Report of the Federal Treasury on execution of the federal budget of RF: http://www.roskazna.ru/store/ reports_file571.xls. – Access date 9.02.2011.
Aleksandrov À. Itogi pryzyvnoy kampanii // Krannaya zvezda. 2010. 27 July (¹ 133); 28 July–3 August (¹ 134).
Goltz A. Gotovim pushechnoye myaso // Voenno-promyshlenny kuryer. 10–16 November (¹44).
Evnevich V. Lazer v rukakh soldata // Voenno-promyshlenny kuryer. 2010. 4–10 August (¹ 30).
RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN trends and outlooks others are getting ready for dismissal), which makes it hard to arrange a normal military training.
Giving such troops even the most cutting-edge weapons will not save their commanders’ day, as soldiers would have no time to master them, nor would they appreciate any incentives to take care of them. So an army, wherein the bulk of troops are in service just for one year, is and will be unlikely to ensure a due combat efficiency. And it is not accidental then that the chief commander of Airborne Forces was compelled to form 5“primary engagement” battalions and man them solely with draftees. Meanwhile, other Airborne Forces’ units are manned with conscripts, which effectively make them look like and operate as training attachments.
Perhaps this very approach might be worth legitimizing, but legislators ruled otherwise.
They were at pains to urgently amend an act in compliance with which “rookies” can be deployed on combat missions after 3 months in service, rather than after 6, as the document stated earlier. The head of SOMD used to accentuate that if the length of service would be reduced to 1 year, conscripts would fill positions that “do not determine the armed forces’ combat efficiency”. Now it means that AF comprises 70% of such positions. Plus, strictly speaking, such a category of positions has not ever been identified in legal terms, and its arbitrary usage appears illicit.
Meanwhile, both RF and other countries are confronted with an urgent imperative of answering a more general question as to what the ultimate objective of conscription is. For Russians, the answer should be built on requirements set by the Strategy of National Security of RF until 2020. The document emphasizes that military threats form just a fraction of a general list of threats to Russia and the nation should get ready to counter them all. In all fairness, life has already made us face the challenge of a non-traditional deployment of individuals recruited from the civic sector to ensure the national security. Specifically, last summer, during the period of wildfires, as many as 8.500 - 10,000 troops and some 1,000 units of specialized military hardware were deployed to fight the fires on a daily basis1. Art. 59 of the RF Constitution does not suggest that the citizen’s duty to defend the Motherland implies only repelling an invasion. That is why all the RF citizenry should be trained to exercise their constitutional duty. If conscription is retained to serve that purpose, it should be reduced chiefly to a shortterm but practical survival course. Having completed the initial phase, only the best and the brightest should be picked and offered to voluntary stay in service for a handsome allowance and lucrative preferences. That is the way professionals in the key security areas should be recruited, otherwise the level of safety of military service and the one of military efficiency of most of troops would remain low2.
The problem, which aggravated in 2010, concerns junior commanders, who are represented overseas by the institution of warrant officers and sergeants. Experts are unanimous:
“Modern ways of fighting war are determined not by generals –to a significant extent they depend upon command which sergeants demonstrate on the tactical level”3.
Until recently, Russia has had too many officers and the national equivalent to the US CWO, who were supposed to exercise control over privates, but in fact could and did nothing in this respect. These positions were slashed, with reference made to other countries, mostly the US’s, army wherein the officers/soldiers ratio allegedly was 1:16. Meanwhile, our reform Tikhonov A. Ne chislom, a umeniyem//Kransya zvezda. 2010. 17 August (¹148).
Litovkin V. Opyat prizyv, opyat problem//Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye. 2010. 9–15 April (¹13).
McDermot R. Armiya nachinayetsya s serzhanta// Voenno-promyshlenny kuryer. 2010. 14-20 April (¹ 14).
Institutional Problems ers lost sight of the much-needed category of warrant officers and did not give thought to well-trained sergeants, either. As a result, our new staff and military service system was doomed to failure: there are no such qualified sergeants in AF as yet - their training has just kicked off and its pace is too low. Hence no hope for the reign of law and order in military barracks.
That a special category of military counselors will be up to the job seems quite problematic, too. Such officers will be assigned to every unit with the number of troops over 75, which suggests there will be 10,000 such counselors in AF, plus 20,000-strong MP and priests. The Ministry of Defense will sure rake up some cash on their subsistence and transition to new uniforms (some Rb. 25 bln.), and on travel subsidies to parents to see their conscripted sons to their stationing locations (the number of concerned parents was over 10,at the heyday of the autumn conscription campaign), but not on transition to draft.
Equally critical was another challenge Russia faced last year – namely, training the renewed officer corps. As the Soviet legacy, the military universities network proved excessive and so did the number of military university graduates, who struggled to find a position in AF. As a temporary solution, they were offered to fill in sergeants’ positions, with all their perks untouched. A considerable part of them opted for an early retirement, though, and it is highly unlikely already retired and now retiring officers will be provided with long-promised housing and decent pensions.
6.6.2. Problems of Design, Production and Supplies of Arms The inadequate closeness of “power” agencies and absence of the civilian control add to the dire situation with supplies to the military.
From the economic perspective, an analysis should encapsulate all the list of items of military supplies (IMS), including both an extensive set of items earlier supplied to AF via the logistic arm and weaponry and military hardware (WMH), which used to be supplied via the Head of the Inventory Service. Today, these structures have been reorganized, consolidated and fell under the “non-military” part of the MOD’s new structures. Those include the inventory system of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF), by which Russia still maintains a rough parity with the US, and Non-Nuclear Forces (NNF), by which Russia catastrophically fell behind its major rival. In addition, those are strategic reconnaissance, communications, navigation and space control systems (SCS), missile attack warning system (MAWS) of the antiballistic and airspace defense (ABD and ASD).
Tactical weapons on theaters of war (TW), or in, a new interpretation, – on operational avenues of strategic command authorities - were traditionally considered the second critical group of IMS.
The third critical group of IMS is formed by means of military power projection from one theater of war to another. Given the time factor, the group comprises military airlift (MA) and the respective means of provision of its functioning.
Meanwhile, there exists an increasing need for developing the fourth group of IMS that secure operations of the AF command authority, various units and attachments, as well as solitary troops, with account of means of automated cut-through command and control, information collection and control, and conduct of “information wars”.
All these groups should have been expected to post some military-economic progress in 2010, for the volume of funding earmarked under the State Defense Order (SDO) was greater than in the previous years. But the actual capacity of the military-industrial complex that in RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN trends and outlooks principle operates to meet demand of both domestic, as well as overseas customers, was not factored in.
The above is evidenced by open data collected from domestic media, fragmented public statements by representatives of the RF military and political command authority, and references of the international Institute of Strategic Studies. The Table below (Table 34) characterizes the dynamic of main IMS of the first group.
Table Dynamic of Equipping AF with Main Models of Strategic Arms Quantity Quantity in Quantity in Dynamic Dynamic IMS group Model Notes in 2008 2009 ã. 2010 ã. 08–09 09–Strategic NS (Delta III, RSM-50) 6 6 5 0 – 1 Reduction appropriate with MC BM (Delta IV, RSM-54) 4 4 4 0 0 Unchanged In the Navy (Delta IV, RSM-52) 2 2 2 0 0 Unchanged (Northern, Tayfoon 2 2 2+1 (re- 0 0 Unchanged Pacific arms) serve) Ïð. 955 1 1+2 (under 1+ 2 (under 0 0 Failure to develop MC, (MC «Bulava») construc- construction NC were not passed into tion) service. Overspending NS- total 15 15 14 0 -1 12 units in service. The with MS BM SB with 252 ñ 252 BM ñ 236 BM -16 combat capacity of the NS BM SB SB SB grouping is down Missile Com- ÐÑ-20 (SS-18) 80 75 68 – 5 – 7 Partial use of old MC to plexes of SRF ÐÑ-12Ì(SS-25) 254 201 180 – 53 – 21 launch SA, particularly Silo-based/ ÐÑ-18 (SS-19) 126 100 72 – 26 – 28 for commercial purposes.
mobile profit= Topol-Ì (SS-27) 48 54 50 +6 +11 The military capacity of silo-based / mobile /15 new BM is on the rise, but fails to compensate for the retirement of old ones ÐÑ-24 0 0 0 + Production and supplies in progress MC with warheads 508 430 430 – 78 0 The general military (WH), total (ÁÃ) with with 1605 with 1605 +5 0 capacity of SRF is intact 1600 WH WH WH Long-range Tu-160 15 16 16 + 1 0 Strengthened aircraft Tu-95ÌÑ6 (H6) 32 32 32 0 0 Unchanged (the 37th Air Tu-95ÌÑ16(H16) 32 32 31 0 – 1 Weakened Force wing) Aircraft with cruise 79 80 79 +1 –1 SNF military capacity is missiles with 884 with 900 with 856 down, but NNF capacity ALCM ALCM ALCM is on the rise Missile Attack ÊÀ ÑÏÐÍ Warning ÐËÑ ÑÏÐÍ 10 10 9 0 – 1 Reduction in the number, means; but modernization MC BMD SH-11 36 32 32 – 4 0 Weakened SH-08 64 68 68 +4 0 Approximate balance Ñ-300ÏÌÓ (SA-10) ---- 1900 1900 0 0 Inclusion in the strategic BMD is inappropriate Ñ-400/Triumf 64 64 0 0 Inclusion in the strategic BMD is inappropriate Airspace Force Spacecraft (SC); No quantitative data on SC, except for --- --- Positive effect thanks to launch and control some dual use ones (GLONASS) dual-use means and commeans mercial launches Source: The Military Balance. London: IISS, 2008–2010.
From the military-economic standpoint, it is important to consider effects from budget investments in this group of weapons and to examine the extent to which the declared plans were implemented. To this end, suffice it to analyze quantitative data on composition of means over the past three years. As evidenced by Table 34 (whose columns of dynamics of volumes of funds are quite illustrative), with all the huge funding pouring in, the effects were negligible, if not negative.
The military capacity of offensive arms, particularly, the naval component, was on decline.
The idea to unify all Russian ballistic missiles proved a failure. Bulava, a naval version of the unified design, is not ready for passing into service, while three nuclear submarines, which Section 6.
Institutional Problems had ben supposed to be equipped with Bulava were launched armless. As a reminder, the Constructor General of Bulava and the previous Defense Minister kept assuring the submarines equipped with these missiles were long to pass into service.
Production of new ground-launched missiles failed to compensate for retirement of old ones. Hence, our most powerful component of the strategic triad weakened, too. Plus, in the aftermath of the noted “unification” it was found out that all the variants of missiles, including the tactical “Iscandar”, should be produced by one and the same plant in the town of Votkinsk, whose capacity fall short of meeting the planned aggregate volume of output.
The Air Force, too, saw no rise in its military capacity. The growth in the number of bombers, which (as the military strategists reckoned) should have resulted in a rhythmic modernization of the 15 existing aircraft and production of another 15 next-gen ones by 2012, was put at jeopardy. The number of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads did not soar, either (judging indirect characteristics of the balance of forces)1. As to non-nuclear variants of equipping the missiles (for the purposes of NNF), foreign references additionally inform just of equipping them with GPS/GLONASS-controlled targeting devices. Notably, foreign publications cite GPS on the first place as a more advanced and precise system, as it might be this year that GLONASS might match the desirable precision characteristics.
The foreign reference materials refer to the destructive role played by some Russian experts’ assurances that the domestic ADMS under the AA defense could shoot down ballistic missiles. That C-300 and C-400 can target short- and midrange ballistic missiles does not make any difference to the national AA defense, as the threat they pose is negligible. Since 2008 foreign sources have begun attributing our complexes, which earlier fell under the category of ADMS, to AA defense, and Russia proved the most equipped with strategic antimissile systems country worldwide. Judging the outcomes of the November NATO Summit, the Europeans do not consider our ADMS as a prospective element of the European AA system.
It is most likely that the “joint” Russia-NATO AA defense will be limited with exchange of information of a missile attack, while Europe will become home to strategic silo-based components developed on the basis of offensive complexes Minuteman-2 (and that is what the US wanted). Numerous experts, including the late Dr. Yegor Gaidar, Director of the IET, cited the military and political danger stemming from this destabilizing move and raised their objections both in Russia and in the US.