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The famous above formula, quoted by Hegel in the preface to the book [6, p. 14] published in Berlin in 1821, is ambivalent: positive, because the rational State was modern and democratic, toward which Hegel was striving; negative, because it did not divide the ideal state of the real one, and such was sliding toward justifying the absolutist state [1, p. 175]. Remarkable is that Hegel, in his attempt to understand the state as being rational in itself, had build a science of the state, stating clear that the constitutional state which he has in mind is something else than the absolutist state in which he is living.

He is obviously talking about the modern state, designed to cancel the abuses of absolutism.

In the definition he gives to the existing right, Hegel believes that this meets the national character of a country..., justifying such the specific situation in Germany. He is opposing to the egalitarian theories (Rousseau) but recognizes that people are behaving because of fear for the laws.

Such confessions suddenly reveal to us the German reality: the wills of the loyal subjects of the absolute monarch make permanent the freedom, but because of fear... But these revelations were intimate to the Hegelian theory. The dialectics, Hegel says, needs to demonstrate how freedom evolves from the first step of


right towards Sittlichkeit (true morality). The abstract right is the right of the person and of things. Above it stands the sphere of morality, a sphere that deals with the right of the subjective will in relation with the right of the world. Above morality, as a synthesis of its own and the absolute right, stays the Sittlichkeit, defined as The idea in its existence in and for itself. Thus, the state appears to be the supreme stage of morality. Hegel himself wonders if this scheme corresponds somewhere in the world to a real history, but his desire is that the realm of right to be the realm of achieved freedom which has its origin in the free will and which in turn proceeds the spiritual world as its second nature.

Hegel's model for this substantive ethical spirit is the ancient polis community, in whose rational order, people can find their own freedom and reason, and they know how to achieve them.

Thus, Hegel's concept of the state is similar to Aristotle's.

The state appears to Hegel as the ultimate ethical spirit, even as something divine. It is true that the state should go through a historical evolutionary process in order to develop its idea and to give materiality to the divine reason on earth. Hegel starts from the fact that the state should first be understood as a conscious reality of freedom, while underlining that reality should not be rational as such, but rather relative rational at the stage of historical development.

The rational state, as the actual reality of the objective moral Idea, marks the end of the process that gives meaning to the entire human history: concrete becoming of freedom. For Hegel the form of this State is the constitutional monarchy. We should however emphasize the essence:

The rational State allows overcoming the apparent opposition between the individual freedom and the submission required by the authority of the State. Thus, the State puts an end to the political alienation of people. Hegel's analysis of the state is remarkable in several respects. The most obvious and most known fact is that he was praising the state, supporting the fact that freedom reaches its supreme right [2, p. 61] within the state, and even saying that the state is the march of God through the world. In Hegel's view the state is the culmination of the system of right that he developed in Philosophy of right [2, p. 257330]. For the full realization of freedom, it is crucial for individuals to belong to ethical institutions in general, but also to be good citizens of the rational state.

The German thinker somehow associates freedom with specific codes of conduct and, more specifically, with the individuals destiny of being a good citizen in a rational state. A social order, connected with freedom, will be stable and will reproduce itself only if individuals are oriented toward obligations and private virtues, culminating with the virtues of a good citizen. When an individual is realizing which the virtues of a good citizen are, he will work to protect and preserve the social and political framework that is necessary to achieve his own freedom. Whishing his own freedom, he will enjoy both the objective and subjective freedom.

In the Hegelian state there will be no difference between interior and exterior freedom, no separation, and no tear between individual and collective freedom (the historical moment of reconciliation). The reason is finally understood as an effective freedom when the best interests of citizen coincide with the imperatives of the state. The conflict between individual freedom and State must be overcome: history is achieving this goal, and attests that reason progresses through overcoming conflicts. Gradually, the distance between freedom and its reality is reduced. The aim of history is the moment in which the universal is made, when the freedom of all people becomes objective, as guaranteed by institutions. These institutions are reliable because they are after a universal interest, and they dont want to abuse their power and authority to promote their own particular interests.

This philosophical conception of history is not new: from Anaxagoras there is the idea of a reason that rules the world, and the idea that the Divine Providence is manifesting in the history is a fundamental thesis of Christianity. Until Hegel the reason was not thought as an external reality and a transcendence of humans and nature: but history is precisely the process by which the spirit and the individual are functioning in harmony with one another in an entity. Thus the history, as a movement to harmonize the spirit with the individual, is the fulfilment of freedom.

Therefore the attainment of freedom, spirit, and values in history is not only a process that occurs through individuals, but it is a process that exceeds them through its super-personal and objective character, it exceeds through its greatness and necessity.

This process does not take account of human happiness: the history of the world is not the land of happiness, but this does not preclude the possibility of freedom, happiness, and necessity.

History is a contradiction process, a process made up of contradictions, conflicts, and crises. For Hegel happiness is possible only in times of stability, when the conflict is gone.

An individual is important in history only if he wears the Spirit of the people. Essentially, the history is only concerned with peoples and not with isolated individuals. The spirit is always in motion and a particular state can only be a temporary form.

The decadence and fall of a state marks the transition of the Spirit to another State; the sequence of the states is the true sense of history. The history is rational because it progresses. According to Hegel, we can perceive the meaning of history only if we can explain it through the progress of freedom, which tends to be objective, completed, and at the same time conscious of itself.

The enthronement of the rational state is the end of the universal history, that is, toward what the peoples history is moving, and also what ends this historical process. The end of human history does not mean the disappearance of humanity, but the fulfilment of what is moving from its origins, its realization in a concrete and effective way.

We tried to capture some aspects of the Hegelian political philosophy illustrating, for the reasons outlined above, the German thinker's ebullient optimism in the analysis of political life. Of course, the foundation of the concepts of political philosophy is represented by his idealistic and objective system as well as his dialectic method. The paradigm of Hegels political thinking somehow signifies a development of the ethical paradigm of Greek antiquity; the political, namely the right dissolves in the moral.

What Hegel calls natural law and the science of the state includes, and identifies law with moral. State and law are moral, legal rules coincide with the supreme values. This fact should be dialectically exploited. The realistic spirit of Hegel refuses to close the moral issues inside of conscience: moral issues are also social and political issues.

Ethical life is the community life wherein individuals actively participate, but while they belong to a being which sustains them. It is the Alive Good that exists in the same way that is being made. Hegel repeats here the great ancient theme of virtue, as an assumption of the community manners by an individual. However he also gives right to the modern freedom of the individual, who must integrate into the life of the group without being absorbed by this. The ethical life develops over three moments: family life, social life, and political life.

Of course, the State is the founding ethical environment: an ethical community would only be viable if it contains a political dimension however restricted it might be. The historical development released this dimension for itself, as the ethical moment that supported the others. If family is the ethical life postulated according to its identity, and society is in fact this ethical life postulated according to its difference, the state concretely realizes it as an identity of its identity, and its difference. The rational or true State is not made by individuals through a contract, but it is organized according to various constitutional powers, submissive to one of them, who embodied the whole state, the supreme power.

The strength obtained in this way allows being even more liberal: the citizen is unyoked by the state in his value as a man, value that is fostered in his social life. The Hegelian State, powerful and authoritative, has nothing totalitarian, allowing, inside of it, a civil society to emerge in which the recognized responsibility of solidarity gives up the most important position to the liberal exigency of the individuals assertion.

The State, politically powerful and socially liberal, is for Hegel the truth of the objective spirit. In its essential meaning, it leads to the end of the long way of world history that is fully subordinated to the objective achievement of freedom, as a reconciliation of the individual with his world.

The highlight of the absolute idealism is the one to say that the final reason works in the historical nature. When Hegel writes that we should believe that in this historical nature, known by the spirit, nothing better will happen than what happens, it is obvious that his famous saying thats how things are as an expression of recognition of the order of things may acquire the meaning of things are exactly like this. We may say that his Philosophy of History is, above all, the result of a paradox: the real history is opening to diversity, contingency, and chance, and yet it is possible to discover the profound and coherence logic of carrying this sequence of actions, of individual destinies. The historical process has its own logic, which is an internal logic of reason. The only idea that philosophy brings is simple: reason rules the world and in consequence history takes place in a rational manner [5, p. 55]. Reality is in the order, and reason can have access to this order. Hegel affirms in this way the possibility of absolute knowledge, because there is a unity between thinking and being. The identity between the subject and the object seems to be a necessary postulate of the existence of truth. Therefore, everything can be understood and explained: reality can not be conceivably.

Even mans becoming is rational. Hegel believed that he had actually recognized the essence of History, namely the unity between what is and what should be, because the real world is as it should be. The great lesson of history comprehension is the dialectic lesson, which had been initiated by the most senior representatives of ancient spirituality (Heracles, Socrates, Democrat, Plato, and Confucius) and developed in the modern era.

The dialectic lesson is the ultimate word of the Hegelian philosophy, so we might appreciate that the idealism of his ontological thinking dissolves itself into a kind of abstract realism in terms of social and political thought. This is the reason for which his concept had been overthrown by the Marxists, in a vulgar materialism manner, which simplified in a brutal manner the role and purpose of philosophy in the understanding of man and world.

References 1. Gulian C.I. (1981), Hegel, Bucharest, Ed. Scientific and Encyclopaedic.

2. G.W. F. Hegel (1969), Lectures on the Philosophy of Right, tr. Virgil Bogdan and Const. Floru, Bucharest, Ed. Academiei.

3. G.W. F. Hegel (1996), Lectures on the Philosophy of Right, tr. Virgil Bogdan and Const. Floru, Bucharest, Ed. Iri.

4. Hegel G.W.F. (1965), Phenomenology of the Spirit, Bucharest, Ed. Academy.

5. Hegel G.W. Fr. (1963), Lecons sur la philosophie de lhistoire (translation J. Gebelin), Vrin, / (1968), Prelegeri de filosofie a istoriei (translation P. Drghici and R. Stoichi), Bucharest, Ed. Academy.

6. Hegel (1956), Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin, Akademie Verlag.

7. Russell B. (2005), The History of Western Philosophy, Bucharest, Ed. Humanitas.

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