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Approved budget

4,991 trln..

12,3 trln..

6,525 trln...

8,125 bln. c d

15 bln.cf

(total 18,5)

18 bln. c (total 23,7)

Received de- facto

7,319 trln..

1,532 trln..

18, 654 trln... b


bln. e

8,33 bln c(total 17,3)


Dividends by the federal packages

115 bln

118 bln

270,7 bln

574,6 mln.

6,15 bln.

Plan 3,5 bln.

- approved budget was adjusted in December 1995, actual income at 70.8% was provided at the expense of loans- for- shares- auctions.

b – including USD 1.875 from the sales of Svyazinvest stock

c – only from the sales of property.

d – adjusted to Rb. 15 bln. in April 1998 (at the level of the government)

e – including Rb.12.5 from the sales of the 2.5% stock of RAO Gasporm.

f – not included in the revenue part o the budget

In 1999, the actual aggregate revenue from privatization totaled Rb. 17.3 bln. ( given that the planned value was 18. 5 bln.). The revenues from the sales of enterprises ( stock packages) has turned out to be almost 2 times lower than the planned indices: Rb. 8.33 bln. vs. 15 bln. planned for 1999. In formal terms, the amount became substantially lower, because of the government’s refusal to sell a number of packages ( 25% + 1 share of Rosneft, 19.68% stock of Slavneft, small stock of Gasprom and RAO UES russia, 25% - 2 shares of Svyazinvest). The said non- accomplished sales may be postponed until 2000.

As a result, the gains from the sales were provided ( as it happened in the previous years) by some individual deals/

On october 29, 1999, the government held a commercial tender with investment conditions on the sale of a 9% stock package of LUKOIL ( RF government Resolution #1423-p) The results of the tender turned out to be traditional: the winner became an off- shore company from Cyprus with a bid at USD 5,000 more than the original price. The actual government’s revenue became USD 3 per each sold share. Such results with almost 100% certainty allow assumption of the continuation of the strategy of self- redemption carried out by the issuer itself ( session of the package to American partners as an option). The 16.6% stock remaining in the ownership of RF may be sold in various ways yet in 2000 ( perhaps, with the golden share remained in the government ownership). Some plans to sell the stock at the foreign exchanges are also under consideration.

Another largest deal of 1999 became the sale of 49.806% of the stock of Tyumen Oil Company (TNK) ( Decree of President # 1413). The original price became USD 66.7 mln., the investment program- 185. 256 mln. ( the aggregate price for 1 share was became 0.16 USD, and there is no market quotation). The set of requirements to a potential buyer allows assumption that, similar to the case of the sales of LUKOIL stock, the deal was arranged for a concrete buyer who is associated with private owners of the control block of TNK.

That is fairly regular, for the specifics of the Russian market is such that with a strict control over the company in place, strategic investors, as a rule, do not intend to purchase non- control blocks ( while such a package is not acceptable for portfolio investors as well). The current problems of TNK, which directly influence the holding’s value, are well known: the need of large investment in Samotlor deposit ( ¾ of the current output), the loss of the majority control over a number of daughter companies ( which did not pay dividends because of financial problems and had to transform the privileged stock into voting stock), etc. In such a situation, the current shareholders may bargain with the state to lower the value of the privatization deal, while in such conditions the government is not at all obliged to accept any compulsory terms and may postpone the sales.

The other kinds of revenue from the government property, nonetheless, have become substantially higher than planned ( Rb. 8.99 bln. vs. 3.5 bln.). Thus, in compliance with the 1999 federal budget, the dividends on the government- owned stock had been projected at the level of Rb. 15 bln., while the actual gain was Rb. 6.15 bln. The revenue from the rent of the federal real estate made up Rb. 2.165 bln. vs. planned 2 bln., and the income from the use of the RF property abroad made up Rb. 315 mln. (vs 200 mln. planned).

At the same time, obviously the success in receiving dividends is related to the possibility of a targeted pressure on the largest companies. Thus, in 1999, in particular, the base for such a sources was also extended: 600 AO=s had to pay dividends to the government ( in 1998 – 200). It would be a tougher challenge to rationalize the revenue from the federal real estate within the country and abroad, at least because of its greater dispersion and difficulties arising with regard to difficulties with the account of actual beneficiaries.

In 2000, there still are many problems related to privatization, and they primarily may cause some concern of those investors who are real outsiders, or well- intentioned buyers. Of the most pressing problems one should note:

  • the already aforementioned danger of re-privatization in Russia on the whole as a factor which may lower the country’s investment attractiveness ( thus, in particular, in 1999 the unofficial rate of enterprises privatized with violations of the legislation was accounted for 40% ( of their overall number);
  • the absence of the normative and legal base for nationalization ( from the investor’s viewpoint, there should be procedures of compensation to investors and procedures of protection of well- intentioned buyers’ interests with regard of already accomplished numerous re-sales);
  • it is necessary to fix the dual approach to the consideration of abuses in the course of implementation of privatization deals: 1) the application of legal sanctions ( including criminal ones) without limitation for the revealed and proved abuses made by authorities and their counterparts; 2) provision for the absolute principle of inviolability of the well – intentioned buyer’s property ( which is adequate to the government’s non- interference in the emerged property structure). The only alternative may become only an absolute compensation for the losses bore by the well- intentioned buyer;
  • the single problem is the informally enforced for the privatization deals a 10-year term of limitation of actions ( on the base of Article 181 of the Civil Code of RF, apparently there is also a need to reduce and legally fix the term of the bringing of a suit on an application of consequences of invalidity of a negligible deal);
  • as concerns the majority of the privatization deals, the problem of their transparency remains actual ( i.e. outsiders still are unaware of the conditions of investment process);
  • in many cases, the sales of a minority ( up to 25%) stock ( especially for foreign investors) is constrained by possibilities of their consequent impact on the decision- making process in the company;
  • the continuous discrimination of insiders and outsiders in the course of selling some stock ( for instance, according to Brunswick Warburg, the terms of the sales of a 9% stock of LUKOIL in 1999 were clearly discriminative for outsiders, as with regard to investments, they were proposed to pay minimum 6 USAD per share vs. 3 USD for insiders. The sales of the TNK and other companies’ stock can be interpreted in the same way);
  • the continuous discrimination of insiders and outsiders from the viewpoint of the level of seriousness of sanctions applied in the event of the failure to fulfill the conditions of privatization deals;
  • the continuous problems, which are related to the dualism of the making of privatization decisions and governing the government property, which had been established yet in 1991 in the course of the creation of Mingosimouschestvo and RFFI. Thus, between 1999 through 2000 both agencies try to identify new spheres of activity ( by initiating projects on control over FSC, the Federal Service for Financial Sanation, etc.). RFFI envisions its future position as some government investment bank that would be granted a right to operate at the securities market, though the level of justification of such a body’s existence is rather unclear.

A. Radygin


2 The difference between the dynamics of deflated indices of execution of the budget and the dynamics of analogous indices in the shares of GDP equivalent May be attributed to the difference between the deflator based upon the price index and the defaltor of GDP

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