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25579

2001

I

20580

The dynamics of the real tax arrears to the federal budget is represented on figure 1. Unfortunately, since 2001the respective MTC statistical sheet was amended, and the debt on all taxes to the federal budget is not represented any more. At the same time for some types of taxes the growth of the actual debt was registered – 1.2% for the corporate profit tax, and 20% for the VAT.

Table 4

Execution of the consolidated budget of the RF (In % of GDP)

1998

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

Taxes

16,2%

17,4%

18,1%

19,3%

19,7%

19,8%

19,8%

19,4%

18,8%

18,5%

18,6%

50482

Revenues

18,8%

20,1%

21,2%

22,4%

23,0%

23,2%

23,2%

22,9%

22,3%

22,0%

22,0%

24,5%

Expenditure

25,3%

23,8%

27,0%

28,1%

28,6%

29,5%

29,4%

28,6%

27,4%

26,9%

27,1%

29,5%

Deficit

-6,5%

-3,7%

-5,8%

-5,7%

-5,7%

-6,3%

-6,2%

-5,7%

-5,2%

-5,0%

-5,0%

-5,1%

1999

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

Taxes

16,8%

16,6%

18,1%

19,9%

20,1%

20,5%

20,8%

20,8%

20,3%

20,2%

20,9%

22,1%

Revenues

19,2%

18,9%

20,6%

22,7%

23,2%

23,9%

24,3%

24,5%

24,1%

24,0%

24,8%

26,3%

Expenditure

18,6%

20,3%

23,6%

25,6%

26,6%

27,3%

27,4%

27,4%

26,7%

26,3%

26,7%

29,2%

Deficit

0,6%

-1,5%

-3,1%

-3,0%

-3,4%

-3,4%

-3,1%

-2,9%

-2,7%

-2,3%

-1,9%

-2,9%

2000

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

I

X

XI

XII

Taxes

20,8%

21,4%

22,6%

24,2%

25,5%

25,4%

24,9%

24,8%

24,1%

23,7%

24,0%

24,6%

Revenues

24,4%

24,8%

26,4%

28,2%

29,7%

29,7%

29,3%

29,2%

28,4%

28,0%

28,6%

30,0%

Expenditure

19,6%

21,1%

23,8%

24,8%

25,2%

25,5%

22,3%

25,1%

24,5%

24,2%

24,6%

27,0%

Deficit

4,7%

3,7%

2,6%

3,4%

4,5%

4,3%

7,0%

4,1%

3,9%

3,8%

4,0%

3,0%

Execution of the consolidated budget between 1998through 2000is represented in the Table 3.

For February 2001we should expect some decrease of tax revenues because of the decrease of oil export custom duties rates. At the same time, some additional revenues must be mobilized to repay more than $US 1.5bln on the external debt.,.

S.Batkitbekov

Monetary Policy

In January 2001the increment in consumer prices amounted to 2.8% (almost 40% annualised), that has become the highest inflation rate since July 1999. In January, prices for services and food stuffs grew by 4.6% and 3.1%, correspondingly, while the rise in the prices for non-food goods accounted for 1.4% only.

As Figure 1shows, high rates of consumer prices growth were in place in February 2001. According to preliminary estimates, the CPI grew by 2.7–2.9% over the month. The tendency contradicts the usual seasonality in the consumer price index dynamics observed during 1994to 2000. After the inflation surge in January, the price rise rates would decline rapidly yet in February. However, in 2001, the seasonal fluctuations were affected by a number of specific factors, stimulating even higher price rise during both January and forthcoming months.

First, during 2000the gap between rates of consumer and producer price growth continued to accumulate, and the inflation surge in early-2001could be attributed to theattempt to narrow it. Secondly, in 2001the seasonal price rise for services and tariffs for natural monopolists’s services was relatively more intensive than over previous years. Thirdly, in 2001the rise in prices and tariffs for services and goods produced by natural monopolists happened to be lasting over several months. The latter adds a great deal to high inflation rates in February. Fourth, in February 2001the uncertainty with respect to the federal budget execution in 2001in light of the need to repay and to service the Russian foreign debt according to the initial schedule intensified expectations of a more rapid Rb. devaluation and, therefore, a higher inflation.

Figure 1

In January and February 2001, the situation in monetary sphere was rather contradictory and its origins are highly intransparent.

On the one hand, in late-January and early-February one could observe a rapid growth of foreign reserves of the Bank of Russia (see Fig. 2). As of the 1st of February, 2001, their volume reached the new maximum value – $29.6billion, that showing a $1,7billion growth over January. In February foreign reserves declined, and as of February 23, fell to $28.7billion. The contraction of reserves partly accounts for the purchases -of foreign exchange by the Russian Ministry of Finance to repay on the Russian debts to the Paris Club1.

On the other hand, for the period between the very beginning of the year until February 4, the narrow monetary base shrank at about 50billion rubles (see Fig. 2), but in February it rose gradually against the fall in foreign reserves. Currently, the Bank of Russia has very scare market tools to manage the money supply, and reserve requirements remained unchanged, the nature of the monetary base fall is very unclear2.

Figure 2

Summing up results of 2000, we can note that the annual increment of the narrow monetary base amounted to 69.0% (from 307.5to 519.6billion rubles), the broad monetary base – 68.1% (since 439.7to 739.2billion rubles). Thus, over the year the real increment of monetary base equalled 40.6% (for narrow aggregate) and 39.9% – for broad aggregate.

The sources of the monetary base growth, namely a higher rate of broad aggregate growth, can be determined on basis of analysis of the broad monetary aggregate structure (see Fig. 3). For 1999and 2000the share of cash declined from 71.2% to 52–55%, while the share of compulsory reserves grew from 7.4% to 13.6% (in July 1998 – 16.5%), the share of balances on correspondent accounts of commercial banks in the Bank of Russia – from 10.7% to 14.5% (in July 1998 – 6.5%), the share of deposits in the CBR and other liabilities – since 10.7% to 15–20% (in July 1998 – 10.5%).

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