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Итак, слияния и поглощения представляются инновационной деятельностью, в среднем, создающей ценность для акционеров. Рост курсов акций не сопровождается экономическими потерями какой-либо заинтересованной группы. В среднем созданная выгода достается акционерам поглощаемой компании, акционеры поглощающей компании не получают существенных выгод. Эмпирическое исследование российских слияний и поглощений показало, что последнее утверждение справедливо и для России.

Вклад автора заключается в обобщении и систематизации теоретических и практических исследований в области слияний и поглощений, проведенных в США, а также составлении базы данных по российским сделкам слияний и поглощений и получении количественных результатов для используемой модели.

Библиография 1. Еженедельные отчеты инвестиционного банка “АТОН” с 01.01.2001 по 30.03.2003.

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