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Number of banks with the gov-t contribution over Rb. 50 Thos.

Owner

Total

the share of contribution in the authorized capital

Up to 1%

1to 25%

25to 50%

over 50%

Federal
authorities

33

4

21

4

4

Subfederal

and local

authorities

139

23

87

20

9

State owned enterprises

616

57

403

108

48

*See Table 1

Note: the total number of banks does not include those in which the value of the government stake did not exceed Rb. 50 Thos. as per the balance sheet.

The government share in the authorized capital of the baking system grew from 1up to 22% over year and a half and made up Rb. 32bln. of Rb. 142bln. The growth in the government participation made up 400% against a 160% general growth in the authorized capital during the period in question. In absolute terms, the government investment in banks’ capital made up over Rb. 25bln., of which the share of ARCO is less than 3%, while the overwhelming part of the amount was invested in the only bank- Vneshtorgbank. As a result, as of January 1, 2000, Vneshtorgbank accumulated as much as 70% of all the government funds invested in banks’ authorized capitals (See Fig.2). Sberbank holds its 4th place, though its share in the amount of government investment slid from 6.8to 1.4%. The aggregate share of the four leaders grew sharply (up to 8.3%), while the overall number of banks, the government investment in the authorized capital of which exceeded 1% of the overall amount of investment, dropped to 7, while their aggregate share grew up to 85.7%.

Fig.2

Allocation of the government participation in the banks authorized capitals, as of January 1, 2000

1. Vneshtorgbank RF

2. Bashcreditbank ( Ufa)

3. AK Bars (Kazan)

4. Sberbank RF

5. The aggregate share of the consequent 189 banks

6. The aggregate share of the rest 463 banks, the aggregate share of the government participation in which makes up less than 1% of the amount of the government participation in banks’ authorized capitals

Hence, the concentration of the government participation in the first top ten of banks ranged by the amount of the governmental stake in their authorized capital grew sharply compared with the pre- crisis level. However, the other 13% of investments are still dispersed substantially: the aggregate share of the last 463 banks in the list makes up less than 1% of the government’s capital in the banks’ authorized capital. The government participates, in one form or another, in the capital of almost half the banks that operated, as of January 1, 2000.

The federal authorities had their stake in the capital of 29 banks, subfederal authorities- in 162 banks, and state- owned enterprises- in 608 ( see Tables 3 and 4). As of January 1, 2000, the total amount of the government’s funds in the banks with the government participation, including ARCO, made up Rb.6.1 bln. ( Rb. 10 mln. per bank on average). Finally, as of January 1, 2000, the aggregate amount of the federal authorities’ investment in the banks’ authorized capital made up Rb.22.7 bln. ( Rb. 780 mln. per bank on average). During one year and a half, the share of banks, in which the federal authorities owned over 25%, experienced a growth.

Table 3

The number of banks with the governmental participation, as of January 1, 2000

Owner

with the value of the state package of stock( shares) as per the balance sheet

Total*

Over 10

10to 1

1mln. To

Below 50

mln.Rb.

mln.Rb

50thos. Rb.

Thos. Rb.

Federal

authorities

29

6

7

9

7

Subfederal authorities

and local authorities

162

17

57

58

30

608**

73

198

212

125

* See note to Table 1

** excluding the banks with ARCO’s participation, the authorized capital of which was diminished

Table 4

The distribution of the governments shares in the authorized capital of banks with the governments participation, as of January 1, 2000.

Number of banks with the gov-t contribution over Rb. 50 Thos.

Owner

Total

the share of contribution in the authorized capital

Up to 1%

1to 25%

25to 50%

over 50%

Federal

authorities

22

2

11

3

6

Subfederal authorities

and local authorities

132

21

81

19

11

State-owned enterpises

483

52

319

73

39

*See note to Table 1

** The total number of banks with the governmental participation does not include banks, in which the government stake did not exceed Rb. 50 Thos.

Because of license withdrawal, the federal authorities were deprived of their investment in 9 banks, quitted the capital of yet 10 banks, contributed to the capital of two regional banks and established the Russian Bank for Development. As a result, the federal authorities cut down their presence in all the groups of banks ranged by the government stake in their authorized capital, except the group of banks in which the governmental stake is over Rb. 10 mln. The overall number of banks with the participation of state- owned enterprises dropped by 21%, while the number of banks, in which their contribution is over Rb. 10 mln., grew by 50%. The subfederal authorities have lost their investment in 30 banks, whose licenses were revoked, and quitted the capital of yet 16 banks. At the same time, they acquired a stake in the authorized capital of more than 30 banks. As a result, the total number of banks, to which they contributed, dropped by 8%. At the same time, the subfederal and local authorities also expanded their participation in relatively big banks and diminished that in small and smallest ones ( compared Table 1 and 3). The number of banks, in which the subfederal authorities had stock or shares worth a total over Rb. 10 mln., grew by 70%.

The aforementioned data seem to show that the government has all the grounds to re-value its role in the banking sector and to identify more distinctly the tasks and boundaries of its participation in the banking capital. Should the concept of contracting the government’s direct participation in the commercial banks be adopted, its implementation will face a whole range of difficulties. Considering a large number of banks with the governmental participation in one form or another, it is likely that one would need a preparation stage to evaluate the actual amount of the governmental property in the banking sphere. However, it is yet obvious that the state- owned ( including by enterprises with the governmental participation) shares are fairly varied, both in terms of their per cent equivalent and by their absolute value. A large number of the government packages falls on very small banks, or the governmental share is too negligible, which raises a question as to marginal values of efficiency, for the inclusion those in a program: it may well happen that sales of the governmental stake in some banks would not become economically expedient, especially considering the necessary pre-sale preparation which provides, above all, the cleansing of the problematic banks’ balance sheet. Obviously, it will be hard to find pretenders for the privatization of a very big or a very small stake. One should also take into account the territorial aspect: given that the major part of banks having no governmental participation in their capital, are located in Moscow, accordingly, the percentage of banks with the governmental participation in the regions is often higher than on average.

.

Fig.3

The correlation between the aggregate capital of the banking system and GDP
in the OECD countries and Russia

Note: as concerns the OECD countries, the average index for 1994-97, except Korea ( 1995-1997)

Calculated by: OECD: Bank Profitability: financial assessments of banks, OECD: 1999, International Financial Statistics

Considering the fact that the government concentrated in its hands over 20% of the aggregate authorized capital of commercial banks, in the short- run, privatization of the governmental stake in banks may become contradictory to the task of raising the capitalization level in the sector. The value of the aggregate government stake, as per balance sheet, makes up a. 36% of the capital invested by other parties in the Russian banks’ authorized capital over the last year and a half. It is not that easy to find investors ready to extend such an amount, moreover, if the objective is not just a bold substitution for the government capital, but, at the same time, the providing for the growth in the banking system’s capital. According to our estimates’ the correlation between the aggregate capital of the operating commercial banks and GDP is back to the pre- crisis level ( a. 4.6%), however, it is still at rather a low level, compared, for example, with the OECD countries

L. Mikhailov, L. Sycheva, E. Timofeev

The real sector: factors and trends

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