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The crisis in the relations between themshowed itself obviously already at the beginning of the last year; it took itsfinal shape in the contest between the two main runners forPresidency40. However, the fact itself of B.Yeltsin’s victory did not mean theautomatic choice of a definite model, because the situation of the objectiveconflict of interests between these two sectors. As to today, this conflictbecame a priority in comparison with the former antagonism between theinflational and anti-inflational models of development and the supportinggroups of interests.

Moreover, it seems that the struggle aroundthis issue will aggravate due to the expected engagement in it of the leadingRussian financial structures. As the Russian banks engage, more and more, inthe real sector, purchasing blocks of shares of privatized enterprises, thesystem of their economic and political interests begins to be more and moredetermined by the interests of expansion of these or that production sectors.Last year, the first signs appeared of such difference among the Russian banks;hence, one may suppose that in the nearest future will be one of the mostimportant when forming the Government course.

The choice of this or that economic modelwill inevitably require the consolidation of the political power, and, first ofall, formation of a more integrated Government. In the other words, thesolution of the economic growth beginning problems is, connected with thetransition, at least for a certain period, from the conception of a coalitionGovernment to that of the Government of supporters of a same idea; here we cansee certain analogies with the period of the end of 1991- beginning of 1992.Though the political program of such team cannot be clearly defined today,because the choice between the, yet.

The move in this direction has, already,begun. The liberal economists and the democracy-oriented politicians supportingthem are regrouping their forces. For the same purposes, the left opposition isactivating its relations with the today’s Ministers of similar opinions. Atthe end of 1996, the both sides had approximately equal political chances toput the policy consolidation under control. Though the choice has not beenmade, yet, this choice will determine the main frameworks of the economicevolution, beginning from 1997, and, hence, the related politicalstruggle.

* * *

In conclusion, here are some quantitativeestimates of the forthcoming economic processes; these are based on theassumption of absence of brusque changes of the economic policy aimed either todash or to hamper the economic transformations.

Forecast of budget situation. The 1997 Budget estimate assumed the GDP of Rbl.2727trln. withthe real growth by 1% from the 1996 value and the annual inflation rate0.8%41.

Our calculations were base don the averagemonthly inflation rate 1.23% and the real GDP at the 1996 level (see below).Based on this, the value of the nominal annual GDP was to be Rbl.2622trln.This index was calculated based on the assumption of the dynamic of the real1997 GDP at the 1996 level. The monthly values of the 1997 GDP were calculatedtaking into account the nominal 1996 GDP and the accumulated prices index forthe relevant period of 1996. The actual consumer prices index of 1996 and theprognosis of the relevant index of 1997 formed the deflator.

While estimating the share of the taxincomes in the GDP we were based on the 1997 amendments to the laws on theprofit tax, income tax, excise taxes, and some other amendments, whoseeffectiveness, as we believe is the most probable (tax on purchase of foreignnotes, ban of certain profit tax and VAT privileges). We have not accounted forthe possible growth of the tax incomes due to the measures preventing from theillegal tax evasion. In the former event, as we believe, the tax incomes willamount to about 9.9% of the GDP, i.e., lower than the 12% of the GDP planned bythe Ministry of finance42. The total incomes of theFederal Budget will amount to 10.9 % of the GDP, assumed the arrears grow, inreal terms, at the same rate as in 1996 (its annual increase, includingpenalties made Rbl.21.6trln.).

Fig. 1.15.

At such prerequisites, during the budgetexecution, the necessity arises to sequester the expenditures by more than 34%(supposing the expenditures on the State debt servicing are fully financed).The event the Government follows a rigid course, to contest the non-payment ofthe taxes, the incomes of the Federal Budget may amount to 11.4% of the GDP;hence the sequestering of the expenditures at the level of about 30% of theGDP.

Inflation forecast. In November 1996, themain theses of the monetary and currency policies of the RF Central Bank for1997 were published. In particular, they plan the growth of the monetary masswithin the 35% limit, at the annual inflation not exceeding 16%. Thus, in itsforecasts, the Central Bank plans to increase the demand for money by about33percentage points.

To forecast the 1997 inflation, the monetaryautoregression model of the inflation processes was used43. Based onthis model, the two variants of the consumer prices growth are considered (seeFig.1.16). They are determined by the two values of the variable exogeneousfor the model, i.e., the average monthly rate of the M2 monetary mass increase.In the milestones of the monetary policy, declared by the RF Central Bank for1997, the growth rates of M2 are set at the levels 1.7% to 2.2%monthly.

The simulation of the values of the weeklyCPI begins from the middle of February. Further on, the support is thetheoretical value of the prices growth for the antecedent week. In accordancewith the model, the annual inflation in 1997 will be 13.95% for variant1(average 1.09% monthly) and 15.87% for variant2 (average 1.23%monthly).

Profitability forecast for the Statesecurities market. The profitability forecast for theGKOs-OFZs for the first half of 1997 was made on the basis of the regressionaldependence between the profitability, inflation level, and the real issuing ofthe State securities for the coming period44.

The following initial prerequisites wereassumed for the estimate. The inflation level was assumed in accordance withthe second variant of the above forecast (16% annual, i.e., 1.2% monthly), thelevel of the future real issuing was set up based on the average actual excessof the placement volume over the redemption in autumn 1996 (7.6%) and theevaluation of the State debt as of 1January 1997 as Rbl.240trln. The dynamicof redemption is shown at Fig.1.16 The obtained evaluation of the averagemonthly real increase of the interior debt in 1997 is about 1%. As thenumerical analysis shows, if the above prerequisites are realized, theprofitability level of the GKOs-OFZs market will fall to 32% annual by theeffective interest rate, which corresponds to 28% to 29% annual according tothe estimate of the Ministry of finance.

Fig. 1.16.


Officialexchange rate (as of the end of the month), Rbl./US$

Growth ratesof exchange rate

Realeffective exchange rate, US$/Rbl. (June 1992 = 100)

CPI

M2,Rbl.bn

M2 growthrate

M0,Rbl.bn

M0 growthrate

Monetarybase, Rbl.bn

Monetary basegrowth rate

Demultiplier

Net internalassets (Rbl.trln)

Netinternational assets (Rbl.trln)

Netinternational reserves (US$bn)

Jan1995

4048

14.0%

33.2

17.8%

93800

-4.1%

31802

-12.8%

44000

-8.3%

2.132

40.5

3.5

0.865

Feb1995

4473

10.5%

33.1

11.0%

101900

8.6%

34381

8.1%

47600

8.2%

2.141

42

5.6

1.252

March1995

4897

9.5%

33.4

8.9%

107300

5.3%

35240

2.5%

49900

4.8%

2.150

40.8

9.1

1.858

Apr1995

5130

4.8%

32.3

8.5%

123200

14.8%

41639

18.2%

57300

14.8%

2.150

46

11.3

2.203

May1995

4995

-2.6%

29.2

7.9%

138200

12.2%

45459

9.2%

64000

11.7%

2.159

44.2

19.8

3.964

June1995

4538

-9.1%

24.9

6.7%

156600

13.3%

54574

20.1%

73700

15.2%

2.125

47.5

26.2

5.773

July1995

4415

-2.7%

23.2

5.4%

165000

5.4%

62400

14.3%

81600

10.7%

2.022

55.1

26.5

6.002

Aug1995

4447

0.7%

21.6

4.6%

173800

5.3%

65794

5.4%

86100

5.5%

2.019

59.5

26.6

5.982

Sep1995

4508

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