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c) Customers are free to choose providers of services regardless of their organizational and legal status and the government (municipality) being its founder. This means that government bodies (municipalities) are not obliged to sign contracts with those organizations, which were founded by them and can choose as providers non public organizations or organizations, which were founded by other levels of government if their services are cheaper and of higher quality.

d) Providers are free to choose customers. Public and non public organizations exercise equal rights regarding contractual financing of social service delivery.

e) Consumers have the right to choose provider from those with whom the government (municipality) previously signed a contract for social service delivery on a free of charge or partly paid basis for con sumers. In addition, social service delivery can be accompanied by signing of a contract directly between provider and consumer. How ever, conditions of such contract should not be different from the con ditions of standard contract signed between customer and service pro vider. First of all, such contract cannot envisage payment by customer for rendered services if according to the contract signed with customer service provider took obligations to deliver services to consumers on a free of charge basis.

General for normative targeted financing and contractual financing advantages in comparison with current financing system are perform ance basis, competition between service providers and consequently incentives to reducing costs and improving quality of services. More over, in the social order arrangement these advantages are more pro nounced because under normative targeted financing arrangement compulsory assignments and setting of norms by administrative means, which do not cover all costs of service delivery restricts providers inter est and thwarts competition between them.

Social order arrangement has its shortcomings, which limit possibili ties of its implementation. In this arrangement the cost of social ser vices defies direct administrative government control and is determined by a contract signed by the government and service provider. Competi tion for the placement of the government (municipality) social order should become an instrument aimed at minimizing prices for procured services. However, competition for the placement of social order is ef fective only in competitive markets. When there is a single given ser vices provider on specific territory in case of alternative solvent demand that provider is capable to dictate the price, which can be unacceptably high for the budget.

Due to mentioned feature inherent to contractual financing, it can be implemented only in those spheres where the government (municipal ity) is not tied by rigid obligations for social service delivery in deter mined volumes to all in need on a free of charge basis. It is true of cul ture, sports, social safety net, medical and educational services ren dered above the Program of government guarantees for providing the citizens with free health care and educational standards. Moreover, we should consider that transition to contractual financing arrangement of social service delivery, which previously were rendered by pubic institu tions is connected with the price growth risk even in those cases when the market is rather competitive (for instance, when on a given territory medical services are provided both by public institutions and private organizations). This is connected with the fact that estimate based fi nancing of public institutions, as a rule, does not cover rational need in funds required for corresponding service delivery. This risk is absent only in case on a contractual basis it is planned to render new social services, which previously were not provided. Implementation of con tractual financing arrangement will allow in that case saving funds for creating public institution and provide it with fixed assets and so on.

When there are public institutions, which render certain social ser vices, transition to social service delivery on a contractual basis should be arranged gradually and only in case when there are on a given terri tory several public and non public organizations, which pursue corre sponding social service delivery. In the process of budget planning it is possible to arrange tenders for the right to sign contracts for social ser vice delivery between public institutions and private organizations act ing on a given territory. Norm of financial input calculated on budget capacity for the next fiscal year for the given service delivery should be came a starting price at such tenders exceeding which will result in ten der annulment. When it became impossible to place social order on a tender basis (for example, nun of the tender participants who offered an acceptable to the budget price, or providers who offered acceptable price are incapable to fully satisfy populations demand in correspond ing social services), normative targeted financing should be used.

Combined implementation of contractual and normative targeted fi nancing will allow levelling shortcomings of the latter, which show up in the absence of objective criteria for checking up objectivity of setting on administrative basis norm of financial input for social services.

3) Guaranteeing consumers right to choose service provider under normative targeted financing Consumer should be guaranteed the right to choose social service provider in order to create prerequisites aimed at enhancing competi tion between providers and thus improving quality of services rendered under normative targeted and contractual financing. This envisages that provider no longer have a fixed contingent of consumers (for ex ample, residents on a certain territory) or rigid determination in the con tract (assignment) of number of consumers and (or) the volume of ser vice delivery. The contract (assignment) for social service delivery should determine the price and financing norm per a unit of service and limited volume of services per a consumer. Besides, assignment for social service delivery by pubic or autonomous institution can make provision for minimal number of customers subject for servicing. In this connection the minimal number of customers set in an assignment to public and autonomous institution, which it has to service, must be viewed as an obligation and not as the right of an institution, i.e. the government does not guarantee an institution corresponding volume of funding unless real demand for its services meets the fixed norms.

In addition, in order to avoid uncontrollable growth of budgetary ex penses, it should be provided that the government (municipality) guar antees the consumer fully free of charge service delivery or service de livery with fixed additional payment only in case if their provider is an organization, which has a contract with the government (municipality) for corresponding service delivery. In case a consumer chooses an other service provider governments (municipality) obligation is limited to granting a subsidy for purchasing corresponding services on the bases of fixed prices and marginal volumes of their provision.

In shaping of the budget expenses on certain type social service de livery is made on the basis of their overall volume per total number of consumers on a given territory and norm of financial input (price) per unit of services.

Distribution of budgetary expenses on service delivery between spe cific providers of services under contractual financing arrangement should be carried out on the basis of a fixed contractual price of ser vices and the real volume of delivery (with possible advance in the amount, for example, not more than half of really delivered social costs by the previous accounting period information).

Under normative targeted financing of public institutions97 planning of expenditures is complicated by the need to fix budget revenue and expenditure distribution of allocations between public institutions. In these conditions competition between service providers can be guaran teed by adjustment mechanism for the budget allocations amounts de pending on the difference between projected volumes of service deliv ery and the real volume of provided services. The Budgetary Code of the Russian federation does not envisage implementation of special procedures to achieve it. However, a number of Budgetary Code norms allow carrying out such adjustment. For example, in order to reduce the volume of budget spending in case the volume of really provided social services turned out to be smaller than the planned one, it is possible to apply blocking of public funds spending. According to Article 231 of the Budgetary Code of the Russian Federation blocking of spending re spondents reduction of limits of budget liabilities in comparison with allocations of budget funds or refusal to uphold assumed budget re sponsibilities on a decision taken by head authority of financial body if budgetary allocations according to law (decree) on the budget were granted to budget recipient on certain conditions. However, by the moment of shaping of limits of budget obligations or confirmation of assumed budget obligations these conditions have not been met.

In order to increase the volume of budget spending in case the vol ume of really provided services turned out to be above the projected one, it is possible, first, to use the right granted by Article 233 of the Budgetary Code of the Russian Federation to principal budgetary man agers and managers of budget funds to move budget allocations be tween budget recipients in the volume not exceeding five per cent of budget allocations transferred to the budget recipient. When there is a need to redistribute budget funds in greater volumes, the law (decree) on the budget for the next fiscal year can include a norm, which will grant principal budgetary managers corresponding rights within limits of the overall volume of approved allocations assigned for the mainte nance of all subordinate institutions98.

There is no such issue regarding autonomous organizations because they get budget ary allocations on estimate based arrangement.

As an example of similar norms of the federal level we can cite Article 40 of the Federal law On 2005 Federal Budget which grant the RF Finance Ministry the right to redistrib Under normative targeted financing it is very important to initiate close monitoring of public and autonomous institutions by principal budgetary managers regarding fulfillment of projected volumes of ser vice delivery and adjustment of financing amounts in case of under ful fillment and over fulfillment. This will allow achieving principal advan tage of normative targeted financing: guarantee dependence of financ ing amounts on the volumes of service delivery.

In the future adjustment of budgetary allocations to public and autonomous institutions or refusal to pay for the services rendered un der the contract must become contradiction between the quality of ser vices and accepted standards. However, implementation of this mechanism is possible not before formalized standards for service de livery are developed or on condition that requirements set to the quality of services are clearly defined in contracts. Otherwise, granting to prin cipal budgetary managers the right to adjust budgetary allocations de pending on a subjective estimation of the quality of services can nega tively reflect on transparency of financing arrangement.

In order to simplify control over the volume of services rendered by certain providers it is possible to envisage issuance of vouchers (certifi cates) for purchasing of services. In addition payment to service pro viders should be carried out on the basis of the number and price of vouchers submitted for payment.

4) Subsidizing the consumer We should differ subsidizing the consumer from normative targeted financing and voucher contractual financing. The former consists in granting to the citizens of public funds for partial compensation of the expenses incurred on purchase of services. Targeted use of public funds is assured in this case by way of transfer of such funds to service provider, which was selected by consumer. In that case the similarity is between normative targeted financing and contractual financing, on the one hand, and subsidizing the consumer, on the other hand.

ute already approved by this law amounts of subsidies from the Federal fund for cost sharing of social expenses between the RF subjects within the limits of their total amount.

Or Article 44 of the same law, which grant the RF Government the right to redistribute amount of subsidies and subventions of the closed administrative territorial entities taking into account execution of their revenues side as well as in case of spending subversions on purposes contrary to the targeted ones.

However, unlike normative targeted financing and voucher contrac tual financing a consumer and not service provider becomes budget recipient in this case. This means that consumer enters into contractual relations with service provider and not the government. Correspond ingly, the government (municipality) does not determine contract provi sions for service delivery and does not take any obligations on such a contract. Government (municipality) responsibility is limited to the pay ment to a citizen a fixed sum in case goals of his contract with service provider coincide with objective of subsidy. Taking into account the fact that consumer is held responsible for the risk of choosing provider in this case, the government does not guarantee the former neither price nor quality of service delivery. Taking into consideration mentioned above features inherent to subsidizing of consumer this financing ar rangement can be implemented in two instances:

a) Regarding services, which the government in principle consider feasible to deliver on conditions of cost sharing by citizens and on con ditions that it does not exercise control over the quality of services;

b) Regarding services, which the government considers possible to deliver on cost sharing basis with citizens and when the state does not exercise control over quality of services only in cases when the citizen chooses as service provider an organization, which is not an institution financed from corresponding budget or an organization, which has no contract with the government for rendering corresponding services.

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