After the elections, the tax inflowsto the Budget grew somehow: by 3.5% in constant prices in July (see Table 1.9).In the same July, the inflows to the consolidated Budget grew by 6.8% inconstant prices (see Table 1.11).
The further dynamic of the tax inflows inaccumulated count shows their stabilization (at the level 8.2% to 8.4% of theGDP to the Federal Budget and 19.0% to 19.2% of the GDP to the consolidatedBudget). As Table 1.7 shows, this process was due to a certain slowdown of thearrears growth.
Hence, no intense reversal occurred in theevolution of the financial crisis after the elections. This fact may have thetwo explanations which do not exclude each other. The first one is theremaining sound “anti-tax motivation” among the economic agents, arising fromboth the weakness of the Federal Government and the fear to lose competitiveposition in the event of observation of the fiscal discipline. The second oneis the engagement of most subjects of the Federation in the regional electionscampaign (mainly from September 1996 to January 1997), which, like in theperiod of the Presidential elections, weakened the possibilities of a firmpolicy in relation to enterprises. It is not hard to see that the above causesof the aggravation of the Budget inflows crisis are of political character andare directly related to the elections.
On the background of the continuing taxcrisis, the certain growth of expenditures of the Federal Budget to 15.0% ofthe GDP in July and to 15.5% of the GDP in August did not allow to reduce theBudget deficit to the level fixed by the Law on Budget for 1996. The deficitscalculated using the Methodology of the RF Ministry of finance was 4.1% of theGDP for July and 4.2% of the GDP for August. According to our estimates, theadditional accounting for the expenditures on the State loans servicingincreases the secondary deficit of the Federal Budget to 6.1% of the GDP inJuly, and 6.5% of the GDP in August.
The data shown in Tables 1.9 and 1.11, allowfor the conclusion on the similarity between the budgetary indexes of theconsolidated and republican budgets. The only significant difference is thatthe smooth decrease of the local budgets deficits smoothens somehow the deficitgrowth of the Federal Budget.
The creation, in autumn, of the TemporaryExtraordinary Commission on the fiscal and budgetary discipline (PresidentialDecree of 11 October 1996) showed the understanding by the executive poweradministration of the fact that overcoming the budgetary crisis is associatednot only with the imperfection of the legislative base and fiscal system, but,first of all, with the presence of the politically influential groups ofinterests, whose economic well-being depends on the tax evasion24. Indirectconfirmations of the emergency of the urgent administrative measures in thefield of taxes collection were both the certain improvement of the taxescollection during the first period of the Commission’s activity and the fierceresistance to these activities among certain economic and politicalcircles.
At the end of the year, the gross taxincomes of the Federal Budget grew from 8.4% of the GDP in October to 8.7% ofthe GDP in November, and 9.7% of the GDP in December (taking into account thefinal circulation), i.e., up to 9.7% of the GDP accumulated. The incomes of theconsolidated Budget grew from 19.1% of the GDP in October to 19.4% of theGDP in November and to 21% of the GDP in December 1996. If counted in constantprices, in December, 1.8‑fold more taxes were collected to the Federal Budget than inNovember; the growth of the real taxes coming to the consolidated Budget made1.6‑fold. The mostimportant source of growth of the tax incomes was the reduction of the volumeof arrears, having made 46% of growth of the tax inflows in December, incurrent price. However, the Government was unable to maintain this trend. Thiswas due, partly to the strongly grown political pressure on the executive powerfrom the politically influential agents and regions, and partly due to the newillness of B. Yeltsin: the administration faced again the politicalincertitude.
A certain decrease of the Budget deficit inSeptember and October should be noted (see Table 1.9). This was favored by thedecrease of the State expenditures in the autumn months. A certain role in thelimitation of the Budget expenditures was played by the Decree “On theEmergency Measures to Ensure the Regime of Savings during Execution of theBudget in the Second Half of 1996” of 18 August 1996. It suspended theeffectiveness of all the decisions on increase of the expenditures part of theBudget, except, for example, the Decrees on payment of pensions (of 8 April and25 January) and Act on provision of military people with living facilities.From the macroeconomic viewpoint, the Decree favored the support of thefinancial stability. However, this document obviously contradicted thepolitical ethics because it broke the promises of the executive power,including the electoral ones.
The comparison of reconstruction of theBudgets of 1995 and 1996 (see Tables 1.12 and 1.13) shows that in 1996,compared with 1995, an insignificant decrease of the inflows to theconsolidated Budget occurred (1.7% of the GDP). The main reduction was in thetax inflows to the Federal Budget (1.4% of the GDP). Meanwhile, the level ofcontribution to the out-budget funds remained the same, though the indebtednessfor the 1996 contributions into, e.g., Pension Fund increased 2.2‑fold. On this background, in 1996,the expenditures and loans minus repayments from the consolidated Budget grew(by 2.7% of the GDP), mainly due to the growth of expenditures of theout-budget funds (by 1.3% of the GDP) and local budgets (by 0.8% of the GDP);the expenditures of the Federal Budget grew by 0.7% of the GDP (withoutnon-controlled expenditure items). These processes resulted in the growth ofthe consolidated budget deficit (by 2.4% of the GDP).
In 1996, if compared with 1995, thesecondary deficit of the Federal Budget grew substantially: in 1996 it was 7.2%of the GDP (with 5.6% of the GDP for the State debt servicing), while in 1995,it was 4.7% of the GDP (with 3.2% of the GDP for the State debt servicing).Hence, a certain growth of the primary deficit may be determined (from 1.5% to1.6% of the GDP).
Reconstruction of State incomes and expenditures of the RussianFederation in 1995
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