only about themeans that were used in the course of initial sales, i.e. without taking intoaccount the volume of investment programmes in accordance with the conditionsof investment tenders, secondary transactions and intermediaries.

29. Originally, in December 1991 itwas suggested that the idea of vouchers be `frozen' (in spite of the fact thatthere was a law on it) for an indefinite period of time. But by spring1992, due to the factors considered, a strategic decision was taken to expeditethe realisation of that model.

30. One more `original' move wasmade by one of the largest Russian manufacturers of cars, Avto-VAZ. Itsmanagement decided to `whip up' the prices of its cars (and this waydrastically reduced the demand for the cars) to reduce the interest of`outside' investors in the shares of the enterprise when they were offered at avoucher auction (for greater detail see Ulyanov, 1994).

31. The expiry of the period ofvalidity of privatisation vouchers was accompanied by a whole series ofdocuments.

On 20 April 1994 a GKI instruction came out to the effect thatfrom 1 May 1994 voucher auctions should accept only the applications of thefirst type for otherwise voucher owners were deprived of the opportunity ofbuying if the prices at the auctions were below the demand from applications ofthe second type.

On 6 May 1994 a decree of the government was signed with thetitle `On Measures to Complete Voucher Privatisation and to Provide Guaranteesfor the Citizens of the RF in the Use of Privatisation Vouchers'. Thisdecree set forth a list of rigid organisational measures to ensure a series ofvoucher auctions. The last vouchers, according to this document, had tobe used before 1 October 1994.

Taking into account the fact that by 30 June 1994 as many as 144million vouchers had been collected, out of 148 million issued (with the rateof voucher collection of the order of 1 million per week during the last week),it was recognised that it was necessary to postpone somewhat the date of finalvoucher liquidation. Originally, in accordance with the decree of thePresident of the RF on 28 June 1994 `On Measures to Protect the Interests ofCitizens at the Stage of Transition from Voucher to Money Privatisation', thepersonnel of the enterprises whose plans of privatisation had been approved by1 July 1994, were allowed to use vouchers for a closed subscription for shareswithin the July period. Another decree of the President, of 20 July 1994,`On Extra Measures to be Taken to Protect the Interests of Citizens at theStage of Transition from Voucher Privatisation to the Money Privatisation',allowed local authorities (within September-November 1994) to accept theremaining vouchers at face value (i.e. actually as a money equivalent) as ameans to pay for objects of privatisation which will be sold this time forcash. By 1 September it was envisaged that audits should be performed inthe territorial agencies of GKI and the regional property funds (first of allto prevent second presentation of vouchers already accepted forliquidation).

32. At the same time this causesthe supply of shares in privatised enterprises to run ahead of demand.For example, in May 1994 alone the supply of shares in privatised enterpriseson the secondary market was 6 times higher than in April (data from 12exchanges and 40 large dealers), while the volume of real bargains made went uponly 1.5 times. Dealers who quote these shares maintain a vast spread -for the shares some 20 enterprises quoted by 15 Russian dealers the averagespread turned out to be (in April-May 1994) about 150%. The spread onbank shares is 3-10% (Skatershikov & Malakhova, 1994).

33. EES Russia, Kominneft,Yuganskneftgas, Surgutneftegas, Lukoil, Rostelekom, Norilsk Nickel and some20-30 other enterprises.

34. It is important to note thatthe model of securities market selected will determine the future role ofvarious interested agencies. That is why, when drawing up a draft of thecorresponding law, the departmental lobbying is very powerful - not alwaysreflecting the realities - interested state organs.

35. In this book by management andcontrol we mean only those activities connected with the operations ofcorporations which are characterised by property relations between the subjectsof property or by relations between these subjects and other interested groups(employees, clients, suppliers, state organs). This kind of activityrequires strict legal regulation. We do not consider here the questionsof management and control from the point of view of the organisation of thefirm, i.e. the structures of functional and linear management, schemes ofadministrative subordination, functional determination of powers and otherstructural factors of the organisation, since these problems are solved by eachcompany independently, taking into account its own purposes and strategy and donot require legislative regulation. I am grateful to Vladimir Gutnik forthe material on Russian company law which was most useful for the analysis inthis chapter.


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Aleksashenko, Sergei & LeonidGrigoriev, `Privatisation and the Capital Market', Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, 3,1, 1991, pp.41-56.

Alekseev, Sergei, `Acquisition',Literaturnaya gazeta,Moscow, 12 December 1990, p.10.

Assekritov, Stanislav, `It is noteverything that is subject to division', Pravitelstvennyi vestnik, Moscow,1991, 22.

Aslund, Anders, Shock Therapy in Eastern Europe and Russia (Moscow, Respublika, 1994).

Aslund, Anders & Richard Layard (eds)Changing the Economic System in Russia (St. Martin's Press, 1993).

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Blanchard, Olivier, Rudiger Dornbusch, PaulKrugman, Richard Layard & Lawrence Summers, Reform in Eastern Europe (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1991).

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Bolmatova, Olga & Petr Evseev,`Legislative diversity affects the hearing of a foreign investor', Finansovye izvestiya, Moscow, 20,5-11 May 1994.

Boreiko, Tatyana, `Enterprises want to havetheir own investor', Finansovyeizvestiya, Moscow, 6, 10-16 February1994.

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Boiko, Maxim & Andrei Shleifer, `ThePolitics of Russian Privatization', in Post-Communist reform: Pain and Progress (MIT Press, 1993).

Boiko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer & RobertVishny, Mass privatisation in Russia. OECD advisory group on privatisation, Fifth Sessiondocuments, Paris, March 2-4, 1994.

Braverman, Aleksandr, A brief explanatory note on the results of marketing of items ofstate property in the conditions of post-voucher privatisation (Moscow, Association of Marketing, 1994).

Bunich, Pavel, `General Welfare and We',Ekonomika i zhizn',Moscow, 1990, 37, pp.9-10.

Chubais, Anatolii, `The results ofprivatisation in Russia and the tasks of the following period', Voprosy ekonomiki, Moscow, 1994, 6,pp.4-9.

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