Secondly, although the total migration-driven population growth, according to official data, not only fully set-off the natural population decrease but even exceeded it by 9.8 % (Fig. 1), it still has failed to compensate for Russia’s loss of the able-bodied population, and can hardly compensate for it in the foreseeable future (Fig. 2). In the late 1990s – early 2000s, Russia was experiencing a favorable situation known as the ‘demographical dividend’2, when the overall population number was declining while the number of able-bodied persons was still high and remained on the rise until 2005. From the year 2006 onwards, there began a rapid natural contraction of the able-bodied population, its rate being comparatively low in 2006 (approx. thousand persons), then doubling in 2007 and reaching the level of almost 1 mln persons in 2009.
In accordance with the ‘medium’ variant of the forecast published by Rosstat, the aggregate natural decrease rate of the able-bodied population in 2010 – 2020 will amount to 10.3 mln persons, reaching its peak in 2015 (1,152.7 thousand persons)3. In view of the existing number of employed in the Russian economy, the average decline per annum will be approximately 1.%. Neither the Russian not the Soviet economy has ever experienced a similar shrinkage of the able-bodied age groups. The experience of the first half of the 1960s – when the natural growth rate of the able-bodied population dropped dramatically ( by half, as compared to the 1950s) but did not become negative – has demonstrated that, in order to liquidate the economic consequences of the impact of demographical structural factors, a package of special measures is required, including reasonable attraction of migrants4. The steps that have been taken in recent years in the spheres of migration and investments demonstrate that, so far, society has failed to achieve an adequate understanding of just how acute the situation with regard to providing the national economy with manpower has become. To a certain extent, the crisistriggered unemployment in 2009 was aggravated by a drop in the size of the able-bodied population.
For more details concerning this procedures, see Chudinovskikh O. S. Voprosy sovershenstvovaniia statistiki migratsii v ramkakh tekushchego uchiota i Vserossiiskoi perepisi naseleniia 2010 goda. [Issues of improving migration statistics in the framework of current record-keeping and the 2010 All-Russian Census] // http://www.valerytishkov.ru/ Vasin S. Proshchanie s demograficheskim dividendom [A farewell to the ‘demographical dividend’] // Demoscop Weekly. No 317 – 318. 21 January – 3 February 2008 ã. http://www.demoscope.ru/ weekly/2008/0317/ tema02.php Predpolozhitel’naia chislennost’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2030 g. Statisticheskii bulleten’. [The presumeable population size of the Russian Federation until 2030. Statistical Bulletin. M.: Rosstat, 2009.
For more details concerning this issue, see Zaionchkovskaia Zh. A. Resume doklada. Itogi kruglogo stola ‘Migratsiia kak factor ekonomicheskogo razvitiia. 16 dekabria 2009 [An abstract. Summary of the round-table discussion ‘Migration as a factor of economic development’, 16 December 2009] // Migratsionnyi barometr v Rossiiskoi federatsii [Migration Barometer in the Russian Federation].
http://www.baromig.ru/single/events/reports/Section Social Sphere Source: Rosstat’s data.
Fig. 1. Population increase through migration (thousand persons) and replacement of Russia’s natural population decrease by its increase through migration (%), 1992 – 2009.
Note. For 2009, the estimates of the natural contraction of the able-bodied population are based on the data on the number of population by age group in accordance with the ‘medium’ variant of Rosstat’s forecast as of January 2010 and the published data as of January 2009.
Source: Rosstat’s data.
Fig. 2. Increase (decrease) of the size of the able-bodied population and the increase of Russia’s population through migration, thousand persons, 2000 – 2009.
RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN trends and outlooks Regretfully, due to the limitations of the migration statistics mentioned above, the relationship between the current situation on the labor market and migration flows is poorly reflected in official statistics. For example, the month-by-month arrival statistics of 2009 are almost identical to the trends observed in the previous years that demonstrate the usual winter lows and summer highs (Fig. 3). Nothing peculiar was recorded either in late 2008 (the ‘official’ onset of the crisis) or in the summer season 2009. And the total number of foreign visitor arrivals in Russia as part of international migration in 2009 was by 8 % higher than the same index recoded a year earlier1.
Source: Rosstat’s data.
Fig. 3. Monthly changes in the number of foreign visitor arrivals in Russia (international migration), 2007 – 2009, persons Departure statistics demonstrated a continuation of gradual decline – a trend that has been Russia’s typical feature for a long time and is totally unrelated to the current crisis. The drop in the number of departures by 18 % must not be regarded as an alarming phenomenon: for example, in one pre-crisis year (2006) this index dropped on the previous year (2005) by nearly a half. The number of departures to the far abroad has declined by 14 % and is rapidly approaching zero, which, however, is by no means an indication of what is actually going on; in fact, it only points to the imperfection of the procedures applied in statistical observations and to a change in the emigration channels.
According to Rosstat’s reports for January – December 2009, the number of foreign arrivals amounted to 279.9 thousand. The figure adjusted on the basis of additional estimates (published by Rosstat) is 304.9 thousand. Correspondingly, the reported population increase through migration amounted to 247.4 thousand, and the estimated population growth through migration amounted to 271.6 thousand.
Section Social Sphere As a result, according to the estimates published by Rosstat (which have somewhat upwardly adjusted foreign arrival statistics), net migration amounted to 271.6 thousand persons.
On the whole, it can be stated that the current crisis, in contrast to the one that occurred back in 1998, has had almost no impact on migration (or, to be more precise, on migration statistics)1. During the first crisis the migration flows responded by a rather explicit increase in the number of departures from Russia to the far abroad and a decline in the number of arrivals in Russia. At present, we are either witnessing an extension over time of the response to the crisis (and so it has not as yet been reflected in the statistics), or statistical data represent only a rather inadequate reflection of the current crisis.
Just like it was in previous years, 93 % of all arrivals are related to the CIS countries.
Throughout the 1990s, the repatriation component was unquestionably predominant in crossborder migration into Russia, the migration flows then being mainly represented by ethnic Russians and members of the so-called ‘titular ethnic groups’ of the Russian Federation (their shares in Russia’s population increase through migration over the period 1989 – amounted to 65 and 12 %, respectively). The return of several millions of persons that shared the ethnic and cultural background of the bulk of Russia’s population had a favorable influence on the Russian demographic situation, particularly in rural areas. However, thanks to the effects of many other factors (departures, adjustment to current conditions, the ageing of the remaining population, etc.), the migration potential in recent years has shrunk significantly2. In part, this was the reason why the government program adopted in 2006 (and implemented from 2007 onwards) that was designed to assist in the resettlement in Russia of compatriots lining abroad has never really begun to work. Instead of the initially declared target of receiving from abroad 300 thousand persons within 3 years, the numbers of persons actually received are as follows: 682 persons in 2007; 8,857 persons in 2008; 5,549 persons in 2009; so, their total number does not substantially exceed 15 thousand.
The initial hopes have proved to be futile – that is, that the small amounts of money offered as financial aid3 would actually serve as incentives for those people who remained in the CIS republics because they had failed to act on their desire to emigrate during the years when their more active compatriots were doing so, and that they would resettle in those RF subjects that were assigned for such resettlement by responsible government agencies (as a rule, these were some ‘problematic’ Russian regions). On the one hand, the offered ‘social adaptation’ package and relocation allowance do little in terms of promoting social and economic integration, while on the other, the potential broadening of these financial support measures is fraught with the If the figures of 1.5-times growth of emigration to Israel reported by some experts (M. Tolts, Jerusalem University) are not taken in consideration.
Zaionchkovskaia Zh. A., Tiuriukanova Ye. V. Immigratsiia; put’ k spaseniiu ili Troianskii kon’ [Immigration: a way to salvation or a Trojan horse] Doklad o razvitii chelovecheskogo potentsiala v Rossiiskoi federatsii 2008: Rossiia pered litsom demograficheskikh vyzovov. [Report on human potential development in the Russian Federation 2008: The economic challenges faced by Russia. M.: PROON [UN Development Program, UNDP], 2009. P. 100.
For more details on this subject, see Karachurina L. B. Migratsionnye protsessy [Migratory ptocesses] // Rossiiskaia ekonomika v 2006 godu: tendentsii i perspektivy. [Russian Economy in 2006: Trends and Outlooks.
M.: IET, 2007. Section 4.3. P. 492 – 513.
RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN trends and outlooks danger of stirring discontent among the local population1 and intensifying ‘paternalistic attitudes’ among the resettlers2.
No real interest in this project was demonstrated by either the migrants or the regions that were expected to receive them. The Program envisaged that the federal center should assume a few minimal obligations: to pay the transportation costs, the state duty for the preparation of the necessary documents, the relocation allowance, and the monthly unemployment benefit in an event of absence of appropriate vacancies. The rest – as, by the way, also all the practical matters associated with relocation – was to be taken care of by regional and municipal authorities. However, the necessity to deal with many other tactical issues coupled with regional budget deficits (a typical feature of some 20 – 30 Russian regions even during ‘fat’ years) devalued the strategic usefulness of the Program in the eyes of even those regions that were constantly complaining of chronic manpower deficit, despite all the efforts of the center to impose the Program on them3. There have even emerged several schemes of sabotaging the implementation of the regional ‘compatriot repatriation’ programs: refusal to provide financing for it from their own sources; allocation only of minimum financing; or preparedness to finance the programs only at the expense of employers or the repatriates themselves4. Some regions altogether refused to develop their regional programs.
As a result, at present the State Program actually serves as a kind of ‘camouflage’. This was also noted by President D. A. Medvedev in his speech at the III World Congress of Russian Compatriots: ‘The total number [of participants in the Program] is important, but still more important is the confidence of all those who are outside of Russia that they can indeed return to their Fatherland’5.
The problems encountered in course of the State Program’s implementation – or, to be more precise, its collapse – have revealed the unpreparedness of public institutions to work diligently and methodically when performing the task of receiving and integrating migrants;
however, in view of the looming demographic ‘gap’ with its threat of shortage of able-bodied age groups, such work may become necessary in the nearest future.
Another key area of migration policy since the late 1990s has become regulation of the the processes of temporary labor migration. During that time – even according to official statistics – the inflow of labor migrants into Russia, especially from her post-Soviet neighbors, From the speech delivered by Governor of Khabarovsk Krai V. Ishaev: ‘What moral right do we have to provide the newcomers, at the very outset, with comfortable apartments what in the city of Khabarovsk alone there are more that seven thousand families who still live in houses that look ready to collapse’ (Ishaev V.. Proekty integratsii my obsudim na forume [We shall discuss the integration projects at a forum] // Rossia v ATR [Russia in the Asia Pacific Region]. 2006. No 3. P. 19).
Mukomel’ V. I. Migratsionnaia politika i politika integratsii: sotsial’noe izmerenie [Mmigration policy and the policy of integration: the social dimension] // Rossia reformiruiushchaiasia.[Russia Reforming] Iezhegodnik [Yearbook] / Ed. by M. K. Gorshkov. Issue 7. M.: Institut sotsiologii RAN [Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences], 2008. P. 268.
Beloglazova G. Kordon dlia profi [The state frontier as a barrier to keep professionals out] // Rossiiskaia Gazeta [The Russian Gazette]. 25 November 2009.
Mukomel’ V. I. Migratsionnaia politika i politika integratsii: sotsial’noe izmerenie [Mmigration policy and the policy of integration: the social dimension] // Rossia reformiruiushchaiasia.[Russia Reforming] Yezhegodnik [Yearbook] / Ed. by M. K. Gorshkov. Issue 7. M.: Institut sotsiologii RAN [Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences], 2008. P. 267.
Biriukova L., Sargin A., Novikova A. Sootechestvenniki pereshli granitsu. [Compatriots have crossed the border.] // Gazeta. 2 December 2009.
Section Social Sphere has increased manifold. In 2000, the number of labor migrants obtaining work permits in Russia amounted to 213 thousand; 6 years later, in 2006, this figure became as high as 1,thousand. It impossible to determine reliably just how dramatically the actual indices – as opposed to official statistics – have altered over that period. Zh. A. Zaionchkovskaia and Ye.