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Nevertheless, the electoral campaign had asignificant influence on the monetary policy. The partial implementation of thepromises made by the President in January and February led to, thoughinsignificant, breach of the program coordinated with the IMF. The actualincrease of the monetary base in the first half of 1996 made 24.7% (seeTable1.16).

The most important negative consequence ofthe Presidential elections for the monetary situation was the formation of thehigh interest rates in all the domestic financial markets. This became anotherfactor complicating the crediting of the real sector enterprises22.

* * *

Let us sum up the above. For the whole firsthalf of 1996, Russia was under influence of the coming Presidentialelections.

Firstly, due to the political incertitude,the fiscal discipline reduced sharply. This showed itself in the sharp growthof the non-payments to the Budget and in the expansion of the tax paymentevasion process.

Secondly, the electoral campaign ofB.Yeltsin led to the growth of the expenditure obligations of the Budget and asignificant shift of the expenditures structure toward the repayment of thedebts for the labor remuneration, allowances, pension, scholarships (financedfrom the Budget).

Thirdly, with the low tax inflows and thenecessity to finance the priority expenditures, the need in financing of thegrown Budget deficit grew. At the same time, the political incertitude led tothe significant growth of the premium for risk, mainly, in the GKOs and OFZsmarkets. As a result, the expansion of the State securities led to asignificant increase of the expenditures on servicing of the Statedebt.

Fourthly, the burden of expenses, for whichthe sequestering was performed, was postponed for the laterperiods.

Fifthly, the political incertitude had thegreatest influence on the financial markets, while the commodities marketsshowed the continuing reduction of the inflation expectations. In contrast tonumerous expectations, it was the growth of the interest rates at the economyredollarization, not the inflationist monetary policy, that became the mainnegative consequence of the electoral run.

Sixthly, the problem of the interior debtis not, yet, so acute to have a significant influence on the macro-economicsituation, in contrast with the processes observed in certain developed andunderdeveloped countries23.

Nevertheless, in 1996, the real value ofthe debt began growing. To the beginning of 1997, it reached 16.2% of the GDPwhich is not so small for a country practicing the loans from the financialmarket for only three years. The future dynamic of the interior debt willdepend upon the degree of the political stability and the sufficient will ofthe Government to increase the tax inflows to the Budget.

Hence, the electoral economic policy showedthe obvious inclination of the executive power to choose between two evils. Theevils were to deteriorate either the budgetary policy or the monetary one; thepower selected the first one. This predetermined, quite naturally, the mainoutlines of the economic problems of the post-elections period for both thesecond half of 1996 and the whole 1997. The budgetary crisis was deemed tobecome the main problem of the Government, the source of tension in both theeconomic and political spheres.

However, this process was within the limitsof the common regularities of evolution of post-communistcountries.

Table 1.10.

Stateinterior debt of the Russian Federation in 1993-1997

DEBT

1 January1994

1 January1995

1 January1996

1 January1997

Rbl. bn

% of GDP

Rbl. bn

% of GDP

Rbl. bn

% of GDP

Rbl. bn

% of GDP

State interiordebt

35196.6

21.7

88400

14

188543.6

11.4

365548.2

16.20

1. Indebtednessto Central Bank

29156.7

18.0

58752.3

9.30

62986*

3.8

59583.27

2.64

2. Indebtednessto commercial banks (guarantees issued by Government)

1899.8

1700

0.3

5793

0.3

17057.17

0.76

3. Indebtednessfor securities, incl.

329.5

0.2

18917.4

3

85196.9

5.1

249034.7

11.04

State loan of1992

15

0.009

22

0.003

53

0.0

55

0.00

State Russian interiorloan of 1990

0.35

0.0002

-

State interior loan of1991

80

0.04

80

0.01

80

0.0

79.7

0.00

GKOs

185

0.1

10594

1.7

66118.7

4.0

203600

9.02

OFZs

7597

0.5

37300

1.65

Treasurybonds

6681.4

1.1

7348.2

0.4

-

Treasurybills

1540

0.2

-

Golden certificates

49.1

0.03

1000

0.1

-

State savingloan


3000

0.2

8000

0.35

4. Indebtednessof former USSR for commodity debts, incl.

3204

2

3100

0.5

2500

0.2

5300

0.23

Goal-oriented loan of1990

2500

1.5

2400

0.4

1850

0.1

2300

0.10

Goal-orienteddeposits, checks for automobiles, debts to workers of the agro-industrialcomplex

704

0.4

700

0.1

650

0.0

3000

0.13

5. Indebtednessto the agro-industrial complex transferred into treasury bills

0

5441.6

0.9

30040**

1.8

4480

0.20

6. Indebtednessfor the centralized credits and charged interests of the agro-industrialcomplex organizations carrying out the Northern import

25000

1.11

7. Indebtednessto AOKamAZ transferred into bills of Ministry of finance

1745.5

0.08

8. Indebtednessof the textile industry of the Ivanovo region for unpaid interests

560

0.02

9. Indebtednessfor financing of the expenditures on formation of mobilizationreserve

2389.5

0.11

10. Other,incl.

276.6

0.2

153.6

0.02

2028

0.1

398.027

0.02

Indebtedness toGosstrakh

23.8

0.01

0.0

-

Interior debt of theRF Central Bank accepted from the former USSR

330

0.2

335

0.05

335

0.0

335

0.01

Difference in pricesfor the agricultural feedstock requiring redemption

61

0.04

-

Deficit of republicanBudget in 1991

63

0.04

63

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