WWW.DISSERS.RU


...
    !

Pages:     || 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |   ...   | 17 |
INSTITUTE FOR THE ECONOMY IN TRANSITION RUSSIAN ECONOMY: TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES March 2006 MONTHLY BULLETIN Moscow 2006 Institute for the Economy in Transition, 1996.

5 Gazetny pereulok, Moscow 103918, Russian Federation Phone: (495) 203-88-16 Fax: (495) 202-42-24 E- Mail: todorov@iet.ru 1 Political and Economic Developments of March 2006........................................................................... 3 Budgetary and Tax Policy....................................................................................................................... 5 Monetary Policy...................................................................................................................................... 9 Financial Markets.................................................................................................................................. 12 Investment in the real sector of the economy........................................................................................ 21 Foreign investment................................................................................................................................ 25 The Real Sector of the Economy: Major Factors and Trends............................................................... 30 The IET Business Surveys in March 2006............................................................................................ 33 A military and economic analysis of the development of the RF aircraft industry.............................. 35 Foreign Trade........................................................................................................................................ 40 Formation of New Approaches to The System of Labor Compensations in Educational Sphere......... 43 An appraisal of competition in the Russian banking sector.................................................................. 45 On the Draft Concept for Improvement of Efficiency of Interbudgetary Relations in the Russian Federation over 2006-2008................................................................................................................... Issues discussed at the meetings held by the Government of the Russian Federation on March 2 and 23 of 2006.............................................................................................................................................. A review of budget legislation introduced in March of 2006................................................................ A review of regulatory documents concerning taxation issues, which were made public in February and March of 2006................................................................................................................................ A review of economic legislation: March of 2006................................................................................ Political and Economic Developments of March The outcomes of March 2006 show new trends in the Russias policy. And, first of all, this is the first common day for elections (that took place on March 12) that give grounds for saying so. The new election legislation considered the common day for elections as an important instrument for actions against opposition primarily because holding ten regional elections in one day (exclusive, for example, less important elections of the mayors of regional capitals) requires from federal parties single-step mobilization of considerable financial resources, which is fairly difficult for any party, except for Single Russia. The same is true for the information field. Considering competition between the parties, the common day for elections enables to carry out pinpoint strikes on most strong wouldbe opposition parties in a concrete region which, on the one hand, suits the weaker opposition parties in the same region, and on the other, prevents coordination of actions of the opposition.

However, it was only the rich Khanty-Mansy autonomous okrug where the ruling party collected over 50% (56%). Nizhny Novgorod and Orenburg oblasts overcame the 40% barrier in voting. Worst of all Single Russia showed itself in Kirov oblast and the Republic of Altai, where it could not collect even 30% of votes. While the Republic of Altai historically considered an opposition region, the result of voting in Kirov oblast turned to be rather unexpected. Contrary to what one might expect the ruling party collected less votes in a village than in regional capital. It turns out upon a closer view that in parallel with regional elections of the heads of local government were held in most of Kirov oblast districts, which attracted the administrative resource for them to the detriment of the ruling party lists.

Almost everywhere the second place was occupied by communists with 10-17% of votes. Such a result can be explained chiefly by the fact that Rodina Party lists were barred at regional elections (and it was Altai where the Rodina Party took part in balloting and occupied the second place, forcing back KPRF to the fourth place) and indistinct position of the Rodina leadership, who could not form definite behavior recommendations for their electorate in those conditions. In most cases the power also did not force against communists, considering them intrinsically safe and foreseeable rivals. The electoral barrier was overcome by LDPR, and in some regions by the Agrarian Party, Patriots of Russia (G. Semigin), the as well as by the Russian Pensioners Party, which changed last year its leadership (with not a bad turnout over 17%, reached in Nizhny Novgorod oblast), and by the Russian Party of Life headed by S.Mironov. Some kind of surprise was also the all-round defeat of traditional democratic parties (after the successful last year Moscow campaign), such as Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS), despite the fact in all regions they were represented by one list of voters. The lists of SPS-Yabloko overcame the barrier nowhere, even in Nizhny Novgorod oblast where the local democrats were for a long time patronized by S.Kirienko. this can be explained by a number of reasons. First, the federal democratic parties could not provide any (!) financial support to their regional organizations, which is why the latter could count exclusively on themselves. second and financial crises is also associated with this democratic parties suffer a strong self-identification crisis. The only chance for mobilization of the electorate integration of parties and formation of a new brand is constantly delayed, and its only natural that a liberally-oriented voter gives unambiguous warning to SPS-Yabloko.

The March elections marked a new stage in practice of arbitrary dismissal from elections of unwanted lists and candidates. Besides the dismissal of the Rodina Party under a derisive pretext, illustrative is the case of dismissal from the electrons V.Plotnikov, the mayor of Perm, deputy of the regional duma and a popular entrepreneur. The court qualified as bribery of voters his promises to provide pensioners, students and learners (in the case of his victory) with travel privileges on public transport, as well as to organize for schoolboys free sporting sections and infant circles. As a result, the second place was occupied by against all candidate, who was overhastily left by authority in the bulletin, and in the second round of elections they had not to admit observers to the polling stations. In Bryansk oblast in the by-elections of a deputy of the State Duma the powers forgot to offer a backup of the official candidate, and to protest against the use of administrative resource all the rest of candidates called off their candidatures, which.could entail the abolishment of elections. Alongside with that, the election were held: the court left a candidate from LDPR in the bulletin, appealing that (though no legislation provides for this) in order to call off his own candidature he (allegedly) was to be given a consent on the part of the federal bodies of his own party. Somewhere the power underestimated opposition in elections of the mayor of Orel-city, where the winner was a candidate from the KPRF Party A.Kasyanov, who, as they considered during the campaign, was evidently behind the candidate from the power.

Actually, the March elections put the independent subjects of the political process in a dilemma.

The electoral procedure turns into a show, on the other hand, in order to conduct a political propaganda, nothing is better than to announce, though formal, but elections. A possible campaign on ballot strike (or voting against all) may face both judicial and substantive problems.

And still, the situation is recoverable. The March showed that Single Russia cannot collect the majority of votes even at a low turnout and disqualification from the elections of most bright opponents, and also under the centrally controlled (by Kremlin) administrative resource in all its manifestations from falsifications to organization of actually free campaign of the ruling party. If the opposition finds ways to explain to citizens lack of logic in voting for false-brands that demonstrate alternatives only for show (its clear that such parties as the Russian Pensioners Party, the Russian Party of Life and Patriots of Russia are nothing more than a brand), the powers will have to solve not a simple task of legitimization of the electoral procedure.

At the Party Rodina Congress its leader Dmitry Rogozin, one of bright politicians to whom the party was obliged by its successes in 2003 beginning of 2005, left his post. Rogozin either could not or did not want to come into conflict with the Putins administration, which put forward an ultimatum demand about his resignation, which was supported by discrediting of the party on the state TV channels, the all-round dismissal of Rodina from the elections, and working with regional branches of the party. Disqualification of Rogozin was carried out with the demonstrative cynicism thus, for example, he could not become even a delegate of the congress, as the conference of the Rostov organization that nominated him, was recognized by the court illegitimate at the request of FRS because nationalistic leaflets were allegedly found in the hall. The only thing Rogozin could do to pass his post to the sponsor of his party - entrepreneur A.Babakov, who was loyal to Rogozin. Rogozins supporters explain the thing that happened by an artful maneuver, that will enable the party to survive and take part in 2007 parliamentary elections, and Rogozin (allegedly) remains the real leader. Let alone the question of leadership, which is hardly reconcilable with uncomplaining capitulation before Kremlin requirements, refusal of the protest rhetoric and protest actions, one can see that Rogozin has no instruments (including financial ones) to retain his positions. As concerns Babakov, one can hardly imagine the less suitable figure for leadership in the opposition left-wing populist project Babakov has neither declamatory data nor bright appearance, in reality he is a personification of oligarch, with whom he is (in principle) to fight.

In March 2006 Basmanny court blocked the accounts of Open Russia one of the most known Russian charitable organization, that was established by M.Khodorkovsky and sponsored over the last few years through donations of a number of off-shore organizations. However, not the aforementioned but the following thing is surprising: During several months Open Russia kept the money on their own accounts and did not transfer them to final addressees for projects. After the actions of Basmanny court it announced about discontinuation of its activities, which is illogical, because in the presence of financial resources their transfer to addressees creates no problems. It looks like the Open Russia sponsors were disappointed with the project, while joiners and human rights defenders lost one of few sources of subsistence.

In March, the Vice-Premier, the Minister of Defense S.Ivanov suddenly strengthened his positions.

He was appointed the head of the renovated military-industrial commission (VPK) under the RF Government, while his deputy in the commission, V.Putilin, obtained a ministerial rank. As the management of the commission states it will not only control the defense business, but will manage defense enterprises. The concrete practice of the commission (including the normative base) still needs to be studied, but its clear already that its activities will be far beyond the scope of a standard consultative body, which most of the RF Government commissions being the case. In March, the head of Rosoboronexport S.Chemezov, one of the persons being closest to S.Ivanov, for the first time confirmed the rumor, that has been circulating on the market since January, on willingness of Rosoboronexport to acquire a big package of VSMPO Avisma. The controlling stake has been divided at this profitable enterprise between V.Bresht and V.Tetyukhin. The enterprise itself is in corporate conflict with Vekselbergs structures and goes through different inspections of the security agencies i.e. holds a vulnerable position. Alongside with that, its present bosses may probably sell it with a bonus (Rosoboronexport, like other enterprises, controlled by the ruling group, can attract in great amounts the resources of the state-owned banks almost without bargaining), however, they will certainly first try to sell the block of shares insignificant for management of financial flows. Not that the fact itself is amazing in this history, in a few months after the acquisition of AVTOVAZ, its more likely the dynamics of Ivanovs ambitions (who was too quickly discarded as a successor by many experts) and his associates.

S.Ivanov carried out another successful public operation The government approved the amendments to the law On military duty and service, which since 2008 reduces the term of service in the army from two years to one year and annul the great number of determents for talented artists, rural medical men, teachers, workers of the military industry, children of pensioners, young fathers, etc).

Pages:     || 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |   ...   | 17 |



2011 www.dissers.ru -

, .
, , , , 1-2 .