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Cependant, le passage à la nomination des gouverneursrégionaux peuts’accompagnerd’un durcissement descontraintes budgétaires : nous l’avons déjàaffirmé plus haut enattachant une grande signification tant aux caractéristiques formelles de ladistribution des ressources financières entre les budgets infranationaux (règles formalisées de distribution des transfertsinterbudgétaires,mesures législativesque les autoritésfédérales doivent prendre en cas decrise financièreprovoquée par lesautoritésrégionales etc.),qu’auxcaractéristiquesinformelles propres àla conduite des autorités fédéralespendant la distribution de l'aide financière. De ce point de vue, il estnécessaire des’en tenir aux acteslégislatifsadoptés ces dernierstemps et réglementantles modalités dedistribution de l'aide financière par le budget fédéral,ainsi que d'éviter,dans la mesure du possible, les décisions qui sont quand même souvent prises ces dernierstemps, de soutenir financièrement les autorités régionales en distribuant les recettes supplémentaires du budget fédéral pour préparer les régions à la saison d’hiver, pour mieux équilibrer les budgets desentités de laFédération de Russie etc.


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