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Source: Statisticheskiye byulleteni o khode privatizatsii gosudarstvennykh i munitsipalnykh predpriyatiy (obyektov) za yanvar dekabr (Statistical bulletins on the progress of privatization of state and municipally owned enterprises (objects) in January through December) of 1997 (p. p. 33-35), 1998 (p. p. 58 - 61, 121 - 124), 1999 (p. p. 58 - 61, 121 - 124), 2000 (p. p. 41 - 43, 98 - 100), 2001 (p. p. 40 - 42, 97 - 99), 2002 (p. p. 40 - 42, 97 - 99); Sotsialnoeconomicheskoye polozheniye Rossii. Yanvar iyul 2003 (Social and economic situation in Russia. January through July of 2003), p. 139, M., RF Goskomstat, authors calculations.

In 2000 through 2002, the share of public companies where blocks of shares were in the federal, regional, or municipal ownership significantly increased (37.6 per cent in 2000 through 2002 as compared with 29.per cent in 1997 through 1999), although in the absolute terms the number of such enterprises declined almost two times (169 units in 2000 through 2002 as compared with 327 units in 1997 through 1999). There is observed an apparent trend towards a sharp decline in the use of special right Golden share. While in This fact may be explained by the changes in the statistical reporting. Previously, corporatization as a special type of privatization was accounted for as a number of joint stock companies created since the beginning of the year. Since 2000, the number of newly established joint stock companies may be calculated as a sum of enterprises (objects) privatized via the sale of shares of public companies at auctions and commercial tenders, sale of shares to employees, at specialized auctions, and enterprises transformed in public companies where 100 per cent of shares are owned by the state of a municipal entity. It can not be excluded that this change in definitions resulted in the inconsistency of reporting before and after 2000.

1997 through 1999 there were registered 128 such public joint stock companies, in 2000 through 2002 the number of such enterprises made 11 units. As a result, the aggregate share of enterprises where the state maintained any form of property control after formal corporatization remained practically at the same level as in 1997 through 1999 (40 per cent). Unfortunately, the official statistical reporting has failed to present the data on public companies where blocks of shares were transferred in trust management or in holding companies.

The comparison of key characteristics of the state property control in the course of corporatization of enterprises of different ownership forms in 2000 through 2002 and the three preceding years brings rather interesting results (see Table 2).

Table State participation in capital maintained in the course of creation of joint stock companies of different ownership forms in 1997 through Period, Public Public JSC where Public JSC where Public JSC Public JSC ownership form JSC, blocks of shares 100 % of shares granted the where all prior to total are in the federal, are in the federal, special right shares corporatization regional, or regional, or golden share designated for municipal municipal sale were sold ownership ownership unit % unit % unit % unit % 2000 199 72 36,2 6 3,0 8 4,0 96 48,- federal 36 9 25,0 - - 3 8,3 12 33,- regional 138 58 42,0 5 3,6 5 3,6 71 51,- municipal 25 5 20,0 1 4,0 - - 13 52,2001 125 59 47,2 12 9,6 2 1,6 55 44,- federal 11 5 45,5 - - - - 6 54,- regional 93 51 54,8 12 12,9 1 1,1 37 39,- municipal 21 3 14,3 - - 1 4,8 12 57,2002 125 38 30,4 16 12,8 1 0,8 44 35,- federal 10 1 10,0 1 10,0 - - 2 20,- regional 94 29 30,9 10 10,6 - - 22 23,- municipal 21 8 38,1 5 23,8 1 4,8 20 95,2000-2002 449 169 37,6 34 7,6 11 2,4 195 43,- federal 57 15 26,3 1 1,8 3 5,3 20 35,- regional 325 138 42,5 27 8,3 6 1,8 130 40,- municipal 67 16 23,9 6 8,9 2 3,0 45 67,Memorandum:

1997-1999 1114 327 29,4 28 2,5 128 11,5 431 38,- federal 312 56 17,9 1 0,3 37 11,9 131 42,- regional 602 192 31,9 18 3,0 81 13,5 215 35,- municipal 200 79 39,5 9 4,5 10 5,0 85 42,Source: Statisticheskiye byulleteni o khode privatizatsii gosudarstvennykh i munitsipalnykh predpriyatiy (obyektov) za yanvar dekabr (Statistical bulletins on the progress of privatization of state and municipally owned enterprises (objects) in January through December) of 1997 (p. 66), 1998 (p. 78), 1999 (p. 78), 2000 (p. 64), 2001 (p. 63), 2002 (p.

63). M., RF Goskomstat, authors calculations.

First, it should be noted that joint stock companies created in 2000 through 2002 mainly based on the enterprises owned by RF subjects before their corporatization (325 public companies out of 449, i.e. almost three fourths (about 54 per cent in 1997 through 1999). The share of companies created on the base of federal enterprises made less than 13 per cent (28 per cent in 1997 through 1999), while the rest (about 15 per cent) were previously in municipal ownership (less than 18 per cent in 1997 through 1999).

Second, the aggregate share of enterprises where the state maintained its property control (for instance, owning a block of shares or using the special right golden share) after corporatization at the federal and regional level changed insignificantly. As concerns public companies created on the base of federal enterprises, this indicator made 31.4 per cent (as compared with 29.8 per cent registered in 1997 through 1999), and 44.3 per cent for public joint stock companies established on the base of enterprises owned by RF subjects (as compared with 45.4 per cent observed in 1997 through 1999). On the contrary, as concerns public companies created on the base of municipally owned enterprises, there the specific weight of enterprises where property control of local authorities was maintained significantly declined from 44.5 per cent registered in 1997 through 1999 to 26.9 per cent in through 2003. It should also be noted that in the course of corporatization of federal and regional enterprises there increased the share of public companies where blocks of shares were owned by the state, while in the course of corporatization of regional and municipal enterprises the similar development was registered in the case of the share of public companies where 100 per cent of shares were owned by the authorities of respective level.

Third, the indicator of the share of public joint stock companies all shares in which were sold may be an indicator of quality of work of state agencies regulating property relations, attractiveness of property designated for sale, and investment climate. From this point of view there may be noted an increase in the share of such enterprises at the regional (from 35.7 per cent to 40 per cent) and municipal (from 42.5 per cent to 67.2 per cent) levels. On the contrary, the share of such public JSC created basing on enterprises in federal ownership decreased from 42 per cent to 35 per cent.

The regional and sectoral specifics of state control maintained in the course of corporatization taking place in 2000 through 2002 look as follows.

The creation of joint stock companies on the base of former state and municipally owned enterprises in through 2002 took place only in 36 out of 89 RF subjects, while in the preceding years the statistics did not register the appearance of new joint stock companies in the course of privatization only in 23 regions. From this point of view there should be mentioned Moscow (147 JSC), St. Petersburg (69 JSC), Tatarstan (51 JSC), Bashkortostan, Samara, and Chelyabinsk regions (24 JSC each), Ulyanovsk oblast (17 JSC), Kemerovo oblast (JSC), and Arkhangelsk oblast (12 JSC). In other regions, over the three preceding years in the course of privatization there were created not more than 10 joint stock companies. Therefore, it makes sense to compare the degree to which the state maintained its property control in newly created joint stock companies across territories only as concerns the regions listed above.

Most broadly this method was used in Tatarstan (blocks of shares in all newly created joint stock companies were owned by the state or municipalities), the Arkhangelsk oblast (over 58 per cent of JSC where blocks of shares were owned by the state or municipal entities), Moscow (49 per cent of JSC partially owned by the state and municipalities and 4.1 per cent of JSC subject to the golden share rule). On the contrary, in St. Petersburg only one tenth of newly created joint stock companies were partially owned by the state, although there were registered no cases where the golden share was used, while in the Samara and Ulyanovsk oblasts at no newly created joint stock companies there were used procedures of the state property control.

It also should be noted that the use of special right golden share, which sharply declined in 2000 through 2002 as compared with the figures registered in 1997 through 1999, was detected only in 6 regions, while 6 out of total 11 cases were observed in Moscow. The occurrence of newly created joint stock companies, where 100 per cent of shares were owned by the state, also was highly concentrated. Out of 34 enterprises (across 7 regions), where such procedures were implemented, the majority of cases were observed in national republics: 14 in Tatarstan, 7 in Bashkortostan, 4 in Udmurtia, 2 in Tyva, 1 in Yakutia.

As concerns these features of corporatization across sectors, it should be noted that in 2000 through 2002 retail trade (70 units), industry (40 units, including 12 units in mechanical engineering and metal working), and construction (22 units) were leading in the terms of creation of joint stock companies where the controlling interest was owned by the state. The largest number of public companies with the golden share right was established in the motor industry (3 units) and construction (2 units). Out of 34 joint stock companies, where per cent of shares were owned by the state and municipalities, 15 were registered in industry (including 5 units created in mechanical engineering and metal working), 5 in construction, and 4 in transport and communications.

Since the total number of newly created joint stock companies was small, across the majority of sectors there were observed situations where the share of enterprises, where procedures of the state property control remained in place after corporatization, was extremely high. The only exceptions were ferrous metallurgy, light industry, enterprises rendering freight handling and forwarding services, where all newly created (although very few) joint stock companies were free of the state participation in their capital, as well as printing industry, motor industry, wholesale trade, public catering, enterprises engaged in material and technical supply and sales activities, housing and public utilities, consumer services, and certain services of the social sphere where the share of joint stock companies with state participation was below 30 per cent. At this background there stands out retail trade, where blocks of shares in almost 54 per cent of newly created joint stock companies were owned by the state or municipalities.

Therefore, an analysis of the corporatization process taking place in 2000 through 2002 reveals that the state (at all levels) and municipal entities retained a high degree of property control over enterprises whose shares were sold. The degree of this control did not diminish in comparison with the period of the economic crisis and political uncertainty observed in 1997 through 1999. Moreover, this control became even more tight because of the growing share of enterprises, where blocks of shares were owned by the state. The main field of corporatization were the regions, which in some ways altered the national privatization model and focused on a gradual privatization while maintaining a high degree of property control over enterprises after their formal transition to the corporate sector in the 1990s.

This situation results from the completion of the mass corporatization of state owned enterprises taking place in the mid-1990s. Since the late 1990s, the enterprises, privatization of which depended on certain legislatively set requirements and was associated with the implementation of typical control procedures, have been actively involved in the privatization process. Therefore, it seems logical that among joint stock companies created in through 2002 there was observed a higher specific weight of enterprises, where the state retained direct (via owning controlling interests) or indirect (via inclusion of the golden shares in authorized capitals) property control.

In this connection it should be noted that the RF Property Ministry considers corporatization of state owned unitary enterprises as the major model of transformation of the economic agents existing at present in this organizational and legal form in a medium term outlook. This scheme presupposes the delegation of state representatives to the Boards of Directors of joint stock companies created on the base of state owned unitary enterprises (SUE), what has become an ordinary procedure in the last years. In this case, it becomes apparent that the burden on state authorities increases, since they will have to operate in the framework of the corporate law. In this connection there arises the necessity to carry out a difficult double task: increase the number of state representatives in the managing bodies of joint stock companies and at the same time ensure that they are highly skilled specialists receiving an adequate material remuneration for conscientious execution of their responsibilities.

The possibility to really improve realization of the state interests in the sphere of corporate governance depends on the actually used tool kits and concrete mechanisms. The further necessary components of the improvement of the management of state owned blocks of shares should be:

more clearly defined and regulated activities of the persons representing state interests at stock companies by introducing amendments to the current normative acts pertaining to these issues (for instance, adjustment of the Model contract for representation of state interests of 1996 as amended in 1998, which still remains in force, to the new requirements);

settle the issues pertaining to the introduction of a mechanism creating incentives for the work of each state representative by allotting to them a certain share of dividends derived from state owned blocks of shares;

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