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0

3.43

Year

Saarland

Sachsen

Sachsen-
Anhalt

Schieswig-Holstein

Thuringen

Berlin

Bremen

Hamburg

1975

1.57

1.58

0

0

0

1980

1.78

1.77

0

0

0

1985

2.94

1.86

0

0

0

1990

5.33

2.97

0

4.10

0

1992

6.00

2.86

0

9.42

0

1993

6.17

3.01

0

9.97

0

1994

20.81

2.43

0

22.90

0

1995

21.95

10.76

11.87

1.81

12.00

9.85

24.12

0

1996

21.40

10.61

11.76

1.83

1 2.03

10.60

24.24

0

Source: Author's calculations using datafrom Statistiches Jahrbuch 1998, tables 20.1.3 and 20.1.4.

Table B.3(b) Share of HorizontalEqualization Payments in State Total Revenues (Percentages)

Year

Baden-
Wurttemberg

Bayern

Brandenburg

Hessen

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Niedersachsen

Nordrhein-
Westfalen

Rheinland-
Pfalz

1975

-2.26

1.13

-1.17

3.43

-0.88

2.71

1980

-3.29

0.82

-1.14

2.36

-0.11

1.57

1985

-2.65

0.05

-2.23

2.15

0.11

2.00

1990

-3.61

-0.05

-3.52

4.13

-0.06

2.18

1992

-1.92

0.06

-3.83

2.37

0.00

2.54

1993

-1.24

-0.01

-4.25

1.79

0.02

2.91

1994

-0.50

-0.69

-3.61

1.68

0.12

2.44

1995

-3.39

-2.51

3.91

-4.31

4.72

0.79

-2.50

0.11

1996

-3.02

-2.88

4.58

-6.12

5.10

0.94

-2.24

0.83

Year

Saarland

Sachsen

Sachsen-
Anhalt

Schieswig-Holstein

Thuringen

Berlin

Bremen

Hamburg

1975

5.97

3.14

0

1.71

-7.22

1980

6.47

2.80

0

4.49

-3.06

1985

6.63

4.16

0

7.07

-3.20

1990

5.34

3.49

0

10.25

-0.05

1992

5.52

2.02

0

6.93

0.00

1993

5.36

0.90

0

8.91

0.68

1994

4.63

0.34

0

6.21

0.36

1995

1.94

4.24

4.64

-0.65

4.65

11.16

6.37

-0.64

1996

2.51

4.64

5.08

0.07

5.16

12.29

7.26

-2.74

Source: Author's calculations using datafrom Statistiches Jahrbuch 1998, tables 20.1.3 and 20.1.4.

Vertical FiscalImbalances

The vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI)indicates an imbalance between federal (state) revenues and expenditureresponsibilities. A large VFI indicates that the states rely heavily on theFederation for transfers to finance their expenditures. Since 1969, VFIhas been only a transient issue in German federalism. Previously, specialallocations had bridged the gap on an equalizing basis. As mentioned, the needfor this system was obviated by the provision for periodic negotiation betweenthe Federation and the states of shares in value added tax (VAT) revenues,based on shifts in expenditure-revenue positions of the two tiers ofgovernment.

Table B.4(a) depicts the VFI for the federaland state governments. It is evident from the table that VFI became a moresignificant issue following unification. Generally, the data reflect the levelof deficit financing, especially from the mid-1970s to mid 1980s. The Federalgovernment, especially, was forced into deficit finance with the establishmentof the German Unification Fund. Recall that this was to be financed partlythrough an income tax surtax and partly through debt, while thestates’ share offinancing was partly offset by a transfer of shares in VAT revenues. TableB.4(b) depicts VFI by state. VFI is shown to be a significant problem for theformer east German states.

Fable B.4(a) Vertical Imbalances BetweenFederal and
State Governments (Percentages)
[(Total Expenditures - Total Revenucs)/TotalExpenditures]*100

Year

Federal

State

Year

Federal

State

Year

Federal

State

1950

7.74

4.81

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