WWW.DISSERS.RU

БЕСПЛАТНАЯ ЭЛЕКТРОННАЯ БИБЛИОТЕКА

   Добро пожаловать!

Pages:     | 1 |   ...   | 13 | 14 ||

112. Holmstrom B. Equilibrium long-term labor contracts // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1983. Vol. 98. N 3. Supplement. P. 23 – 54.

113. Holmstrom B., Myerson R. Efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information // Econometrica. 1983. V.51. N6. P. 1799 – 1819.

114. Kalai E., Lahler E. Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium / Game and Economic Theory. University of Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995. P. 89 – 111.

115. Kreps D., Wilson R. Sequential equilibria // Econometrica. Vol. 50. N 4.

P. 863 – 894.

116. Laffont J.J. Fundamentals of public economics. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989. – 289 p.

117. Laffont J.J. The economics of uncertainty and information. Cambridge:

MIT Press, 1989. – 289 p.

118. Laffont J.-J., Tirole J. The dynamics of incentive contracts // Econometrica. 1988. V. 56. N 1. P. 7 – 29.

119. Lambert R.A. Long-term contracts and moral hazard // Bell J. of Econ.

1983. V. 14. N 3. P. 441 – 452.

120. Lehler E., Pauzner A. Repeated games differential time preferences // Econometrica. 1999. Vol. 67. № 2. P. 393 – 412.

121. Ma. C. Renegotiation and optimality in agency contracts // Review of Economic Studies. 1994. Vol. 61. N 1. P. 109 – 129.

122. Malcomson J.M., Spinnewyn F. The multiperiod principal – agent problem // Rev. of Econ. St. 1988. V. 55. N 3. P. 391 – 408.

123. Malueg D.A. Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model with discounting // J. of Math. Econ. 1986. V.15. N 3. P. 217 – 230.

124. Marchak J., Radner R. Economic theory of teams. New Haven – London:

Yale Univ. Press, 1976. – 345 p.

125. Mas-Collel A., Whinston M.D., Green J.R. Microeconomic theory. N.Y.:

Oxford Univ. Press, 1995. – 981 p.

126. Matsushima H. Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring // Journal of Economic Theory. 1989. Vol. 98. N 2. P. 428-442.

127. Moore J. Implementation, contracts and renegotiation in environment with complete information / Advances in Economic Theory. Vol. 1. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1992. P. 182 – 281.

128. Myerson R.B. Game theory: analysis of conflict. London: Harvard Univ.

Press, 1991. – 568 p.

129. Nosal E. Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space // Economic Theory. 1997. Vol. 10. № 3. P. 413 – 436.

130. Perlman R. Labor theory. N.Y.: Wiley, 1969. – 237 p.

131. Radner R. Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principalagent relationship // Econometrica. 1981. V. 49. N 5. P. 1127 – 1148.

132. Radner R. Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting // Review of economic studies. 1986. Vol. 53. N 1. P. 43 – 58.

133. Radner R., Myerson R., Maskin E. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria // Rev. of Econ.

St. 1986. Vol. 53. N 1. P. 59 – 69.

134. Radner R. Repeated principal-agent games with discounting // Econometrica. 1985. V. 53. N 5. P. 1173 – 1198.

135. Rey P., Salanie B. Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: on the value of commitment in contracting // Econometrica. 1990. Vol. 58. N 3. P. 597 – 619.

136. Riordan M., Sappington D. Commitment in procurement contracting // Scand. J. of Econ. 1988. V. 90. N 3. P. 357 – 372.

137. Rogerson W. Repeated moral hazard // Econometrica. 1985. Vol. 53. N 1.

P. 69 – 76.

138. Rubinstein A., Yaari M.E. Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard // J.of Econ. Theory. 1983. V. 30. N 1. P. 74 – 57.

139. Selten R. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games // International Journal of Game Theory. 1975. Vol. 4. N 1.

P. 22 – 55.

140. Spear S.S., Srivastava S. On repeated moral hazard with discounting // Rev. of Econ. St. 1987. V. 54. N 4. P. 599 – 617.

141. Taylor J. Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts // Journal of Political Economy. 1980. Vol. 88. N 1. P. 1 – 23.

142. Thomas J., Worral T. Self-enforcing wage contracts // Rev. of Econ. St.

1988. V. 55. N 4. P. 541 – 554.

143. Tirole J. Incomplete contracts: where do we stand // Econometrica. 1999.

Vol. 67. № 4. P. 741 – 782.

144. Tirole J. Procurement and renegotiation // Journal of Political Economy.

1986. Vol. 94. N 2. P. 235 – 259.

145. Townsend R. Optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information // Journal of Political Economy. 1982.

Vol. 90. N 6. P. 1166 – 1186.

146. Wang G.H. Bargaining over a menu of wage contracts // Rev. of Econ.

Studies. 1998. Vol. 65. № 2. P. 295 – 306.

147. Wen Q. The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information // Econometrica. 1994. Vol. 62. N 4. P. 949 – 954.

Pages:     | 1 |   ...   | 13 | 14 ||



© 2011 www.dissers.ru - «Бесплатная электронная библиотека»

Материалы этого сайта размещены для ознакомления, все права принадлежат их авторам.
Если Вы не согласны с тем, что Ваш материал размещён на этом сайте, пожалуйста, напишите нам, мы в течении 1-2 рабочих дней удалим его.