However, on the whole, according to the RF Chamber of Trade and Commerce Economic Security department, about of takeovers are of hostile nature, i.e., taking into account the prevailing techniques, are based on buying up of shares with the use of blackmail, threats, or bribery, unlawful access to registers of shareholders, etc18. The obvious economic motive to use unlawful methods of takeovers is the comparison of costs borne in the course of a “hostile” (taking into account the specifics indicated above) and “civilized” methods of takeover: for about US $ 0.5 million (comparable to the annual earnings of the targeted company) spent for legal services, bribery of officials, judges, and bailiffs, the violator may obtain an object worth US $ 5 million.
Moreover, the problem of hostile takeovers carried out with the use of so called “administrative resource” became so urgent in 2002 and 2003 that it required attention on the part of legislators. Thus, in May of 2003, the State Duma held a special hearing concerning the legislative measures aimed at ensuring ownership rights, including cases of hostile takeovers. Among the recommendations voiced during the hearing is the introduction of more strict responsibility for making the respective court rulings (what will require amendments of the legislation pertaining to the juridical system), introduction of responsibility of minority shareholders for lodging claims initiating hostile takeovers, more precise definition of procedures governing shareholders’ meetings and keeping registers of joint stock companies (definition of grounds on which registers may be transferred to other registrars, prohibition to arrest registers), etc. Nevertheless, even introduction of these amendments in the legislation would fail to render the problem less urgent until there remain the respective economic (comparable cost effectiveness of different methods allowing to establish control) and institutional (systemic corruption) prerequisites.
A. Radygin, N. Shmeleva See: Pleshanova O. Slitno i bezrazdelno. Kak obyedinyayutsya rossiyskiye kompanii. – Kommersant, 2004, February 6.
Yefimchuk I. Vzryv sliyaniy. – Finans, 2003, No. 35, p. 15.
Interview of A. Makarychev, the director of the RF Chamber of Trade and Commerce Economic Security department – Kommersant, 2004, February 6. In 2002, 76 per cent of 1870 takeovers were defined as hostile in this context. Apparently, this case is different from the classical definition of hostile takeover as an attempt to obtain control over the financial and economic activities or assets of the targeted company by legal means (for instance, via tender bidding or buying up of blocks of shares on the market) in the situation, where the management of the targeted company or its key participants oppose the transaction. According to a number of other assessments, in 2002 the share of attempted hostile takeovers in the their total number made 85 per cent to 90 per cent (as compared with 65 per cent to 70 per cent in 2001); however, as concerns all completed takeovers, this share was considerably lower – about 55 per cent.
The cumulative mortgage system as a new tool aimed to settle the housing problems of military personnel Among the numerous problems encountered in the process of the RF military organization switching to the new recruitment system, one of the most urgent issues is that the planned measures are implemented in the situation, where the federal targeted program (FTP) has been already approved by the RF Government (in August of 2003), but the design of the new recruitment system is still unclear. The new conditions of the military service have not been determined as yet. The legislation remains the same. Draft laws (including those worked out by IET) are available, however, their discussion and approval is being delayed.
As it has turned out, it is necessary to change not certain stipulations of certain laws, but the whole system of personnel policy. Until now, this term has been used only in relation to the officer corps. However, in 2003 the President and the RF Government took the decision to staff all regular troops (forces), starting with the military units of constant combat readiness and the military units on permanent combat alert, with servicemen recruited on the contractual voluntary basis, and significantly cut the term of conscription based military service. In this situation, the definition of “personnel policy” should be considerably broadened in order to train and retrain all servicemen and provide them with all types of allowances.
As concerns the economic aspects of the problem, there are two major types of allowances: money and housing ones.
The situation relating to money allowances is clear: in order to create incentives for citizens to enter the voluntary contract based service, the levels of money allowances should be raised and maintained above the amount of the average wages and salaries in the country.
The situation in the sphere of housing is aggravated by two well known factors: the lack of necessary military residential housing and the enormous debt of the state to the citizens still serving in the Armed Forces and military pensioners. The line of servicemen having no apartments and in need of improvement of their housing conditions exceeds 170 thousand persons.
Proceeding from the difficulties related to the contract and conscription based recruitment system of the RF military organization, and possible negative consequences, there were more precisely defined the earlier recommendations aimed at the improvement of the personnel policy to be pursued by the military organization, which were worked out by IET. It is proposed to extend personnel policy not only to the officer corps, but also to privates and non-commissioned officers.
As concerns the personnel policy, there was carried out a number of calculations pertaining to militaryeconomic and socioeconomic efficiency of the new recruitment system19. In the course of modeling it was found out that from the financial and economic point of view there should be taken into account not only direct expenditures associated with the transition to the new recruitment system, but also indirect outlays.
Even in the case there is implemented a rational personnel policy envisaging that half of contracted servicemen, who consequently make three 3 year contracts return to the civilian sphere, the expenditures for their dismissal, pensions, and housing provisions turn out to be rather significant. These expenditures should be taken into account and planned in advance.
Any other policy allowing a contracted military personnel to join the military organization “for life,” i.e.
until the retirement, turns out to be a too heavy burden on the state.
Basing on the results of the modeling of personnel policy options and choice of the rational version thereof, there was modeled the cumulative mortgage system (CMS) aimed at provision of housing for all servicemen, including privates and non-commissioned officers serving on the contractual basis.
This model is principally different from the previously analyzed ones, since it not only takes into account the option that privates and non-commissioned officers will be entitled to participate in the cumulative mortgage system, but also in terms of dynamics of the CMS development set forth by the targeted federal program for the period from 2004 till 2007 and is further defined in the “Basic Principles of the State Policies of the Russian Federation Related to Military Development for the Period until 2010.” Besides, there were more precisely defined certain input data as concerns the numbers and rates of entry of military personnel of different categories to the cumulative mortgage system and disentitlement thereof because of being provided with housing or due to other reasons. In the course of the computation there was taken into account that the rate of recruitment of young officers in the RF military organization will be www.iet.ru/files/text/voennoe/seminar.pdf thousand persons a year. As concerns warrant officers, it was assumed that until 2008 the respective rate of recruitment will be at 15 thousand persons a year and later will correspond with the rate of transfer of contracted privates and non-commissioned officers to this category of military personnel.
The share of persons entitled to participate in the cumulative mortgage system was assumed to make: in 10 years – 50 per cent; in 20 years – 30 per cent; in 25 years – 15 per cent; and in 30 years – 5 per cent.
These data should be further verified. As a matter of fact, the military organization is not interested in too early “rooting” of military personnel in concrete localities and garrisons, since this would render new transfers and appointments more difficult. Therefore, there should be created incentives for servicemen to obtain housing via the mortgage system as late as possible. This policy may be implemented, for instance, by making the military personnel to pay interest on the mortgage credit in the case of an early purchase of housing, while the persons using temporary accommodation facilities at the place of service should be granted substantial bonuses over the time of participation in the cumulative system and obtain better housing after discharge.
As concerns contracted privates and non-commissioned officers, the specifics of respective personnel policy (see above) should be designed with the aim to ensure that the average term of service were about 6 years and therefore only a small portion of contacted military personnel (about 1/8) could serve until retirement, therefore, the model recommends a two tier structure of the cumulative system.
All contracted servicemen should be entitled to participate in the first tier of this system (the single cumulative system for military personnel, SCSMP). The second tier (the cumulative mortgage system per se, CMS) should be applicable to the persons whom the law entitles to the right for own housing or an equivalent cash compensation.
The SCSMP should be financed from the budget in proportion to the number of participants in the system, at the same time the savings should be personified. The probable high initial rate of entry in the system of contracted military personnel is not an obstacle, since the respective funds upon facilitating the fast start of the SCSMP operation will be returned to the budget having created the incentives to enlist in the military organization on the contractual basis and thus enabling the military organization to select servicemen deserving the second contract term.
It is assumed that all servicemen, including privates and non-commissioned officers, who made contracts entitling them to participate in the SCSMP, should be entitled to participate in the SCSMP after January 1, 2005. The question if the military personnel serving their first 3 year contract terms should be entitled to participate in the system is still open. In the course of modeling, this option was taken into account.
According to the results of modeling, it has proved more feasible to choose the option, where only privates and non-commissioned officers serving their second contract terms should be entitled to participate in the SCSMP, what permits to include in the system in 2005 many privates and non-commissioned officers, serving their first contract term at present.
In the future, the term of participation in the SCSMP and accumulation of funds should be prolonged if the servicemen make next contracts without intermission. In the case the contract is terminated and no new contract is made (either on the initiative of the serviceman or the Defense Ministry) before the length of service made 10 years, the serviceman should be discharged from the military organization and disentitled from participation in the SCSMP. The amount accumulated in the serviceman’s personal account should be returned to the budget.
As concerns the military personnel with the length of service exceeding 10 years, these servicemen become entitled to participate in the second tier of the system – CMS. Such servicemen should be granted the right to either transfer the respective savings to a mortgage company, or continue participation in the CMS.
Servicemen should have the right to independently choose the option most suitable for them: either purchase housing using the savings accumulated over 20 years, or prolong participation in the CMS and purchase better housing later. Neither commanders, nor the CMS administration should have the right to influence this choice.
While practically all officers have the right to participate in the CMS on condition that they perform their duties and meet status requirements, privates and non-commissioned officers will know that that they face contest barriers and may expect to be entitled for housing only in the case they develop their skills and become warrant officers or ensigns. Therefore, the personnel policy will create incentives for military training and thus facilitate the development of national defense capability.
It is important to note that the company vested with the management of the single cumulative system for military personnel should take into account the necessity to return to the budget the funds made available after servicemen are discharged from the military organization in the way discussed above.
The personnel and accumulation policies described above should create a number of incentives important for the military personnel, the CMS, and the state:
- as concerns persons without higher education, they would be interested to enter military service on the contractual basis as privates or non-commissioned officers and develop their skills, since after 45 years of military service they would be entitled to military pensions and savings sufficient for purchase of housing;
- as concerns servicemen, they would be interested to prolong their contracts and participation in the CMS and at the same time retaining mobility and readiness for redeployment;
- the inflow of budget funds in the CMS would facilitate the its fast launch, later these funds would be returned to the budget at a minimum cost;
- elimination of uncertainty concerning service perspectives of the contracted military personnel: the servicemen willing and deserving to remain in the military organization would switch from SCSMP to CMS thus accumulating funds sufficient for purchase of housing, while the citizens serving one term would return to the civilian sphere without at a low budget costs.
Материалы этого сайта размещены для ознакомления, все права принадлежат их авторам.
Если Вы не согласны с тем, что Ваш материал размещён на этом сайте, пожалуйста, напишите нам, мы в течении 1-2 рабочих дней удалим его.