On the basis of the obtained evaluations, one could estimate the comprehensive effective numerical strength of the NCOs and other ranks’ under any system of manning, whatever the absolute numerical strength of this contingent might be in regular forces, and then to plot its dependence on the probability of mobilization deployment, Dm.. In Figure 1, the results of the estimates are presented in the form of shares of the absolute numerical strength, S, which express the resulting effective numerical strength, ESê.
Table The results of estimates for the “unadulterated” methods of manning PP Years of K ESrf Dt, d, Ì ESmr EScr service years S/year 0.5 0.13 0.13 16 2 32 8.32 8.TS 0.TS1 1 0.34 0.24 15.5 1 15.5 5.27 5.TS1.5 1.5 0.50 0.32 14 2/3 9.3 4.67 4.TS2 2 0.62 0.40 13.5 1/2 6.8 4.19 4.PP-1 25 --- 0.67 0 0 0 0 0.PP-2 On the --- 0.59 --- 0.06 0.68 0.57 1.whole includ- 3.5 0.78 0.16 13 1/29 0.45 0.35 0.ing 6.5 0.95 0.18 10 1/58 0.17 0.16 0. 9.5 1 0.10 7 1/116 0.06 0.06 0. > 9.5 1 0.15 0 0 0 0 PP-3 On the --- 0.61 --- 0.08 0.94 0.79 1.whole includ- 3.5 0.78 0.22 13 1/21 0.62 0.48 0.ing 6.5 0.95 0.25 10 1/42 0.24 0.23 0. 9.5 1 0.14 7 1/84 0.08 0.08 0. > 9.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 Table The decoding of the rated parameters’ values Parameter Decoding Dt – the rated length of time spent by a serviceman in MR1 after several years of service in regular forces tabulated in Column 2; the length of time is calculated starting from the moment of demobilization from regular forces until the exclusion from the resource of the first category on passing the relevant age limit d – the rate of transfer of this group of servicemen into MR1, in shares of S per year Ì = Dt*d – the absolute number of persons (in shares of S) of the said group within MR1; in estimates “on the whole” the group indicators are summed up ESmr = Ì* k – the effective number of persons whose absolute number is presented in the previous column; it is similarly evaluated by summing-up the group indicators ESice = ESrf + ESmr – the summary indicator of the potential combat efficiency of the NCOs an other ranks of the armed forces The graphs indicate that if the levels of military threats (and the probability of mobilization) are deemed to be low, the indicator of comprehensive effective numerical strength, ESê turns out to be higher in the armies manned on a voluntary basis. At the values of the Dm probability approaching 7%, all the “unadulterated” personnel policy of manning become almost similar in their effectiveness.
When the Dm value is higher than 7%, it becomes more effective to man the army with draftees.
This makes it possible to offer an explanation as to the contemporary world’s practice of using various systems of manning and various terms of service, which differ from state to state42.
The states which consider any aggression against them to be unlikely, because they are protected either by their own strength or by the inclusion in military-political alliances, as a rule, cancel the draft. It should be noted that to cancel the draft would be equally logical for the states which are planning to resort to preventive military actions outside of their national borders. Of greater use for them will be professional soldiers (both in regular forces and in reserve) and not the mobilization manpower resource.
S. Kostiaev, S. Zolovkin, V. Shan’kov. Pochemu lish’ chast’ Evropy gotova otkazat’sia ot obiazatel’noi sluzhby v armii. (Why only a part of Europe is ready to cancel compulsory military service) // Novye Izvestiia, 19.
The states without any allies to rely on, or those which consider the probability of aggression and, therefore, the probability of mobilization to be high, preserve the system of draft in time of peace, thus attempting to achieve two goals. The first of them is to maintain the combat efficiency of its peacetime army, and to do it cheaply. In this case, the numerical strength of regular forces should be big, and the term of service under the draft should be lengthy (because such service requires minimum expenditure). Simultaneously, the second aim – maintenance of the high effective numerical strength of the mobilization manpower resource – is also being solved because of the sheer numbers of citizens passing through military service under the draft, which substantially increases the size and the combat efficiency of the said resource.
1,1,0,0,0,0,0 2 4 6 8 10 ÑÑ0,5 ÑÑ1 ÑÑ1,5 ÑÑ2 ÊÏ1 ÊÏ2 ÊÏFigure 1. The dependence of the ESê indicator (in shares of S) on Dm (in percent) When giving this explanation to the principles of manning, we deliberately avoid touching upon any political questions concerning one or other state’s political system or its adherence to the principles of peace and democracy, etc.
The methodology under consideration can form a basis for offering estimates regarding the states which prefer the mixed system of manning the NCOs and other ranks’ contingent (including Russia).
In this case one has to assess the generalized effective numerical strength of an army, where a certain part pc of the total number of NCOs and other ranks serve under a contract, while the remaining part, which equals 1- pc, serve under the draft. The effect produced by mixing the ways of manning is estimated by the indicator ESc= pc * ESrf(PP) + (1-pc) * ESrf(TS) + [pc * ESmr (PP) + (1-pc) * ESmr (TS)] * Pm, where TS and PP are the variants of manning policy - draft and voluntary service under a contract respectively.
The norms of mixing the ways of manning can be different. The easiest norm – fifty-fifty – was repeatedly spoken in favor of by Russia’s military leadership. At present, the RF Armed Forces has pc 0,35.
Some of the estimates concerning the possible variants of mixing the “unadulterated” methods of manning are tabulated in Table 4.
The dependencies of ESc on Pm for these variants of military-personnel policy are illustrated in Figure 2, which is similar to that used above for “unadulterated”, unmixed methods.
Table The results of estimates for mixed methods of manning PP Pc ESrf Ì ESmr ESc when EScr Pm=8% PP-1+TS2 0.25 0.47 5.10 3.14 0.74 3.PP-1+TS1 0.5 0.46 7.75 2.64 0.67 3.PP-2+TS1 0.5 0.42 8.05 2.92 0.68 3.PP-3+TS1 0.5 0.43 8.22 3.03 0.70 3.PP-3+TS0.5 0.75 0.49 8.71 2.67 0.74 3.0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 2 4 6 8 10 ÊÏ1+ÑÑ2; pk=0,25 ÊÏ1+ÑÑ1; pk=0,5 ÊÏ2+ÑÑ1; pk=0,ÊÏ3+ÑÑ1; pk=0,5 ÊÏ3+ÑÑ0,5; pk=0, PP1+TS2; pc=0.25 PP1+TS1; pc=0.5 PP2+TS1; pc=0. PP3+TS2; pc=0.5 PP3+TS0.5; pc=0.Figure 2. The dependence of the ESc indicator (in shares of S) on Pm (in percent) for some variants of military-personnel policy of mixed manning When analyzing the results of the estimates, it can be pointed out that different variants of mixing the methods of manning produce results that are approximately similar in terms of military efficiency.
At the same time, two variants – the “PP-1+TS2, when pc=0.25” which was used in the RF until recently, and especially the “PP-3+TS0.5, when pc=0.75” which was offered but has got no approval – seem to be more preferable than the rest throughout the whole range of the expected values of Pm.
Russia has already abandoned the first variant, while the second is being rejected. We are being told that the combination of PP1 and TS1, when pc=0.5, is the “optimal” one. Why so All the estimates indicate that so far as the ESc indicator is concerned, none of the analyzed personnel policies which could be materialized with regard to contractees, including PP-1, has any decisive advantages from the military point of view when the term of service is one year.
The following explanation sounds plausible. The authorities are promoting this variant of “reform”, because they are ready to contemplate only minor concessions to society, whose active representatives insist that significant changes should be introduced into the system of manning. This variant implies a concession that would be real enough, but it will be made – via military officials – only to the illegal parasitic structures benefiting from the bribes offered to them for exemption from military service under the draft in regular forces, which are making use of the drawbacks in its organization. Other wise, the reduction in the term of service would not be accompanied by the cancellation of many deferments.
At the same time, any criticism of the manning system organized as “PP-3 + TS0.5, when pc <=0.75” would be groundless from the military point of view. Such a system could guarantee both a high level of combat efficiency of regular forces and the maintenance of a substantial mobilization resource.
We can add a few more arguments in favor of such a system, in order to further justify its advantages illustrated above on the basis of the ESc indicator. These arguments are concerned with the absolute numerical strength and the structure of the mobilization resource which emerges in the mixed systems of manning. To begin with, when the length of service under the draft is set at 0.5 year, the absolute number of young men, who have received military training and have taken the oath, is the highest. When pc = 0.75, and only one quarter of the total number of NCOs and other ranks are men serving under the draft, the only aim of which is the provision of primary training, the absolute numerical strength of MR1 will be eight times higher than that of the army in time of peace.
Argument number two. With pc = 0.75, the drafting of the required number of young men for 0.5year service would produce the same results as the drafting for 1-year service with pc = 0.5, but its negative consequences for the draftees, their families and the country’s economy would be much weaker.
And the final circumstance. An analysis of the size of the various groups joining MR1 under the variant “PP-3 + TS0.5, when pc <= 0.75”, makes it clear that the ratio between the number of militarily experienced citizens included in the mobilization resource after having served for three years and longer under a contract, with the personnel policy being PP-3, and the number of less experienced citizens who have undergone only 0.5-year-long primary training in training units (or training centers), with the term of service being TS0.5, turns out to be rational (approximately 1 to 10) in this very variant. As a rule (but not always, of course), persons included in MR1 after having served under a contract could become squad leaders in the event of declaration of the state of martial law and mobilization, their squads or other similar groups under their command being composed of militarily inexperienced citizens who have received only primary training. If necessary, this will make it possible to intensify the training of such groups, and, more importantly, to hasten the formation of larger combatefficient units.
If all this is apparent, there arises a question: why the program of further transforming our system of manning the armed forces is based on a concept which is far from being the most efficient Our citizens and society have the right to expect that the authorities, who have started to develop a new federal target program without taking into account the lesson taught by the failure of the previous program, will give them intelligible answers to this and other questions.
The RF Government’s policy of aimed at improving the performance of state academic establishments I. Dezhina The author analyzes the Government’s attempts at developing methods and approaches to assessing the performance of state research and higher educational establishments. Among other things, our analysis addresses the suggested methodology for assessing their activity, as well as the aims of the planned inventory and the ways for its implementation by the authorities. Besides, some alternative approaches to assessing the performance of academic establishments are suggested.
Recently, the Government has initiated a new stage in reforming the organizational structure of the research and higher educational establishments belonging to the state sector of the economy. These are the establishments with the organizational-legal form of institutions, federal state unitary enterprises, or economic societies, where more than 50% of shares (or stakes) in authorized capital are held by the State, and also those economic societies that own more than 50% of shares (or stakes) in their own authorized capital. According to representatives of the RF Ministry of Science and Education, the aforesaid establishments will soon be inventoried for the purpose of assessing their performance and making appropriate managerial decisions43. Thus, more than 3,600 establishments that are in some or other way financed from the state budget will be subject to inventory.
A thorough appraisal of the activity of research establishments is necessary, beyond any doubt. It has long been said and written that the state sector of science does not fit in with the modern system of economic relations. Despite a rise in the budget financing of science in recent years, the expected results have failed to materialize so far: by the science citation index and the number of publications, Russia’s standing in world ratings steadily declines, the level of innovation activity remains low, Russian universities are not among the leaders, etc. At the same time, the Government has been persistent in its attempts to restructure the network of the research establishments since the very beginning of the post-Soviet period. Numerous new methodologies for reforming the network of budget-funded academic institutions, for appropriate management of property complexes, including those of academic research establishments, and for the formation of a network of national laboratories, etc. were mapped for this purpose. However, because of the fact that practically always the task of reforming was entrusted to the very same departments that were in charge of the establishments being reformed, the results of their activities (even when they were not limited to discussions) turned out to be modest at best. Tailored to the conclusions made by independent commissions, any attempts to begin reforming “from the outside” have invariably failed, owing to the inability or unwillingness of the departments to come to a consensus (the state of confrontation between the RF Ministry of Education and the Russian Academy of Sciences with regard to many issues of policy in the sphere of science have become nearly the norm in recent years).