Therefore, Russia accumulates the experience of the introduction of protective measures. The legislation in this sphere is relatively new, the first law permitting to introduce protective measures in foreign trade was approved in 1998. At present, protective measures are introduced with respect to the import of refrigerators, ball bearings, and poultry. The protective measures concerning import of starch and caramel were abolished. There is also an agreement with Ukraine limiting imports of pipes from that country, which expires in 2004. There are also antidumping measures with respect to galvanized rolled products from Ukraine and countervailing measures against import of iron rods for concrete constructions. The major objective of the introduction of protective measures is to ensure that domestic producers have competitive power with respect to their Western counterparts.
N. Volovik, N. Leonova Urgent nature of the military reform problems This study continues the military and economic comparison of possible variants of stepping up the transition to the contract based system of recruitment and switching to a shorter conscription based service (1 year and 6 to 9 months) in connection to terrorist attacks and the necessity to adequately meet this challenge by simultaneously increasing the military strength of the state and promotion of the readiness of the civil society to parry these terrorist threats.
A series of terrorist attacks, recently carried out in our country by the forces of international terrorism with veiled assistance of shadow political structures was perceived by the society as the beginning of a war. The RF President has officially stated the same thing. He also indicated the main means to fight off this peculiar aggression: “this is the mobilization of the nation against the common threat.
The events happening in other countries demonstrate that the terrorists suffer the most resolute rebuff there, where they confront not only the strength of the state, but an organized, united civil society.” There may be also added another obvious point: in the case we expect that the civil society efficiently rebuffs terrorism, this society, and especially its most active forces, should be in advance prepared for this function.
Therefore, it appears that it would be necessary to overhaul the plans of modernization of the military organization of the Russian Federation, in particular, the new system of recruitment.
As it is well known, in 2003 there was approved the federal target program (FTP) of such transition, envisaging two principally important outcomes::
Rossiyskaya Gazeta of September 6, 2004. “Interventsiya” (Intervention) Address of the RF President 1) recruitment of about 50 per cent of privates and noncommissioned officers on the contractual basis;
2) reduction of the duration of conscription to 1 year.
Both measures should be introduced in 2008. The complete transition to the contract based recruitment to the regular troops is postponed for an indefinite future.
Both two key parameters of the FTP (the duration of the conscription based service and the term of completion of transition to the contract based recruitment of regular troops) have already been met with questions. Now, there arises a new question: do we have the right to strive for only these objectives in the situation of war Is the strength of regular troops, i.e. the “strength of the state” according to the President’s definition, sufficient for the task Is the civil society, especially its section defined as the mobilization resource (MR) sufficiently organized and prepared for the rebuff In order to answer these questions, IET has continued to compare different possible variants of switching to the reduced term of military service based on conscription. The IET approach is based on two key scenarios. The first scenario, offered by the Defense Ministry, envisages the reduction of the term of service to 1 year upon the completion of the FTP. The second scenario, proposed by IET, envisages a more rapid completion of the FTP and the use of conscription based service for primary military training of a larger number of citizens, what can help to increase the strength of the MR, as well as select volunteers for contract based military service. In this case, the term of service for the majority of other military specialized fields may be 6 months. According to the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper12, this variant (more precisely, from 6 to 9 months) was studied as an alternative by the experts of the Administration of the RF President.
The results of comparison of these two variants (and several others) basing on an imitation model were described in the study published in the IET Working Papers series (No. 75, “Challenges and Practice of the Transition of Russia's Military Organization Towards a New Draft System”). In this study, these variants were indicated as B1-2 and B2-2.
The first variant envisages that after the completion of the FTP the transition of military units to the contract based service will be continued in order to achieve the sufficient (in terms of efficient strength and possibilities of selection) strength of contracted servicemen by 2012. Alongside with the variant based on the concept of the RF Defense Ministry (a 1 year service) there was also analyzed the variant envisaging the transition to a six month period of service.
The second variant (B2-2), which envisaged a more rapid switching of troops to the contract based principle of recruitment in order to achieve the sufficient strength of contracted servicemen not by 2012, but by 2008, and a reduced term of draft service (6 months) in this study was supplemented with a variant, where the term of service was 1 year.
Therefore, there were analyzed 4 variants:
• B1-2 – a variant studied earlier;
• B2-2 – a variant also studied earlier;
• B1-2sh – the same variant as B1-2, however, the term of service in this variant is not 1 year, but 6 months starting from 2008;
• B2-2g - the same variant as B2-2, however, the term of service in this variant is not 6 months, but 1 year starting from 2008.
The figures below present some results of the comparison. For instance, Fig. 1 demonstrates the changes in the number of citizens conscripted in these variants.
Krasnaya Zvezda of July 10, 2004. D. Barabash “Otsrochek stanet menshe” (There will be less deferments) В1-2ш В1-2 В2-2г В2-Transition to 0.year of service Transition to year of service 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Fig. 1. The number of conscripts to the RF military organization (thousands persons each six month) It should be reminded that the number of the conscripts is affected by the following factors:
- number of contracted servicemen; it should be at the sufficient level, and latate it should be annually supplemented by the number of contracted servicemen leaving service upon the termination of their contracts;
- the number of conscripts and also the necessity to compensate for the number of those leaving service;
- the number of potential draftees yearly supplemented by the growing young people, this number includes the persons, whose deferments expire in a given year, and diminishes by the number of persons exceeding the conscript age;
- additional conditions relating to the personnel policy, which determine the rate of draft.
The strength of the contingent subject to draft was modeled basing on the available demographic data on the number of young males entering age of 18. in the course of the modeling concerning the rate of draft, especially in the transition period (from 2008 till 2012), there were introduced certain constraints, for instant those relating to the deceleration of the growing required rate of conscription. It permitted to “maintain” for a certain time the contingent subject to draft to the detriment of the maintenance of the total strength. Otherwise, the contingent subject to draft is fast exhausted, thus creating conscription problems after the completion of transition. The graphs in Fig. 1 demonstrate that for switching to the 6 month service period it is necessary to achieve the sufficient number of contracted servicemen as soon as possible. While in the case of variant B2-2 it is required to maintain the strength of conscription at the level of 360 thousand persons in half-year, in the case of variant B1-2sh this strength should be significantly higher, at about 540 thousand persons. Only by 2012 this number will decrease to 360 thousand persons.
A more complete picture may be seen in the course of comparison of the preceding figure with Figure 2.
Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень В1-2ш В1-В2-2г В2-Actual strength of privates and noncommissioned officers B1-2sh Actual strength of privates and noncommissioned officers B2-2g Actual strength of privates and noncommissioned officers B2-Actual strength of privates and noncommissioned officers B2-03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Fig. 2. The total number of conscripts in the RF military organization (thousands persons each six month) It follows from the comparison that in the first half-years after the transition there is observed a decline in the total number of drafted servicemen, and, therefore, the total strength of the privates and noncommissioned officers. This decline in the strength is also observed after 2015 for variants B2-and B1-2 (in the case the term of service is reduced to 6 months). This development is related to the “exhaustion” of the contingent subject to conscription.
However, the maintenance of the total strength can not be the main objective of the reform. First, because the number of draftees is sufficient to ensure contest based selection for contract service. This assumption is confirmed by the graphs presented in Fig. 3.
В1-2ш В1-2 В2-2г В2-08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Fig. 3. The ratio between the number of drafted servicemen and the number of persons required to complete regular troops with contracted servicemen.
Figure 3 demonstrates that both in the case of transition to 1 year service and 6 months service it would be possible to organize the contest based selection. Naturally, in the framework of variants B12 and B2-2g the contest will be more strict than in the framework of variants B1-2sh and B2-2, since there are taken into account the persons serving 6 months to 1 year, who are less likely to make con Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень Весна Осень tracts. In any case, there are people to serve on the basis of contracts, the only thing, which is needed, is moral and material incentives.
And, second, the most important thing is that regular troops will be completed with trained contracted servicemen. From the point of view of the efficient strength expressed as the equivalent number of “professional fighters” (see Figure 4), there is no important difference between the transition to 6 months or 1 year service term. In any case, after 2012 it will be above the present level. At the same time, the impact of more rapid transition to contract based service is apparently indicated in the period from 2008 to 2012. The large number of contracted servicemen will permit to avoid the “dip” of the efficient strength of the military in the period of transition to a reduced term of draft service.
В1-2ш В1-2 В2-2г В2-03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Fig. 4. The efficient strength of privates and noncommissioned officers in the RF military organization. (thousands persons each six month) В1-2ш Absolute strength В1-2ш Efficient strength В1-2 Absolute strength В1-2 Efficient strength В2-2г Absolute strength В2-2г Efficient strength В2-2 Absolute strength В2-2 Efficient strength 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Fig. 5. The absolute and efficient strength of the mobilization resource (1st category) in the RF military organization.
From the point of view of the impact of the mobilization resource on the efficient strength (see Fig.
5), there is also no significant difference between the variants with the exception of certain advantages observed in the case of variant B2-2g in a long term outlook.
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