WWW.DISSERS.RU


...
    !

Pages:     | 1 |   ...   | 2 | 3 ||

FrydmanR., C.Gray, M.Hessel, A.Rapaczynski (1997): Private Ownership and Corporate Performance. Policy Research Working Paper 1830. The World Bank, Washington.

FrydmanR., C.Gray, M.Hessel, A.Rapaczynski (2000): The Limits of Discipline. Ownership and Hard Budget Constraints in the Transition Economics // Economics of Transition. Vol. 8. . 577–601.

GershenkronA. (1962): Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Harvard University Press.

GertnerR., D.Scharfstein (1994): Internal Versus External Capital Markets // Quarterly Journal of Economics. . 1211–1230.

GilsonS. (1990): Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firm Default // Journal of Financial Economics. . 355–388.

GilsonS., M.Roe (1993): Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization // Yale Law Review. . 871–906.

GlaeserE., S.Johnson, A.Shleifer (2001): Coase Versus the Coasians // Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 116. . 853–899.

GortonG., F.Schmid (1996): Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms. NBER Working aper 5453. Cambridge, Mass.

GreifA. (1997): Contracting, Enforcement and Efficiency: Economic beyond Law. In: Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. 1996. Washington. . 239–265.

GreifA., E.Kandel (1995): Contract Enforcement Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current Status in Russia. In: Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform. Ed. by E.Lazear. Hoover Institution Press. . 291–321.

GrigorievL., B.Kuznetsov (1998): Russian Corporate Governance Revisited. Conference on Corporate Governance in the Former Soviet Union, London.

GrosfeldI., G.Roland (1995): Defensive and Strategic Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe Enterprises. CEPR Discussion Paper 1135, London.

GrossmanS., O.Hart (1980): Takeover Bids, the Free – Rider Problem, and the Theory of Corporation // Bell Journal of Economics. . 42–64.

HandleyK., P.Murrel, R.Ryterman (1998): Law, Relationships and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises. Mimeo.

HarrisM., A.Raviv (1990): Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt // Journal of Finance. . 321–350.

HealeyP., K.Palepu, R.Ruback (1990): Does Corporate Governance Improve After Mergers NBER Working Paper 3348 Cambridge, Mass.

HolmströmB., J.Tirole (1993): Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring // Journal of Political Economy. . 678–709.

HornerM. (1988): The Value of the Corporate Voting Right // Journal of Banking and Finance. . 69–83.

HoshiT., A.Kashyap, D.Scharfstein (1990a): The Role of the Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan // Journal of Financial Economics. . 67–88.

HoshiT., A.Kashyap, D.Scharfstein (1990b): Bank Monitoring and Investment. In: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment. d. by G.Hubbard, University Press of Chicago.

HoshiT., A.Kashyap, D.Scharfstein (1991): Corporate Structure, Liquidity and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups // Quarterly Journal of Economics. . 33–60.

JacobsonR., D.Aaker (1993): Myopic Management Behavior with Efficient but Imperfect Financial Markets. A Comparison of Information Asymmetries in theU.S. and Japan // Journal of Accounting and Economics. . 383–405.

JensenM. (1984): Takeovers: Folklore and Science // Harvard Business Review. . 109–121.

JensenM. (1986): Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers // American Economic Review. . 323–329.

JensenM. (1988): Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences // Journal of Economic Perspective. . 21–48.

JensenM. (1993): The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems // Journal of Finance. . 831–880.

JohnsonS., D.Kaufman, A.Shleifer (1997): The Unofficial Economy in Transition // Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. . 159–221.

JohnsonS., P.Boone, A.Breach, E.Friedman (2000): Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis // Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 58. . 14–186.

JohnsonS., R.La Porta, F.Lopes de Silanes, A.Shleifer (2000): Tunnelling // American Economic Review. Vol. 90. . 22–27.

KangJ.-K., A.Shivdasani (1995): Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Executive Turnover in Japan // Journal of Financial Economics. . 29–58.

KangJ.-K., R.Stulz (1996): How Different as Japanese Corporate Finance An Investigation of the Informational Conflict on New Security Issues // The Review of Financial Studies. . 109–139.

KapeliushnikovR. (1997): Job Turnover in a Transitional Economy: The Behavior and Expectations of Russian Industrial Enterprises. In: Labor Market Dynamics in the Russian Federation. OECD Paris.

KaplanS. (1997): Top Executive and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and Germany, Japan and theU.S. Comparative Corporate Governance. Essays and Materials. Ed. by K.Hopt, E.Wymeersch, W.De Gruter.

KaplanS., B.Minton (1994): Appointment of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers // Journal of Financial Economics. . 225–257.

KarpE., A.Koine (1990): The Japanese Corporate Bond Market. In: The Japanese Bond Market: an Overview and Analysis. d. by F.Fabozzi McGraw Hill.

KenwayP., J.Chlumský (1997): The Influence of Owners on Voucher Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic // Economics of Transition. . 185–193.

KesterC. (1986): Capital and Ownership Structure: a Comparison of United States and Japanese Manufacturing Companies // Financial Management. . 5–16.

KharasH., B.Pinto, S.Ulatov (2001): An Analysis of Russia’s 1998 Meltdown: Fundamentals and Market Signals // Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1. . 1–50.

KornaiJ. (1990): The Road to a Free Economy Norton.

KrugmanP. (1999): Analytical Afterthoughts on the Asian Currency Crisis. Working Paper MIT. Cambridge, Mass.

La PortaR., F.Lopes de Silanes, A.Shleifer (1999): Corporate Ownership Around the World // Journal of Finance. Vol. 54. . 471–517.

La PortaR., F.Lopes de Silanes, A.Shleifer, A.Vishny (1998a): Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World. NBER Working Paper 6594. Cambridge, Mass.

La PortaR., F.Lopes de Silanes, A.Shleifer, A.Vishny (1998b): Law and Finance // The Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 106. . 1113–1155.

LauL., Y.Qian, G.Roland (2000): Reform without Losers: an Interpretation of China's Dual Track Approach to Reform // Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 108. . 120–163.

LeaseR., J.McConnel, W.Mikkelson (1983): The Market Value of Control in Publicity Traded Corporations // Journal of Financial Economics. . 439–471.

LeaseR., J.McConnel, W.Mikkelson (1984): The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations // Journal of Business. . 443–467.

LevineR., N.Loyaza, T.Beck (2000): Financial Intermediary Development and Economic Growth: causality and Causes // Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 46. . 31–77.

LichtenbergF. (1992): Corporate Takeovers and Productivity. MIT Press.

LichtenbergF., G.Pushner (1992): Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance in Japan. NBER Working Paper 4092. Cambridge Mass.

MalleS. (1994): La Privatisation en Russie: spécifité, objectifs et agents. Capitalismes à l’Est: un accouchement difficile. Economica.

MarcinćinA., S.Van Wijnbergen (1997): The Impact of Czech Privatization Methods on Enterprise Performance Incorporating Initial Selection Bias Correction // Economics of Transition. . 289–304.

MartinK., J.McConnel (1991): Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover // Journal of Finance. . 671–688.

MayerC. (1998): Financial Systems and Corporate Governance: a Review of the International Evidence // Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Vol. 154. . 144–165.

MeadeJ. (1972): The Theory of Labor – Managed Firms and of Profit Sharing // Economic Journal. . 402–428.

MegginsonW. (1990): Restricted Voting Stock, Aquisition Premiums, and the Market Value of Corporate Control // Financial Review. . 175–198.

MegginsonW., J.Netter (2001): From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization // Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 39. . 321–389.

MegginsonW., R.Nash, M.Van Randenborg (1994): The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis // Journal of Finance. . 403–452.

MorckR., A.Shleifer, R.Vishny (1988): Management Ownership and Market Valuation: an Empirical Analysis // Journal of Financial Economics. . 293–315.

MorckR., B.Yeng, W.Yu (2000): The Information Contents of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Price Movements // Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 58. . 215–260.

MorckR., M.Nakamura (1999): Banks and Corporate Control in Japan // Journal of Finance. . 319–339.

MunteanuC. (1997): Employee Share – Ownership in Romania: The Main Path to Privatization // Privatization Surprises . 182–203.

MurphyK., A.Shleifer, R.Vishny (1992): The Transition to a Market Economy: Pifalls of Partial Reform // Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 107. . 889–906.

MurrelP. (1992): Evolutionary and Radical Approaches to Economic Reform // Economics of Planning. . 79–95.

NellisJ. (1999): Time to Rethink Privatization in Transition Economies IFC Discussion Paper 38. Washington.

PhelpsE., R.Frydman, A.Rapaczynski, A.Shleifer (1993): Needed Mechanisms of Corporate Governance an Finance in Eastern Europe. EBRD Working Paper 54. London.

PinkowitzL., R.Stulz, R.Williamson (2001): Corporate Governance and the Home Bias. NBER Working Paper 8680. Cambridge, Mass.

PintoB., M.Belka, S.Krajewski (1993): Transforming State Enterprises in Poland: Evidence on Adjustment By Manufacturing Firms // Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1. . 213–269.

PistorK. (1996): Supply and Demand for Contract Enforcement in Russia: Courts, Arbitration, ad Private Enforcement // Review of Central and East European Law. . 55–87.

PurruckerM. (1983): Bank in der Kartellrechtlichen Fusionskontrolle. Berlin.

RadyginA. (1992): Spontaneous privatization: motivations, forms and main stages. In: Studies on Soviet Economic Development, Birmingham (USA). Vol. 3. 5. Oct.1992. . 341–347.

RadyginA. (1995): Privatization in Russia: Hard Choice, First Results, New Targets. CRCE – Jarvis Print Group.

RajanR., L.Zingales (1998): Financial Dependence and Growth // American Economic Review. Vol. 88. . 559–586.

RapaczynskiA. (1996): The Roles of the State and the Market in the Establishing Property Rights // Journal of Economic Perspectives. . 87–103.

RoeM. (1993): Takeover Politics / The Deal Decade. d. by M.Blair. Brookings Institution. Washington.

RoeM. (1994): Strong Managers, Wear Owners. Printon University Press.

RolandG. (2000): Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets and Firms. The MIT Press Cambridge, Mass.

RowleyA. (1987): Asian Stockmarkets – The Inside Story // Far Eastern Economic Review.

RydquistK. (1987): Empirical Investigation of the Voting Premium. Northwestern University Working Paper 35. Evanston.

Schneider – LenneéE. (1992): Corporate Control in Germany // Oxford Review of Economic Policy. . 11–23.

SheardP. (1985): Main Banks and Structural Adjustment. Australia – Japan Research Paper 129.

SheardP. (1989): The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan // The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Vol. 11. . 399–422.

ShleiferA. (1995): Establishing Property Rights / Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. 1994. Washington. . 93–117.

ShleiferA. (1997): Government in Transition // European Review. Papers and Proceedings. . 385–410.

ShleiferA., D.Vasiliev (1997): Management Ownership and Russian Privatization // Corporate Governance Vol. 2. Insiders and the State. . 62–77.

ShleiferA., D.Wolfenzon (2000): Investor Protection and Equity Markets. NBER Working Paper 7974. Cambridge Mass.

ShleiferA., L.Sommers (1988): Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers / Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequence. d. by A.Auerbach. Chicago University Press.

ShleiferA., R.Vishny (1986): Large Shareholders and Corporate Control // Journal of Political Economy. . 461–488.

ShleiferA., R.Vishny (1989): Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager – Specific Investments // Journal of Financial Economics. . 123–143.

ShleiferA., R.Vishny (1997): A Survey of Corporate Governance // Journal of Finance. . 737–783.

SmithM., B.Amoako-Adu (1999): Management Succession and Financial Performance of Family Controlled Firms // Journal of Corporate Finance. Vol. 5. . 341–468.

SolnickS. (1998): Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions. Harvard University Press.

SommerA. (1991): Whom Should the Corporation Serve The Berle – Dodd Debate, Revisited Sixty Years Later // Delaware Journal of Corporate Law.

SteinJ. (1998): Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia // The Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 96. . 61–80.

StiglitzJ. (1994): Whither Socialism MIT Press.

StiglitzJ. (1999): Whither Reform Ten Years of the Transition. Keynote Address. The World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. Washington.

TaylorW. (1990): Can Owners Make a Big Difference // Harvard Business Review. . 70–82.

TewelesR., E.Bradley, T.Teweles (1992): The Stock Market. 6-th ed. John Wiley and Sons.

The World Bank. From Plan to Market. Washington, 1996.

TiroleJ. (1998): Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand Econometrica.

TiroleJ. (1999): Corporate Governance. CEPR Discussion Paper 2086. London.

Pages:     | 1 |   ...   | 2 | 3 ||



2011 www.dissers.ru -

, .
, , , , 1-2 .