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On the whole, if one compares the rise in the number of contractees achieved by the year 2007 with the previous figures, the results illustrated in Figure 1 will definitely lose some of their gloss.

1 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Fig 1. The dynamics of the numbers of non-commissioned officers and other ranks in the RF military organization The meaning of the lines presented in the diagram is as follows. Against the background showing the number of young men reaching military age (thousands of persons in a half-year), the following is shown:

the dynamics of the draft (thousands of persons in a half-year - the bottom line), and the number of noncommissioned officers and other ranks serving under contracts (thousands of persons the dotted line, second from the bottom) and under conscription (thousands of persons the third line).

The overall number of contractees serving in the MOS is represented by a dotted line, because this number, in contrast to the number of draftees set by the RF President non-classified Edicts, is considered secret, and, therefore, it could be estimated only tentatively. But even these estimates indicate that the FTPs successes are very modest. We have not reached the level of the number of contractees attained in the mid1990s. The overall number of non-commissioned officers and other ranks serving under contracts were, until the very end of the FTP, much lower than the number of servicemen serving under conscription. This qualitative characteristic is revealed in more detail by the indicators taken from the FTP and presented below.

So far as the socially significant objectives are concerned, the unevenness of the distribution of the military service burden among the RF citizenry only increased during the period of implementing the FTP. In particular, students of 67 privileged higher educational establishments, up to 20 thousand persons per year, after being trained at the military chairs of these establishments (165 military chairs at other higher educational establishments, will be closed) will become officers of reserve exempted from call-up to military service, while students (up to 3 thousand per year) from a number of other federal higher educational establishments, after being trained at 37 special centers at these establishments will serve as officers for a period of three years, as is stipulated in their contracts. And the majority of graduates of civil educational establishments will serve for a period of one year in the positions to be filled by soldiers and sailors, alongside those who have failed to enter higher educational establishments or to graduate from them. This approach to the problem of conscription violates one of the major, historically justified principles the principle of the universality of military service.

The indicative reflection of the course and the results of the FTP. It should be recalled that any FTP, in accordance with the existing Procedure for its implementation, should be estimated not only qualitatively, that is, linguistically, but also through the use of some quantitative indicators (or indices) specified in the FTP and / or cited by RF top officials, including the Supreme Commander of the RF Armed Forces. Apart from this, the Procedure makes it obligatory for the supervisors of the FTP to inform society as to the degree of the FTPs implementation, by means of these indicators.

In the FTP under consideration, the main expected result was to increase the number of contractees in the military units being switched over to the new system of manning, from 22.1 thousand to 147.578 thousand (under the initial version of the FTP), and then to 138.722 thousand (under the amended version of the FTP). As early as the time of launching the FTP, specialists paid attention to the imprecise setting of the initial number of contractees. This lack of precision had its impact on the form of entering their final number as well. Later on, in the course of adjusting the FTP, the content and the form of entering this first indicator were made more precise, as is reflected in Table 1.

Table The indicative representation of the number of non-commissioned officers and other ranks serving under contracts in the MOS Financing of Fed. Rise in number of contractees, by year Over period of Exec. Bodies 2004 2005 2006 2007 07, total Participant of FTP Ministry of Defense 18215 40842 24405 41897 Ministry of Internal 3880 3881 992 976 Affairs FSB 990 2644 In MOS, total 22095 44723 26387 45517 Those were the targets, set in the FTP. The results were represented much less precisely. Our analysis of the information posted to the website of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade makes it possible to arrive at only one conclusion: the degree of obtaining the first indicators values specified in the Table was not registered, which prevented society (and the authorities as well) from supervising the course of implementing the FTP. The estimation of this indicator as of the end of 2007 is even more complicated. Nothing more precise than the words approximately 100 thousand persons, said with regard to the Ministry of Defense by the head of the General Staffs Main Administration for the Organization of Mobilization, has ever been published.

The conclusion that such a value of the first indicator means a virtual disruption of the FTP has never been voiced by any high ranking official. Moreover, it is being actively rejected by them. What we hear is the assurance that the FTP will be implemented all the same, in the year 2008. However, its term has not been officially extended, and the requested additional 10 billion rubles has not been allocated.

A similar situation has developed with regard to the two other officially entered indicators: indicator one, the number of places for housing servicemen enlisted for military service under contracts in hostels with housing cells and in hostels of a simplified type (126,580 such places were to emerge), and indicator three, the number of places for training servicemen enlisted for military service under contracts (it was necessary to furnish and equip 26,909 such places).

The high ranking officials at the Ministry of Defense are forced to admit the failure to implement the FTP with regard to these indicators as well. In particular, when trying to excuse himself for the shortage of contractees serving in the RF Armed Forces, the head of the General Staffs Main Administration for the Organization of Mobilization shifted the responsibility to the builders. In the afore mentioned interview he has said the following: We have slightly decelerated this process on purpose, because the builders are failing to timely create the corresponding funds of service housing. It transpires from his words that despite the additional financing, the FTPs indicators directly related to construction do not suggest that the FTP has been implemented.

In addition to the indicative indicators, let us consider yet another extremely important indicator the share of contractees in the overall number of non-commissioned officers and other ranks. This indicator, although not included in the FTP, was implied in the text of the so-called White Book 26 of the Ministry of Defense, because an increase in it would have meant a reduction in the number of draftees. In his interview published by the newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda (The Red Star) on 6.11.2004, Head of the General Staff Iu.

Baluevskii stated that by the end of 2007, the number of contractees filling the positions to be held by sergeants and soldiers will rise to 50 %, as a result of which the RF Armed Forces will obtain a rational mixed system of staffing.

As regards the share of contractees attained after the FTP, the November 2007 report of the Minister of Defense cited 45 % instead of 50 %, the annual report of the RF Government approximately 40 %, while our estimates suggest something very different: the word approximately should be read as 36 37 %.

Therefore the present system of manning, when regarded from the point of view of Iu. Baluevskii, is not rational militarily.

Neither this system is rational for society, because the shortage of contractees (by comparison with the estimated value included in the FTP) should be compensated for by increasing the call-up. In time, this would coincide with a sharp reduction in the number of young men born in the early 1990s and now reaching the age of 18. As is shown in Figure 2, the conscript class (CC) which is, at present, more than ten times larger than the number of actual draftees, will be rapidly exhausted in the next few years, its replenishment with able-bodied young men will become equal in numbers with the call-up, and thereafter young men will be called up indiscriminately, which may still be insufficient for adequately coping with the shortage of manpower. The serrated appearance of the graph, reflecting in this case the dynamics of the CC, indicates that the call-up papers will be delivered practically to everybody included in the CC. Plotted as abscissa are the intervals of the completed (2004 07) and the future (2009 -11) FTPs.

2 000,1 800,1 600,1 400,1 200,1 000,800,600,400,200,0,20022003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 () . . / (. . / ) The conscript class (CC) before the beginning of the draft The call-up, in thousands of persons / half year The number of young men reaching military age (in thousands of persons / half year Figure 2. The forecasted dynamics of the call-up to the RF military organization There is a real danger of disruption - this time not of the FTP alone but of the very process of manning the MOS as well. And this disruption may commence even earlier than is shown in the graph because of a more widespread draft dodging.

The meaning of the FTPs results for citizens and society. As regards the other socially significant results expected from the FTP, the state of affairs is equally bad. The case in point is the following objectives stated in the FTPs certificate: the reduction of societys dissatisfaction with the existing system of manning the RF Aktualnye zadachi razvitiia Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Moscow [ Urgent issues relating to the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation]. Moscow: MO RF (the RF Ministry of Defense), 2003, pages.

Armed Forces and other troops, military formations and organs, and with these servicemen being dispatched for military service in the hot spots.

The expected considerable reduction of societys dissatisfaction has not taken place. On the contrary, a new reason for dissatisfaction has emerged, this time on the part of officers not serving in the units of permanent readiness. They are now more dissatisfied, because the level of their money allowance has become lower than that of their colleagues filling similar positions in the units of permanent readiness. And in the nearest future a new dissatisfaction will emerge, as shown in Figure 2, caused by the cancellation of deferments, primarily for young fathers and graduates of higher educational establishments. This dissatisfaction will grow because of the already beginning increase in the size of bribes and in the price of other services in the sphere of draft dodging.

The positive result produced by the reduction in the term of compulsory military service was brought to naught by the cancellation of a number of deferments. The decision not to dispatch servicemen enlisted for compulsory military service under conscription to Chechnya has not been legally consolidated, and the Regulation on Military Service does not eliminate this possibility.

The cost - effectiveness of the results. From the point of view of the military and economic cost - effectiveness of the FTPs results, it is very important to estimate the degree of achievement of the expected results in comparison with the costs. Initially, it was planned so that the sum of 79,091.65 million rubles in the 2003 prices should be allocated to the FTP. Later on, in the course of adjusting the FTP, in parallel with the reduction in the numbers of contractees by 8,856, the expenditures on the FTP were increased to 98,913.million rubles in the 2003 prices! In terms of specific values per serviceman, the expenditures rose from their initial value of 536 thousand rubles per person to 713 thousand rubles per person, or by 177 thousand rubles per person, or by 33 %. Nevertheless, the program has been disrupted.

It is equally important to exactly analyze what the additionally allocated funds were spent on. It turns out that they were spent on items other than those aimed at increasing the attractiveness of military service(although it was its low attractiveness that was singled out in every annual report on the progress of the Program as the main threat to successfully implementing the FTP). Virtually all the additional funds were allocated to capital investments. In the first version of the FTP these expenditures amounted to 34 % (or 27,178.28 million rubles), while in the adjusted version they climbed to 44 % (or 43,577.52 million rubles).

The expenditures on promoting the idea of military service under contracts and on research were on the rise as well. And only the special increment to money allowance introduced in order to increase the attractiveness of military service under contracts remained frozen.

Thus, the main reason for the failure of the FTP is absolutely clear. It is the low attractiveness of military service. Both independent experts and specialists from the Ministry of Defense were of the same opinion in this respect and expressed it in the mass media and scientific publications. The ten percent increase in the afore said increment to be introduced this year cannot be considered an effective measure.

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