V. Tiuriukanova 1 - as well as some other researchers2 - on the basis of their studies stressed the fact that ‘the overall number of migrants present in Russia as of the end of 2006 was no more than 7 mln’, including 5 – 6 mln persons arriving as part of labor migration. Selective surveys that were conducted in Russia in 2003 – 2006 revealed that up to 80 % of migrants had no written agreement with their employer, 75 % of migrants received their wages – in part or in full - ‘under the counter’ (’in an envelope’), and 50 % had no residence registration3.
The increasing flows of labor migrants who were registered fully or in part (for example, prior to 2006 they had registration but worked under a contract with an employer who had no permission issued by the migration service; or, they had registration but worked without any contract) or were unregistered, as well as the growing share of illegal migrants had necessitated the introduction in legislation of some urgent alterations, which was then actually done from 15 January 2007 onwards4 (an advising procedure for those arriving under a visa-waiver regime; the possibility to register at the legal address of their employers; a new procedure for obtaining a work permit, etc.). As it usually happens, the new legislative initiatives needed first to be somewhat adjusted on the basis of unhurried and methodical efforts to coordinate practical work with law-making and law enforcement practices. However, on the whole the new ‘migration package’ was perceived as a liberal innovation that was designed to achieve a maximum degree of legalization – to the extent that such legalization can actually be possible in face of Russia’s existing economic realities (when 1/5 of Russia’s own population are work Zaionchkovskaia Zh. A., Tiuriukanova Ye. V. Immigratsiia; put’ k spaseniiu ili Troianskii kon’ [Immigration: a way to salvation or a Trojan horse] Doklad o razvitii chelovecheskogo potentsiala v Rossiiskoi federatsii 2008: Rossiia pered litsom demograficheskikh vyzovov. [Report on human potential development in the Russian Federation 2008: The demographic challenges faced by Russia. M.: PROON [UN Development Program, UNDP], 2009. P. 223 – 225.
Mukomel’ V. I.. Migratsionnaia politika Rossii: Postsovetskie konteksty [Russia’s migration policy: PostSoviet contexts. M.: Dipol’-T, 2005. P. 194 – 198.
Tiuriukanova Ye. V. Prinuditel’nyi trud v sovremennoi Rossii: nereguliruemaia migratsiia i toprgovlia liud’mi. [Forced labor in modern Russia: unregulated migration and the trade in humans]. 2nd ed.. ILO, Geneva, 2006; Karachurina L. B. Osobennosti zaniatosti migrantov v Rossii (po dannym sotsiologicheskogo obsledovaniia) [The specific features of migrant employment in Russia (by the results of sociological surveys)] // Gornye strany: rasselenie, etnodemographicheskie i geopoliticheskie protsessy, geoinformatsionnyi monitoring.
[ Mountainous countries: population distribution, ethno-demographical and geopolitical processes, geoinformational moniroting.] Materials of an international conference. Stavropol – Dombai, 25–30 September 2005 – M.– Stavropol, 2005. – pp. 156 – 165; Problemy nezakonnoi migratsii v Rossii: realii i poisk reshenii (po itigam sotsiologicheskogo obsledovaniia). [The problems of illegal migration in Russia: the realities and the search for solutions (by the results of a sociological survey conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), IOM Bureau in Russia (Ed. By G. S. Vitkovskaia). M.: Gendalf’, 2006, pp. 490 — 498; Mukomel’ V. I. Ekonomika nelegal’noi migratsii v Rossii. [The economics of illegal migration in Russia.] //Demoskop Weekly. No 207 – 208. http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2005/0207/tema01.php For more details, see Karachurina L. B. Migratsionnye protsessy [Migratory ptocesses] // Rossiiskaia ekonomika v 2007 godu: tendentsii i perspektivy. [Russian Economy in 2007: Trends and Outlooks. M.: IET, 2007. Section 4.2. P. 379 – 394.
RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN trends and outlooks ing not quite legally1, and the coefficients applied in order to additionally estimate illegal activities are abnormally high).
The results of the first year of applying the altered legislation demonstrated that the number of migrants obtaining work permits had doubled. Evidently, there occurred some positive redistribution resulting in part of the unregistered migration being channeled into the registered segment – that is, legalization of part of the illegal component. However, every ‘step forward’ in migration policy is usually followed by (at least) a ‘half-step backwards’. Thus, the events in autumn 2006 in Kondopoga (Karelia) resulted in a ban being imposed on employing foreign citizens in retail trade throughout the whole country.
The passive attitude of employers to the campaign aimed at establishing the quotas for attracting foreign workers on the basis of employer applications – the first one to be based on the newly introduced rules (according to the new law, the applications for employing foreign workers in a next year have to be submitted by 1 May of a current year2) – resulted in the quota for ‘visa-waiver’ foreign workers being reduced from 6,000 thousand in 2007 to 1,thousand in 2008. The world financial crisis that ‘officially’ hit Russia precisely at the moment when the quota for a next year was being assigned necessitated its sequestration in order to protect the labor market for the benefit of domestic workers – thus disregarding the requests of employers3. The initially established figure for attracting foreign workforce was 3,976.7 thousand persons (including 1,250.8 thousand persons from the ‘visa-waiver’ countries)4; later on, 50 % of this number of workers was marked as ‘reserve’5, and so the final figures are as follows: 625,4 thousand from the ‘visa’ countries and 1,363 thousand from the ‘visa-waiver’ countries 6.
Another anti-crisis measure was the alteration introduced in the procedure for issuing work permits to foreign citizens. The innovations introduced in this sphere are as follows: a foreign worker who has arrived in Russia from one of the ‘visa-waiver’ countries and undergone the migration registration procedure can now receive a work permit only for a period of 90 days (instead of the previously available (maximum) period of 1 year) during which he or she must The share of those employed in the ‘informal’ sector in September 2009 was 21.7 % // Rosstat: Obsledovanie naselenia po problemam zaniatosti. [A population survey with regard to employment problems]. Rosstat. September 2009.
For more details on this subject, see Karachurina L. B. Migratsionnye protsessy [Migratory ptocesses] // Rossiiskaia ekonomika v 2006 godu: tendentsii i perspektivy. [Russian Economy in 2006: Trends and Outlooks.
M.: IET, 2007. Section 4.3. P. 492 – 513.
In late 2008, the Government of Russia decided that in 2009 the quota for permits granting the right to employ foreigners should be 3 mln 977 thousand persons, but that 50 % of this quota should be reserved, that is, not extended to regions.
The RF Government’s Decree ‘On determining, for the year 2009, the need for attracting foreign workers to the Russian Federation’ of 7 November 2008, No 834.
Order of the Ministry of Health Care and Social Development of the Russian Federation ‘On the distribution among subjects of the Russian Federation of the quota for the issuance of work permits to foreign citizens approved by the Government of the Russian Federation for the year 2009’ of 26 December 2008, No 777n.
Simultaneously with toughening the rules, the government also adopted some documents aimed at attracting foreign workers by means of ‘bypassing’ the consolidated rules; consider Order of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of 23 November 2009, No 329, ‘On the procedure for granting to the juridical and physical persons that have concluded civil legal contracts for the construction projects needed for holding meetings of the heads of states and governments of the countries – participants in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 2012...’ // See the FMS’ website http://www.fms.gov.ru/upload/iblock/e60/pfms16041.pdf Section Social Sphere find a job and to conclude with their employer a labor contract for a period of 1 year, after which the work permit can be prolongated (by once again applying to the FMS) for the period remaining until the expiry of the one-year period. From a formal point of view, the ‘90-days rule’ has been introduced in order to reduce the number of those labor migrants who have entered this country under the conditions of visa-waiver exchange and who cannot find employment here due to the crisis. Actually, as this anti-crisis innovation is far from being impeccable from the point of view of law, the employers - who frequently avoided the legalization of their foreign workers even before the introduction of the new procedure – now are even more reluctant to conclude such contracts, thus increasing the segment of illegal migration and informal employment. Moreover, the new procedure has given rise to an absolutely vague situation with regard to foreign workforce statistics, because now it frequently happens so that one and the same migrant in entered in official statistical records of the issuance of work permits as several different individuals: first, when he is issued a three-month work permit, and then every time he applied for a prolongation of his stay.
Evidently, the law enforcement procedures relating to migration registration have also changed. It should be reminded that, from 15 January 2007, the Federal Law ‘On migration registration of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship in the Russian Federation’ (of 18 July 2006, No 109-FZ) came into force in this country, whereby all the foreign citizens arriving for a temporary stay are required to register at the place of their residence within three days of their arrival, while their ‘place of dwelling’ may be ‘residential premises that are not a place of residence’ or ‘another premises, institution or organization in which the foreign citizen or the person without citizenship are situated’1. The surveys conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2007 – 2008) have demonstrated that nearly all the labor migrants learned very soon of the simplification of the registration procedure and of the necessity to obtain a migration registration, and so tried to comply with the established rules (some – by actually undergoing the procedures, while others simply bought the necessary documents).
By mid-2009, the new procedure had already been in force for nearly 2.5 years, and so in a situation of crisis and lowering quotas for the employment of foreign workers the authorities began a furtive struggle against those employers who were allowing their workers to register at non-residential premises, as it was allowed by the law2. The data yielded by the two ‘waves’ of surveys conducted by the Center for Migration Studies3 in August – September 2008 and May 2009 demonstrated that the share of migrants who had undergone the migration registration procedure changed very little. The legalization level in Russia of temporary labor migrants re Article 2 of the Federal Law ‘On migration registration of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship in the Russian federation” (of 18 July 2006, No 109-FZ) //http://demoscope.ru/weekly/knigi/zakon/zakon056.html Yu. F. Florinskaia. Sochi – rai dlia migrantov i bezrabornykh [Is Sochi a paradise for migrants and the umemployed] // Rossiiskaia migratsiia [The Russian Migration]. 2009. No 5 – 6 (36 – 37). P. 27 – 28.
The study was conducted by the Center for Migration Studies (Director – Ye. V. Tiuriukanova) as part of the projects ‘Migration management in conditions of a demographic crisis’ (The McArthur Foundation) and ‘Assessment of Russia’s new migration policy in the sphere of labor migration from the CIS countries’ (supported by a grant of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation). The survey patterns were similar, and so it is possible to compare the labor flows ‘before’ and ‘during’ the financial crisis. The pre-crisis survey took place in August – September 2008 and involved 774 migrants from the CIS countries, who were questioned in Moscow, Kazan, Voronezh, Krasnodar, and Astrakhan. The ‘crisis’ survey was conducted in May 2009 in Moscow, in St. Petersburg, and Krasnodar, and involved 801 migrants.
RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN trends and outlooks mains high, 80 % of migrants register in this country. However, the share of those registered at their place of work dropped nearly by half – from 43 to 22 %.
There are some other indications pointing to further proliferation of the informal shadowy practices in the sphere of migration that have long become habitual in this country. To a various extent, their increasing significance could be contributed to by the three interested parties as follows.