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In May publication of IET, that concerned an analysis of the reform of the army manning system, we provided evidence in favor of the variant of reform, defended in a number of years by IET specialists. In consideration of changes that concerned the salaries of contract servicemen and in plans of war construction, we may conclude - acceleration of the reform is useful. This will raise combat effectiveness of the military organization (the assessment indicators provide strong evidence about its efficiency) and is quite affordable for the Federal budget (FB).

If our earlier concept switching of regular deployable troops to contract based military service and maintenance of six months term of draft service exclusively for the military trained reserve was supported, from political parties, only by the Union of Right Forces, now the number of our supporters is increasing. Thus, from Rossiyskaya Gazeta 100 of 13.05.05 citizens have read the following information in the new wording of the program of the Russian Party of Life: the country needs well trained mobile troops, manned by contract based professionals, and army reserve trained on the basis of six months term draft service.

From the point of view of usefulness for the state and society, one may only welcome coincidence of conceptual views of different parties on one of the most urgent problems of the day. The experience of confrontation with Yabloko on this question witnesses its malignancy for both manning problem itself and both parties.

No less important is to evaluate coincidence in the positions also as a testimony of the all-round, including economic substantiation, of this concept.

The representatives of other science schools also paid attention to that problem. We would like to single out the researches of M. Lokshin and R. Emtsov: Economic Burden of Drafting to Military Service: Results of Microeconomic Analysis. They analyze in this paper an impact of conscription on the budgets of servicemen families. The results obtained by the authors testify that:

- Disproportionately large part of conscription burden falls on marginal population;

- The sons of villagers with low level of wage and education have much higher chances to be drafted to service, than the sons of urban citizens, who have higher level of wage and education;

- Marginal population bears disproportionately higher losses, which exceed the law rates of personal income tax established by the law.

Recognizing the results of the researches of M. Lokshin and R. Emtsov, but only in the context of the present-day system of manning, the Laboratory of War Economy of IET focused, in their new cycle of research, on macroeconomic indicators.

In comparison with the article, that was published in the popular journal of RAS for the attraction of attention to the problem of recruitment of a wider range of economists, and with the later issue of IET scientific works, that attracted to our researches attention of not only war specialists but also human rights defenders, we have specified the initial data and methodology of the socio-economic analysis.

In order to have a more full account of variety of views of citizens about the manning system, that are defended by political parties, the new cycle of our researches expand the list of compared variants.

By convention 1-0 is defended by the General Staff or the Ministry of Defense, 12-months term of draft service by the General Staff and Single Russia, 6-months term By SPS and by the Russian Party of Life, total resignation of draft by Yabloko. All those variants, including Yabloko opinion, were analyzed from the point of view of their military efficiency and relevant Federal budget expenditures. However, the military-economic evaluations of IETs May publication did not include the opinion of Yabloko party. One may read about them in the publications from the reports of the special It is not known if this paper has been published in the RF, but its major results were presented on 22.12.at the scientific seminar of the Higher School of Economics (see the site with information on the seminar in HSE).

Khrustalev, Tsymbal. Forecasting and Analysis of the Socio-Economic Outcome of Transition to Contract Based Principle of Manning the Military Organization. Forecasting Problems, No.4, 2004. pp.83-97.

E.A. Vatolkin, V.B. Zatsepin, N.I. Kardashevsky, E.Yu. Khrustalev, V.I. Tsymbal. Problems and Practice of Transition of the Military Organization of Russia to the New Manning System (Gaidar E.T., Tsymbal V.I. ed.,) M.: IET, 2004. p.283.

ists of the war economy laboratory of IET at the conference Legal Status of Servicemen and Civilian Control over the RF Military Organization, held in June 24-25.

This text predominantly reflects the results of estimating the socio-economic outcome of the military reform for society.

Table Variant The Pace of Drafting to The Pace of Drafting Term of Draft Year of Completion of TranCode Deployed Units to Non-Deployed Service (month.) sition to Contract Based Units after 2008 Service for All Regular Troops According to FTP, -2 (it was 5) %, Later than 2012 (is not speci1-0 Further all non- further as in FTP fied exactly) commissioned officers - 2% until 2008, 1-2_(12) FTP with continuation 12 >0 until completed - 2% until 2008, 1-2_(6) FTP with continuation 6 >0 until completed - 2% until 2008, 1-2_(0) FTP with continuation 0 / volunteers23 >0 until completed 2-2_(12) FTP with intensification >>0 until completed 12 2-2_(6) FTP with intensification >>0 until completed 6 2-2_(0) FTP with intensification >>0 until completed 0 / volunteers Besides a greater amount of variants, some initial data were specified which were employed in modeling and presented in the mentioned issue of IET proceedings.

Positive transformations for the society are as follows:

1. Growth of additional incomes, i.e. those that servicemen will bring to their families. Specifically, these are incomes of privates and non-commissioned officers serving under contracts, with account of additional increase; to a lesser degree - incomes of conscript servicemen; and also rather big, additional commander charge to officers, warrant officers, and ensigns, that are to be introduced in parallel with charges to privates and non-commissioned officers.

2. Family incomes and therefore, the society, which contract servicemen will obtain in the form of housing. Houses obtained by them under the government housing certificates (GHC) will be granted to them via mortgage-saving system, and the money for underlease - by married contract servicemen.

Negative outcome for society also deserves attention. They are:

1. Losses of families and the society on the whole, because of compulsory conscription of ablebodied youth to the military organization. This is an account of the so called short-received incomes, that is the money which servicemen could earn at home, if he was not drafted for the army. Methodology of computation of this indicator is basing on average pay value across the country and considers draftees (18 27 years) pay to average pay value ratio. According to sociologic data, it equals 70% in the RF. Employment of such indicator is substantiated by both domestic and foreign economists. With growth of average pay value short-received incomes are also increasing.

2. Losses of the society because of draft evasion. Most part of changes took place in the methodology of computation of such indicator, which is associated with the need of accounting not only the effect of the level of draft, but also the reduction of the number of draftees. Adjustment was made, for example, of incomes of criminal structures, that was estimated in 2002.

As a result, a new formula for computation of those incomes look like this:

2005 (t) 2003 - = 2003, where 2003 2003 (t) - is the coefficient that characterizes the effect of the term and purpose of service on criminal incomes, which vary for different variants of the reform of manning system;

. estimation of criminal incomes in the draft system of 2003;

Volunteers persons wo decided to serve in the army of their own free will, for money (in the model for a six months term), but not yet been contract servicemen as have not signed a long-term contract. Following the results of 6 months training selection and carrying out contracts is carried out.

"Kommersant-Dengi" No 17-18(372-373) of 14.05.2002. Alexei Khodorych Belyi bilet po chernomu data on average pay across the country in 2005 and 2003;

draft rate in half a year;

t serial number of the current year;

demographic data for the youth of 18 years old;

the number of young men (computated), entering the higher education institutes, who have the right to be exempted from the military service.

A balance is computated on the basis of the above income and expenditure.

The table presents values that were employed in modeling the parameters.

Table Average pay in 2005 (Rb) 6831.Average pay in 2003 (Rb) Draftees salary to average pay ratio 0.Overall half-yearly incomes of criminal structures in 2003 (million rubles.) Averaged draft in 2003 (thou. pers./ half year) 175.- 1-0 Coefficient K, that characterizes the effect of the term and purpose of - 1-2_(12) 2-2_(12) 0.service on criminal incomes - 1-2_(6) 2-2_(6) 0.- 1-2_(0) 2-2_(0) Half a year for entering a higher education institution with the right to deferring (thou. pers.) of the young men 0.total number of young men that entered a higher education institution (thou. pers.) 187.Fig.1. Society Gains, Including:

- incomes of privates and non-commissioned officers serving under contracts in the military organization of the RF - incomes of conscript servicemen in the military organization of the RF - incomes of war pensioners from among privates and non-commissioned officers (Rb bn) Below in figures 1 - 5 the dynamics is shown of major socio-economic indices obtained with the use of a mathematical model.

The dynamics of money incomes, presented in figure 1, reflects the fact that by the level of additional incomes the General Staff variant is close to that, when the contract based service becomes attractive. Indirectly this is evidenced by the facts that appeared in mass media, according to which, the polluted workers of military enlistment offices in depressive regions begin to take bribes for enlisting to service on the contractual basis.

From the chart in the first figure it is seen that all variants of accelerating switching to a new manning system bring to society a larger portion of money incomes than that defended by the Ministry of Defense. Variants with selection of volunteers will give the society the largest gain at the expense of included in computations payments to volunteers (the level of additional incomes, characteristic for a contract serviceman).

Fig. 2 shows the dynamics of incomes due to granting houses. And also all variants accelerating the reform are more preferable for the society than the variant of the Ministry of Defense. The growth of incomes in question during 2018 2026 is explained by granting houses under the government housing certificate for those who concluded the second contract until 2005 and was not on time for coming into mortgage-saving system. It is planned that since 2026 there will not be servicemen who obtain housing according to the government housing certificate, thus stabilizing the dynamics of granting houses.

Fig. 2. Society Gains in the Form of Housing, Including:

According to the Government Housing Certificate, via Mortgage-Saving System and the Money for Underlease (Rb bn) Fig. 3 shows the dynamics of losses of society because of the enforced draft, equal (as noted above) to the amount of foregone incomes. For variants with cancellation of draft and enlistment of volunteers this indicator may be considered an alternative cost, taken into account by individuals when they decide to be drafted as volunteers. Dynamics in the negative region reflects negative outcome.

Due to less number of figures of draftees, the charts of all the proposed variants lie beyond the line of the Ministry of Defenses variant. The least level of losses is presented in variants with reduction of the term of draft service to 6 months or - total cancellation of draft service.

Fig. 4 shows possible dynamics of the society expenditures for illegal paying off (the same is dynamics of the incomes of criminal structures in the draft system). This chart illustrates greater discrepancy between the variants in question, than previous ones. The variant defended by the General Staff cannot solve the problem of corruption in the draft system. The incomes of criminal structures will be increasing. Only in 2016 2018 we may expect their decreasing, but due to demographic factors, and not because of solving problems in the draft system.

Most favorable in this respect are variants of transition to the six months term of draft service or total cancellation of draft service. In them, due to changing of both the term and purpose of service there will be a dramatic drop in expenditures in 2008. It is natural that full liquidation of corruption in granting of deferments and discharges is possible only in the case of cancellation of draft service itself. But in growing attractiveness of the service on contractual basis, corruption appears in the sphere of drafting contract servicemen. But this problem is beyond the scope of our study.

Fig. 3. Society Expenditures (Losses) Because of Enforced Draft to the Military Organization of the RF (Rb bn) Fig. 4. Society Expenditures Because of Draft Dodging of Citizens (Rb bn) The resulting indicator may serve a balance of income and expenditures, the dynamics of which is presented in Fig. 5. The first object that salutes the eye is that the negative balance is in the variant of the Ministry of Defense. All other variants are positive, i.e. a greater salary and provision of housing is able to compensate the foregone income and possible society expenditures for illegal excuse from the military service.

Fig. 5. Balance of Income and Society Expenditures (bn rubles a year) The results of the research make possible to draw the following concussions:

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