As evidenced by data of Table 3, it was the rise in the housing and utilities tariffs that has formed the principal inflation component between 2006 and 2009. The respective payments account for a substantial fraction of the households’ expenses, particularly because prices of the said services nearly doubled between 2006 and 2009. As concerns the group of non-food goods, it is worth noting the price rise for gas on the backdrop of bouncing upwards prices for energy sources and a very moderate price rise for construction materials, because of an intense slump in the construction sector. Finally, it is important to note a sharp deceleration of price rise rates for foods in 2009.
Table The Annual Price Increate Rates for Individual Kinds of Goods and in 2006–2009 (%) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006–CPI 9.0 11.9 13.3 8.8 50.Foods 8.7 15.6 16.5 6.1 55.Cream butter 6.8 40.3 10.5 7.9 78.Pasta 4.7 23.6 33.8 1.6 75.Bread and bakery 11.1 22.4 25.9 2.4 75.Gruels and legumes 12.1 24.7 25.8 -2.5 71.Milk and dairy products 8.7 30.4 12.2 2.3 62.Fish and seafood 7.8 9.0 15.1 10.6 49.Sunflower seed oil -1.2 52.3 22.1 -19.8 47.Meat and poultry 5.9 8.4 22.2 5.0 47.Non-food goods 6.0 6.5 8.0 9.7 33.Construction materials 11.5 16.2 11.3 2.1 47.Gasoline 10.9 8.5 1.2 8.0 31.Paid services for the population 13.9 13.3 15.9 11.6 66.Pre-schooling services 28.5 11.8 20.7 16.2 101.Housing and utilities 17.9 14.0 16.4 19.6 87.Sanatorium and rehabilitation services 15.2 15.6 21.2 9.5 76.Services by organizations of culture 15.6 14.5 15.5 11.3 70.Passenger transportation services 14.2 13.6 22.5 6.5 69.Source: Rosstat In conclusion let us compare the price rise rates in Russia with those across the CIS (Table 4).
Section Monetary and Budgetary Spheres Table Consumer Price Indexes in the CIS in 2000-2009 ãã., as % to the Same Period of the Prior Year Jan.-Sep.
It can be noted that the 2009 inflation slowed down in all the CIS countries, while the impact of the global financial crisis on the inflationary processes in Russia and other CIS countries was two-fold.
For one part, the depreciation of the national currency drove up the price rise for imports and the rise in inflationary expectations. The latter were also stirred by the growing financial instability. Finally, the slowdown of the economic activity resulted in a lesser demand for cash, as economic agents lost confidence in the national banking system and were transferring their Rb.-denominated savings into the forex ones.
On the other hand, a sharp slowdown of money supply growth rates sent the monetary inflation down. Let us note that the compression of money supply during the critical phase of the crisis was taking place regardless of sizeable anticrisis public expenditures, as a consequence of economic agents’ transferring their savings in forex and the money multiplier being in decline. Finally, a sharp compression of the aggregate demand also exerted a substantial downward pressure on prices.
So, in Russia’s conditions, contraction in money supply and in the aggregate demand has led to inflation deceleration. Meanwhile, the stabilization of the state of affairs on the global markets that kicked off in April and the price rise for energy sources have resulted in a significant decline in expectations of a further depreciation of the Rb. exchange rate as early as in the spring 2009. The prices for main Russian exports bounced back, the private capital inflow in Russia was noted in the 4th quarter of the year, while the budget deficit was financed out of the Reserve Fund – all this caused a spike of money supply at the end of the year.
Should these inflationary trends be further unfolding in 2010, inflation may not demonstrate its further decline and its rate may account for 8-9%.
2.1.3. The State of the Balance of Payments1 and the Forex Market The sustainability of Russia’s balance of payments in 2009 was traditionally secured by its exports, primarily the fuel and energy goods. Meanwhile, the global financial crisis has led to a price downfall for main Russian exports, which is why their ultimate 2009 export volume from RF plunged by 35.7% vs. the prior year. But the restoration of the prices and improve Evaluation of the balance of payments was conducted on the basis of preliminary data of the CBR.
http://cbr.ru/statistics/credit_statistics/print.aspfile=bal_of_payments_est.htm RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN trends and outlooks ment of the global economy’s health since the spring 2009 have resulted in a stabilization of the nation’s balance of payments. Ultimately, by the 2009 results, Russia’s balance of payments appears fairly sustainable; however in the medium-term the sustainability of the balance of payments will remain exposed to an intensification of the global crisis and an advanced growth in imports in RF vis--vis the nation’s exports.
According to the published by the CBR’s preliminary estimation of the nation’s 2009 balance of payments, the positive balance of the current account was USD 47.5bn., i.e. 53.6% down compared with 2008 (Table 5). More specifically, down at 38.5% was the positive balance of trade (from USD 139.7bn to 110.6bn), with exports down by 35.7% (from USD 371.6bn to 303.3bn) and imports shrinking at 34% (from USD 291.9bn to 192.7bn). The proportion of oil, petroleum derivatives and natural gas in the aggregate volume of Russia’s export was 62.8% (in 2006- 62.8%, 2007 – 61.7%, 2008- 65.8%) (Fig. 3). So, like in the recent years, it was the balance of trade that formed a main factor behind the value of the balance of current account. Meanwhile, the balance of the balance in trade in turn is strongly dependent on the dynamic of world prices for energy sources and other main Russian exports. The data presented in Fig. 4 evidence that the correlation between the world oil prices for oil and the balance of Russia’s balance of trade, which was noted between 2002-2008, was still there in 2009.
500 0 Export Proportion of oil, oil products, and natural gas in export Source: The CBR.
Fig. 3. Dynamic of Export and Proportion of Products of the Fuel and Energy Complex in 1999–The deficit of the balance of services accounted for USD 19.8bn and tumbled (by its absolute value) by 20.8% vs. its respective value of 2008. Export of services made up USD % USD bn.
Section Monetary and Budgetary Spheres 42.4bn, thus being USD8.9bn (17.4%) down compared with the prior year. The 2009 value of import of services plunged by 18.6% and accounted for USD 62.1bn.
The 2009 labor compensation balance fell by the absolute value and made up USD -8.7bn (vs. -14.2bn in 2008). The deficit of the balance of investment revenues in 2009 tumbled by 10.4% vis--vis 2008 and was USD 31.4bn. Investment incomes due slid from USD 52.2bn to 30bn, which was determined by a substantial drop of the indicator by non-financial enterprises (from USD 28.2bn to 14.2bn) and monetary regulators (from USD 18.3bn to 6.9bn).
The fall in incomes due can be ascribed to the global financial crisis and the plunge in the volume of overseas investment. The drop of incomes due across non-financial corporations from USD 73.7bn to 46.4bn was determined by the fall in the aggregate income due from USD 90.2bn to 61.4bn.
The 2009 balance of current transfers1 accounted for USD -3.2bn (up 4.2% compared with 2008).
So, the main factors underlying the retaining of a considerable positive balance of the current account of Russia’s balance of payments in 2009 were prices for main Russian exports that bounced back to their high values in the 2nd-4th quarters of the year. It is worth noting that, despite concerns of potential difficulties the crisis engendered with respect to servicing the private sector’s external debt, the national banks and the non-financial sector’s indebtedness to overseas economic agents contracted (see Table 5) as a consequence of a partial debt restructuring against the background of a notable reduction in the volume of attraction of new debts. One can expect a renewal of the growth rate of the foreign debt in the medium term, and the process should encompass both the private sector and the public one, as the country lacks domestic financial resources which are very costly.
In 2009, determined by stabilization of the state of affairs in the global economy, the absolute value of the balance of the capital account plunged considerably and accounted for USD – 45.2bn. The 2009 balance of capital transfers was -11.7 USDbn. So, without regard to the capital transfers, the 2009 financial account deficit was -33.5 USDbn.
The 2009 ultimate increase in the domestic economic agents’ liabilities before overseas economic agents was just USD 6.3bn, or 14.6 times less than in 2008 (USD 92.4bn).
In 2009, the federal public administration agencies became net borrowers before nonresidents, with their external liabilities standing at USD 0.8bn resulting from sales of T-bonds to the non-residents. Meanwhile, the balance of external liabilities of the RF Subjects remained practically unchanged. The 2009 rise in the monetary regulatory agencies’ liabilities hit USD 11.6bn chiefly due to the Bank of Russia’s conducting REPO with foreign counterparts.
According to the CBR, current transfers, e.g. humanitarian relief in the form of consumer goods and services, bolster the level of the disposable income and consumption of goods and services by the recipient and diminish the donor’s disposable income and consumption capacity. Current transfers are reflected in the current account.
Transfers that are not current by default form capital transfers. Capital transfers result in a change of both the donor and recipient’s volume of assets or liabilities and are reflected in the capital account. In the event the donor and the recipient are non-residents towards each other, the capital transfer entails a change in the level of the national wealth of the economies they represent. An example of capital transfers is a non-repayable reassignment of property rights for capital assets, debt forgiveness.
RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN trends and outlooks Table Main Items of the Balance of Payments and the Dynamic of the Foreign Debt in 2007–2009 (as USDbn) 2007 2008 Items of the balance 22.6 14.5 15.7 24.2 77 38.0 26.2 29.7 8.5 102.4 9.3 7.6 15.0 15.6 47.Current account 14.5 48.4 –3.7 26.5 85.7 –25.6 35.7 –9.6 –135.5 –135.2 –32.0 3.2 –25.4 9.0 –45.Capital account** Change in –32.9 –65.5 –7.9 –42.6 –148.9 –6.4 –64.2 –15.0 131.1 45.3 30.5 –14.2 9.1 –28.8 –3.forex reserves («+» means reserves are down, «–» – ðîñò reserves are up) Net errors –4.1 2.6 –4.1 –8.2 –13.8 –6.0 2.4 –5.0 –4.0 –12.6 –7.7 3.5 1.3 4.1 1.and omissions 41.8 44.2 38.6 33.2 157.8 13.6 51.1 12.5 –67.7 9.5 –32.8 21.3 9.8 –8.5 –10.Change in Russia’s foreign debt ( «+» means the debt is up, «–» the debt is down) 3.6 –3.2 3.5 –6.1 –2.2 –5.4 –2.1 3.9 –10 –13.6 –2.4 4 9.5 0.9 Change in Russia’s foreign public debt 38.3 47.3 35.2 39.3 160.1 18.9 53.3 8.6 –57.8 23 –30.5 17.3 0.4 –9.5 –22.Change in Russia’s foreign debt of the private sector * Preliminary estimate ** With regard to forex reserves.
Source: the CBR.
The continuance of the global financial crisis that has seriously derailed the Russian economic agents’ possibilities to attract borrowings for overseas and a vehement restructuring of already attracted loans have led to a USD 43.7bn-worth contraction in the banking sector’s liabilities towards non-residents. The overseas economic agents’ investment in the Russian non-financial sector made up USD 37.4bn (vs. 97.1bn in 2008). So, the 2009 volume of nonresident investments plunged drastically vs. the respective indicator of 2008, albeit it proved to be far in excess of that to the banking sector. That said, the volume of direct investment in the non-financial sector over the year accounted for USD 38.2bn vs. 63bn. in 2008, while the increase in portfolio investment was in the prior year. In 2009, the volume of the nonfinancial sector’s debt by loans and credits towards non-residents dropped by USD 5.2bn.
I Q I Q I Q Ãîä II Q II Q II Q Year IV Q IV Q III Q III Q III Q year* IV Q* Section Monetary and Budgetary Spheres Residents’ foreign assets (liabilities of foreign economic agents before Russian ones) grew by USD 39.8bn in 2009 (in 2008 – by USD 228bn).
Meanwhile, foreign assets of the federal public administration agencies plunged by USD 10.2bn, while those of banks – by 11.2bn. In contrast, foreign assets of monetary regulatory institutions remained practically unchanged.
Capital export from the sector of non-financial corporations and households fell by 61.8% vs.
2008 and accounted for USD 61.2bn. The volume of the “not collected on time export proceeds, goods and services not received against monetary transfers by import contracts, transfers by fictitious transactions with securities” also tumbled compared with 2008 and accounted for USD 26.5bn. At this point, it is worth noting that the dynamic of the item “cash foreign exchange” underwent considerable changes – in 2009, Russia saw a USD 3.9bn-worth export of foreign exchange in the cash form, while in 2008 as much as USD 25bn was imported into the country. In other words, once in the autumn of 2008 the Rb. showed the first signs of depreciation towards the bicurrency basket (both in the nominal and real terms), the population and the non-financial sector once again, for the first time since 1997, began vehemently buying foreign exchange. But in 2009, with the situation on the financial markets gradually stabilizing and the Rb. renewing its appreciation trend, the boom on the forex market subsided.