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Ȼ* . IMPLEMENTING G8 ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS:

HOW INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION HELP J.J. Kirton - () ?

( , ) . , - ? ( ) - - . 15 ?

. .. , , Paper prepared for a 2006 G8 Pre-Summit . Seminar On the Road to St. Petersburg: The Role , of International Organizations in Implementing G , , Commitments, co-sponsored by the State Uni ;

versity Higher School of Economics (SU-HSE), , Moscow and the G8 Research Group, University . of Toronto, Toronto, Moscow, June 30, 2006. Ver , sion of June 22. I am grateful for the contribution , of Laura Sunderland, Senior Researcher of the G .

, , Research Group.

. Introduction , , , - - How do international institutions help the Group of Eight (G8) change the world? More specifically, , , how have and can the worlds other international , institutions assist the G8 in enhancing its members , compliance with, and the effective implementation , of, the commitments made and directions set by , G8 leaders at their annual summit and by the , broader G8 system as a whole?

. These questions are becoming more im , , , portant. The current G8 has been making an * . , .

. 2006. increasing number of commitments, of a more evidence and analysis can say about them, and ambitious kind, over a broader range of issues. what further research is required before more in G8 governors have been assigning to the worlds novative recommendations can be confidently put major established international institutions as forth.

well as those in their own G8-centric system re- Throughout this study, the emphasis is on sponsibility for implementing the decisions that decisional commitments within the broader ar G8 leaders collectively make. In preparing and ray of governance functions the G8 summit and producing the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit Rus- system perform. It is also on the first order com sia, hosting a regular G8 summit for the first time pliance of the members, rather than extended but without full membership in all parts of the implementation through to solving the problem G8-centered system, is relying on other interna addressed. It is also on the one way relation tional institutions to an unusually high degree to ship flowing from G8 governance to international make its first summit a success. It has invited as institutional responsiveness and support. The participants to the St. Petersburg summit an ab study does not deal with the equally important normally large number of leaders of the interna reciprocal relationship in which the G8 helps im tional institutions most relevant to the summits plement international institutional commitments work.

and governance. However it is hypothesized that the connection between two is a synergistic two Yet little is known about how well, how, where, way street in which G8 support for international when and why these international institutions help institutions constitutes a cause of the institutions or harm compliance with, and implementation help for the G8 in its compliance, implementa of G8 commitments, and which institutions can tion and other tasks in return, in a relationship of be counted on in particular situations to help the both specific and diffuse reciprocity. Thus a full most. There is thus a very slender foundation for temporal spectrum is included in this analysis, judging which international institutions should be running from the start of an annual G8 summits invited to a summit, and how they should be in preparatory process through to its implementa volved in the overall summit process and system tion end and how other international institutions throughout the year. There is also little to guide are involved at every stage. Such involvement outside analysts and G8 governors in assessing, should, it is hypothesized, produce superior re selecting from, and innovatively expanding the sults to the alternative of the G8 involving inter diverse array of recommendations about how the national institutions only immediately after the G8-international institutional connection can be summit commitments are publicly produced, as improved to more effectively solve the many major a fait accompli from a deus ex machina directoire global problems the G8 and its sister international that then asks other institutions out of the blue to institutions take up.

help implement what the G8 has already decided all on its own.

To help build the analytical foundations re quired for improving G8 compliance and imple 1. An Assessment of Existing mentation, this study undertakes in a preliminary Arguments and Evidence fashion five essential tasks. First, it briefly reviews the existing debate and evidence about how in A. The Debate Among Competing ternational institutions improve G8 compliance.

Schools of Thought Second, it offers an analytical framework for as sessing the many ways in which international in To date, the debate on the link between the stitutions can help and harm G8 implementation.

G8 and other international institutions in regard to Third, it presents a set of hypotheses about why compliance and implementation has centered on international institutions help the G8 with com three major competing schools of thought.

pliance and implementation in an effective way.

Fourth, it offers new evidence and analysis from i. G8 Governance through Multilateral Or the G8s recent compliance record to test some ganizations. The first school, pioneered by Ella of these hypotheses. Fifth it identifies the major Kokotsis in her 1999 democratic institutionalist policy questions that have arisen in regard to the way international institutions might better assist model of G8 performance, presents a vision of with G8 implementation, notes what the existing effective G8 governance through multilateral or ganizations1. It argues that the work of multilateral school, developed by John Kirton in his concert organizations controlled by G7 members is an im- equality model, argues for effective G8 govern portant cause of compliance with G8 commitments ance against multilateral organizations2. It ar when those organizations are directly relevant to gues that the G8, born of the great failure and the particular G8 commitments in question (Koko- its founding leaders dislike of the old multilat tsis 1999, Daniels and Kokotsis 1999). Thus, from eral organizations during the crises of the early 1988 to 1995 compliance with G7 commitments 1970s, has increasingly moved from reinforcing, by the United States and Canada was higher in through reforming, to replacing with antitheti those areas assistance to the former Soviet Un- cal alternatives the old multilateral organizations ion and debt relief for the poorest most relevant and their order with a fundamentally different to the long established, most powerful multilateral G8-centred system of its own. This evolution was organizations the 1944 International Monetary first seen in newer transnational/global issues Fund (IMF) and World Bank that were employed areas, such as energy, the environment, infor by the G7 as an implementing instrument, and mation technology, terrorism, and transnational controlled by the G7 members through their domi- crime where the old multilateral order had no nance of the institutions executive boards. In con- organizations of its own. Yet after the great fail trast, compliance was less in those fields climate ure of the G7 to reform the 1944 Bretton Woods change and biodiversity where the relevant in- and broader 1940s functional UN system at the stitutions the 1973 United Nations Environment 1995 Halifax summit where institutional reform Program (UNEP) and the 1992 secretariats of the was the defining focus, the G7 moved to create United Nations Framework Conventions on Cli- a new generation of G8-centered institutions to mate Change and Biodiversity were more recent, govern the traditional economic fields, notably more fragmented, less organizationally powerful, the Group of Twenty (G20) and Financial Stabil and less controlled by the G7. ity Forum (FSF) for finance in a now globalized world, and the African Personal Representa Also relevant in causing compliance were tives, African Partnership Forum and a G8 meet institutional factors at the informal G7-centered ing of development ministers for development plurilateral, and national level. For in the finance in a now rapidly democratizing one. This G8-led fields there was a G7 ministerial forum since great transformation in global governance sub 1973 (which Canada and Italy joined in 1986) and sequently extended into the political-security strong co-ordinative centres within the Treasury field, with the G8s liberation of Kosovo and de Department and Department of Finance, while in velopment of its conflict prevention agenda and the environmental field, a G7 ministerial meeting forums in 1999 (Kirton 2002).

emerged only in 1992, and national co-ordina tive centres remained relatively weak. In all cases, Across all domains the established interna however, compliance for both countries improved tional organizations are not allies but adversaries from 1992 on, when new multilateral and G7-cen- in the G8s effort to ensure effective compliance tered institutions arose in finance and especially and implementation. For these organizations have in the environment fields. at least obsolete and often antithetical mandates, management and governance arrangements, ii. G8 Governance against Multilateral Or- cultures, and a record and reputation of failure, ganizations. The second, sharply contrasting and have proven impervious to change by a deter In the seminal work prior to that of Kokotsis, George Von Furstenberg and Jospeh Daniels conjectures ruled out the structural factor of member countries relative capability as a relevant cause of compliance. Quan Lis (2001) subsequent analysis of their data set found that compliance with inflation control commitments were correlated positively with the interstate level variable of reciprocating behaviour and negatively with the domestic level variables of divided/ coalition governments and uncertainty. International institutional variables were not accessed.

Kirtons concert equality model, developed to explain the G8s governance performance overall, highlighted member countries relative vulnerability and capability, along with poor UN-based multilateral organizational performance, the common purpose and constricted participation within the G8 summit, and the domestic political capital and control of G8 leaders at home. The model worked well almost everywhere, but failed to account for G8 compliance overall or in the trade and finance fields (Kirton 2004). Its failure in explaining compliance may have flowed from its neglect of the striking growth and operation of G8 sub-summit institutions in reinforcing compliance and of the way the leaders themselves mobilize their political capacities at the summit consciously to craft commitments that will bind their own and their partners polities to comply for a longer time.

. 2006. mined G7 at its most self confident post cold war oping hypotheses and guiding future empirical height. The failure of the UN to change its charter research (Kirton 2006, Kokotsis 2006, Panova and Security Council at its September 2005 World 2006, Savic 2006, Scherrer 2006, Stephens Summit and that of the IMF and World Bank to 2006, Ullrich 2006). But it has produced no com transform itself for the twenty-first century in ways pelling analysis to suggest which of the three that the now finance-surplus superpowers of Ja- basic competing visions is most likely to be more pan, China and other Asian want strongly sug- correct.

gests that the G8 will be able to count even less on the old multilateral organizations in the years The most recent systematic research, as ahead. sessing G8 compliance since 1996 in the field of health and especially finance has focused on how iii. G8 Governance without International Or- G8 leaders themselves as autonomous agents ganizations. The third school of thought, lying be- can improve compliance by embedding eight tween the first two but with a tilt toward the second, different compliance catalysts in the commit points to G8 governance without international or- ments they craft or approve at the summit, and ganizations. Developed most explicitly by Nicho- whether these are in turn assisted or driven by las Bayne, and elaborated in a detailed look at the the work of their own G7/8 ministerial bodies or G8s relationship with the OECD, this view begins structural forces in the world as a whole. Here it with the original frustration of G7 leaders with the seems that when leaders at their summit embed inherited multilateral organizations and their poor their finance commitment with a specific time performance during the crisis ridden world of table to be met, and with a priority placement 197075 (Bayne 2000). As Bayne (2000: 45) put in their declaration, greater compliance comes it The OECD covered all the economic subjects of (Kirton 2006). Moreover, when their G7/8 finance concern to the summits and included all the sum- ministers remember and repeat the same com mit participants. But the political objectives of the mitment in the year before and in the year after leaders and their reaction against bureaucratic the summit, compliance rises as well. A combi procedures made it difficult for the summits and nation of increasingly equal vulnerability and ca the OECD to work together. Their relations were pability among the G8 members inspire finance often tense or distant. The OECD, instead of being ministers to remember and repeat such commit encouraged by the summits, at times came to feel ments, but does not directly increase compliance threatened by them. While these tensions did not itself. These findings offer some support for the endure, the end of the Cold War and the advance argument of G8 governance against multilateral of globalization shifted the summits attention to organizations. But they did not include an ex institutions of wider membership. He added that amination of the impact of international institu as the G7s fourth cycle began, the connection tions beyond the G8 in the ensuing actions taken between the G8 and the OECD withered too. His by member countries to put these commitments analysis suggests the relationship between the into effect (as distinct from their presence in the G8 and institutions is one of mutual co-existence commitment itself).

and non-involvement when their agendas are dif ferent, but one of tension when they are the same.

2. An Analytic Framework In the latter case, the central cause is the seminal of the G8-International Institutional anti-bureaucratic convictions of the leaders-driv en G8, and implicitly the failure of most institutions Connection to have an annual leaders-driven centrepiece sim ilar to that of the G8.

In order to explore this largely missing ingredient of outside international institutional involvement B. The Available Evidence as a cause of compliance, the first task is to develop an analytic framework that identifies in The most recent attempts to analyze the some systematic fashion the multiple ways in course and causes of effective compliance with, which international institutions are connected to and implementation of G8 commitments across the G8 system of governance, and how they help a wide array of issues areas and countries has or harm the G8s compliance and implementation yielded a rich repertoire of evidence for devel tasks.

Here three dimensions stand out3. The first is tutional process as the referent, the relevant time the level of connection. On the G8 system side, period extends from the pre-summit preparatory this ranges from the leaders summit and their per- phase, which starts immediately after the previous sonal representatives or sherpas, through the years summit is done, through the intra-summit many ministerial G8 and G8 centric bodies, to the on-site stage at the summit itself, to the post three dozen or more official level and increasingly summit implementation phase that starts imme multi-stakeholders bodies that that G8 has cre- diately after the summit its over when its decisions ated since 1975 to assist with and implement its have just been released in its public documents work. A similar hierarchical range applies to the and the task of compliance and implementation international institutions, with the important addi- begins to continue for at least the following year.

tion that they often have permanent secretariats While the contributions international institutions and thus the full time international civil servants make for each phase may extend into the others, (at many levels) that the G8 system entirely lacks. each contribution can be best considered as mak For this initial study, where the focus is on compli- ing its greatest contribution at, a single stage.

ance with the commitments made or approved by G8 leaders at their annual summit, the framework A third dimension is the intentionality of the is confined to contributions the international insti- international institutions contribution, on the part tutions make to the G8 summit level, although the of the G8 and the relevant institution(s) alike. Tak framework developed for this purpose may also en together, in broadest terms, the combination of apply to levels below. the two sides revolves around the reinforce, re form, replace trilogy familiar from Kirtons work.

However here, a basic structural imbalance That is, are the two sides pulling together as al between the two sides should be noted, beyond lies (with support flowing both ways if not in equal the important material reality that the institutions degrees)? Or are they competitive colleagues, overwhelmingly have secretariats that the G8 has each trying to do the same things differently and always completely lacked. This is that the G8 re- better to the same end, reforming the other to liably meets face-to-face at the leaders level at this same end, or each doing different things for least once a year, whereas the institutions usually the common cause, even as ships passing in the do not. The one institution that reliably beats the night, with one serving, consciously or not and in a G8 in this regard, and has a vast international sec- co-ordinated fashion or not, as the global govern retariat of its own as well the European Union is ance gap filler for issue areas or functions that the also a member of the G8. Together with the rela- other cannot do? Or are they adversaries, each tively small size and combined power of the G8, it acting against the other to govern the same fields is thus analytically sensible, if politically insensi- through the same functions on a foundation of an tive, to begin the analysis in the first instance by tithetical values and to essentially different ends conceiving of the G8 as the worlds inner cabinet to realize the very different vision of global order or directoire for global governance, with the in- each holds dear?

ternational institutions constituting the civil serv ants required to implement what their all popularly Within this larger framework, the dimension and democratically elected G8 political masters of intentionality embraces three components direct them too4. on both the G8s and institutions side. The first is awareness of what the other is doing, intends The second dimension is the timing of the to do, or wants done. The second is the willing connection. Again with the G8 and its core insti- ness of each side to support, co-exist or compete Other analytic dimensions to be developed and incorporated are scope (issues of intra G8 or global concern, following Baynes analysis) and function (especially given the inherent comprehensiveness and interconnectedness of the G8).

The use of the term directoire will immediately inspire the objection, usually voiced by G8 cofounder France, that the G8 is not a directoire. It clearly is in the English language sense of a board of directors for global governance. It has arguably become so in the seminal French-language sense of the directoire that decided who would live or die during the terror of the French revolution. The G8 has often done so by omission, in such cases as Darfur. It also has started doing so by commission, by initiating the war to liberate Kosovo in 1999, using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as is implementing international institution of choice.

. 2006. with the other. The third is the ability of each side world, even in the absence of further action on the to put its will (including that elusive substance of institutions part.

political will) into effect, with the resources it has at hand or can readily raise. On the G8 side, the 3. Understanding. The involvement of inter G8 may deliberately be aware of the institutions national institutions at or during the summit can work, seek to not duplicate, respond to, and sup provide them with a better understanding of the port it, and craft its commitments to be compat intentions, context and political considerations ible with those of the institutions or easily be put behind G8 actions and thus enable the institutions into effect by them.

to better implement them, assuming this enriched awareness is accompanied by a willingness to as Within this analytic framework it is possible sist on the institutions part.

to construct the following list of the fifteen major contributions international institutions make to 4. Buy In. Involvement in the shaping of G G8 compliance, implementation and governance actions can allow the institutions to buy in to in general, arranged along the temporal dimen them, by adopting them as their own, and taking sion identified above. While specific contribution ownership of them. This moves the institutions can run throughout and beyond all stages in the from mere awareness to an embedded willing summits year, each is considered to be most rel ness to assist.

evant to a particular stage, as identified below. In all cases a premium is placed on critical resourc 5. Credibility. Involvement by the institutions es the international institutions can offer that the can give G8 actions greater credibility, in that in G8 lacks entirely or has in short supply, and that side and outside constituencies will know that its member national governments (and even the these actions are grounded in and backed by the quasi-national/quasi-international institutional intellectual, bureaucratic, financial and legal re European Union) cannot easily provide.

sources that the institutions bring. For example, at Gleneagles, the G8 leaders in their communiqu A. At the Summit: The Commitment explicitly relied on the OECD to define the figures Stage for how much their ODA pledge would be worth to give it greater credibility in the eyes of a world At and around the time of the summit, in skeptical of the G8 itself. This extends the insti ternational institutions can provide six crucial tutions contribution from awareness and willing resources. This is especially the case if they are ness to the ability to assist.

involved in the leaders discussions on site but can also be done by communication or public 6. Legitimacy. Involvement by the institu and private endorsements from afar. These six tions can confer greater legitimacy on G8 actions, resources are:

regardless of their content, by having them ap proved by or associated with bodies with a much 1. Visibility. The institutions can create great broader membership (in number of members and er awareness for G8 governance around the world across all diversity dimensions such as region and in new constituencies. They carry awareness of class). Moreover to the extent that the executive G8 governance out through international institu heads of international organizations, such as Kofi tions out to their own constituents and stakehold Anan as Secretary General of the UN, have legiti ers and the wider world.

macy in their own right, their involvement with the G8 can reinforce the legitimizing effect.

2. Sensitivity. International institutions can provide superior information about the problem being addressed, work already being done by B. After the Summit:

others including themselves, and the likely reac- The Implementation Stage tion of their broader membership to the G8s pro posed deliberations, directions, decisions, and After the summit, G8-aware institutions which development of new institutions, in ways that can are willing and able to assist can make further improve what the G8 leaders do on site. They can contributions in specific valuable ways, largely by thus generate G8 commitments that are inherently bringing their critical resources of money, staff, more appealing to and absorbable by the outside secretariats and stakeholders, and legal authority to bear. Among their many contributions, the fol- for G8 action on initiatives and resources preferred lowing stand out. by the institutions (notably raising more money for them) through to adopting a full component of the 7. Burden-Sharing. The first is broadened G8s agenda and action plan on the G8s behalf burden sharing, as institutions add the money of (as with the World Bank and energy poverty for St.

the institution itself or its non-G8 members to that Petersburg in 2006). Whatever the directness and mobilized by the G8 to put G8 decisions into ef- direction of the connection, several critical institu fect. Cases in point include donations to the G8- tional contributions stand out.

created global funds and projects of the Global Fund Against AIDS, TB and Malaria, assistance 11. Information. The first is information, start packages to the former Soviet Union and Central ing with the provision of statistics that provide reli and Eastern Europe, and debt cancellation for the able information on the state of global problems, poorest countries at Gleneagles in 2005. causes and responsive actions, including on the part of members of the G8. Here the IMFs and 8. Substitute Secretariat. International in- OECDs regular forecasts of global and compara stitutions can serve as substitute secretariats for tive country growth stand out as forming the foun a G8 system that ahs none of its own and that is dation for the G8s treatment of its world econo adamantly against creating any for the particular my agenda. Such reliable information can form G8-centered processes and institutions it cre- the foundation for G8 agenda-setting (what prob ates. One case is the WHO assuming the account- lems need to be addressed now), direction-set ing and associated responsibilities for the Global ting (what new principles and norms are needed) Fund which the G8 created along with the UN in and decision-making of several kinds (for exam 2001. One prospective case is the recent offer by ple, by forming the base from which G8 commit the new head of the OECD to have no organization ments are calculated, as in doubling official de formally assume the role of serving as the secre- velopment assistance (ODA) to Africa by 2010).

tariat for the G8. Institutions also serve as a permanent repository for information, and a convenient meeting place 9. Training. Institutions with their experi- for facilitating the work of G8 bodies, such as the ence, permanent professional staff and associ- Financial Action Task Force.

ated resources can provide training to those the G8 wants trained. One recent case is the role of 12. Analysis. International institutions can as the OECDs Development Assistance Committee semble various stream of information into analysis (DAC) in training Africans about the process of that further helps the G8 identify what problems peer review. need to be addressed, by whom, and how soon. A classic case is the OECDs creation in the 1980s of 10. Compliance Monitoring. With their per- a producer subsidy equivalent formula to measure manent professional staff, international institu- agricultural subsidies, a formula used by the G tions could perform compliance monitoring of summit in its effort to control such subsidies and or for the G8, by systematically assessing how thus liberalize agricultural trade. The findings of much and how G8 members are complying with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, G8 commitments. They could do so with or with- for example, catalyse and shape the G8s work on out the G8s permission, co-operation or even climate change.

knowledge. They could extend this contribution to include evaluations of the effectiveness of G8 ac- 14. Consensus. International institutions can tions in solving the problems they address. also generate analytically based policy and po litical consensus that forms a foundation for G C. Before the Summit: commitments to be created, complied with and the Preparation Stage implemented. They provide a continuous meet ing place for contact and communication among Prior to the summit, during the preparation members, especially when the institutions have stage, institutions can also make an important G7/8 caucus groups, as do the IMF and OECD.

contribution. Their involvement can range from The institutions can share, compare, and chose providing services that routinely as a public good best practices, facilitate the application of peer that the G8 can freely access, through to lobbying pressure and moral suasion, and promote or con . 2006. duct more active forms of policy co-ordination as 4. Membership Overlap. The more G8 mem a foundation for or on behalf of the G8. bers (and their partners participating in their meet ings) dominate the membership of the institution, 15. Catalytic Support. International insti- the more the institution will effectively assist in tutions can provide the pressure or support re- G8 compliance and implementation. Thus the old quired to get the G8 to agree to create a com- OECD should help more than the new OECD with mitment in a certain way, with sufficient force to its expanded membership, and much more than propel compliance with the commitment soon the virtually universal UN (See Appendix E, F).

after it is announced. These are the commit ments created by the institutions and adopted by 5. Managerial Control. When G8 members the G8 and thus the ones the institutions best un- and their participating partners dominate the derstand, have bought into for the longest time, management structure of the international insti and are thus more likely to actively help put into tution, through voting shares, decision-rules and effect. membership on the inner management core or Executive Board, greater compliance assistance will arise5.

3. Hypotheses to Explain 6. Mutual Experience. The more experience International Institutional Assistance G8 leaders and sherpas (and their ministers and with G8 Compliance officials) have had or simultaneously have with in stitutions, and the more the institutions have had with the G8, the more the institutions will assist in Under what conditions will international institutions the G8 compliance and implementation task (See make these contributions and improve compliance Appendix G).

with G8 commitments as a result. The relevant conditions come from a wide range of domains, 7. Co-hosting Responsibility. When the G embracing the nature of the institution, the G8 and host simultaneously serves as the head of another the relationship between the two. Among the rich international institution (such as the EU within the array of hypotheses than arise across this wide G8 system), then grater compliance assistance range, the following stand out.

from that institution will arise, as the host tries to co-ordinate its approach to global governance 1. Participation. The more the institutions between the two. One case is Canadas hosting of participate at and in the G8 summit, ministerial the Commonwealth and La Francophone summits meetings, and official level bodies, the greater the in the fall of 1987, in the lead-up to the G7 summit contribution the institutions will make in assisting it hosted in Toronto in June 1988.

with compliance and implantation, across all the components noted above (See Appendix A).

8. Early Involvement. The more the interna tional institutions are involved in G8 governance 2. Communiqu Incorporation. The more G summit communiqus and their commitments ex- and commitment creation at an early stage and plicitly reference institutions and different institu- ideally from the very start, the more the institu tions will effectively assist in G8 compliance and tions, the more likely the institutions will do what implementation.

the G8 directs (See Appendices B, C, D).

9. Government Organizational Co-ordina 3. Mission Compatibility. The more the char tion. When responsibility for G8 and other inter ter-encoded core, constitutional mission of the national institutions are combined in a single divi institution coincides with the G8s seminal values sion/bureaucratic centre in a G8 members home of globally promoting open democracy, individual liberty and social advance, the more the institu- government, implementation assistance increas tion will effectively assist in G8 compliance and es, as co-ordinated strategies can more easily be implementation. mounted by the member states.

Financial contributions from G8 members may not have the same effect, as the difference between a high financial contribution and low managerial control may lead to unresponsiveness and frustrations, as with UNESCO and the US and UK.

10. Country Specific Hypothesis. In addi- 15-17th, 2006. This set of 21 assessed commit tion, a further series of country specific hypoth- ments from the summits total of 212 constitutes eses, building on hypothesis 9 above, can be de- the largest annual sample to date, and arguably vised, along the following lines (See Appendix H). the most thorough reports on members compli A countrys compliance with commitments that are ant behaviour with each. As Appendices I and J assisted by an international institution is likely to be indicate, compliance tend to be higher when the greater when that country is an institutional mem- commitments contain more references to inter ber, founder, or board member (as all G7 members national institutions, mention a wider variety of are in the IMF and World Banks Executive Board institutions, and (more tentatively) offer the in but Japan, Germany, Italy and Canada are not in stitutions support rather than guidance. Those the UNs Security Council Permanent Five). institutions featured uniquely in the high compli ance commitments the Quartet, the Paris Club, and the African Development Bank are those 4. The Evidence from the G dominated by the G7 in membership and man Compliance Record agement (and financial contribution in the last case).

An initial empirical assessment of how interna tional institutions enhance G8 compliance can be B. Sea Island, 2004- made, following Hypothesis 1 above, by seeing if the summits where the institutions participate These results only partly emerge at the generate priority commitments with higher com- Sea Island Summit (Appendix K). More reference pliance scores Appendix B suggests they do, es- to institutions and to different institutions does pecially when they participate in summit sessions not increase compliance. perhaps this is because themselves. of the particular institutions and G8 relationship A second assessment, following Hypothesis selected. The G8 in its lowest complying com 2 above, can be made by considering the record mitments relied heavily on the virtually universal on compliance with G8 priority commitments from UN and on instructing (leading) it in what to do, 1996 to 2005 to determine if high compliance is rather than offering support. This approach came associated with the relevance and relationship of at a summit where, for the first time in four years, international institutions in the commitment itself not a single international institution (including the and in the compliance behaviour which follows. most frequent favorite, the UN) was invited to par In the commitment itself, attention is directed to ticipate.

the explicit presence or absence of a notation to a non-G8-centered international institution, the C. Okinawa, 2000- number of such institutions, and the number of different institutions, and the number of particu At Okinawa in 2000 however, the highest lar institutions noted. In the later case, the same complying summit in G7/8 history, the Sea Island dimensions would be measured for the behaviour pattern was reversed. More references to insti of all (and each) member countries that constitute tutions and to different institutions did increase compliance, as identified in the research reports of compliance. The commitments with the highest G8 Research Group analysts who have assessed compliance contained the most references to the compliance with that commitment each year. On UN and the WTO, and to leading them without of this foundation, attention can be then directed at fering and support even though no institutions particular combinations of issues, G8 members were there to participate. This striking difference and international institutions where compliance is in the two summits hosted by the G8s two most particularly high (or low).

powerful countries may be explained by systemic factors such as the 911 terrorist attacks that struck A. Gleneagles 2005- after Japans hosting but before that of America under George W. Bush. However it may also point This analysis begins with the preliminary final to particular compliance-inducing combinations compliance results for the 21 priority commit- of the G8 host country and the institutions speci ments assessed from the July 6-8, 2005 Glenea- fied as compliance instruments, with a multilater gles summit, through the ensuring eleven months alist, UN-committed Japan is juxtaposed against just prior to the St. Petersburg Summit on July a unilateralist, UN-skeptical U.S.

. 2006. 3. Should the OECD meet at the summit lev 5. The Analytic Case for Policy el, perhaps first to celebrate its 50th anniversary in Innovation 2010/11 and combine this summit with the work of the G8 summit that and each year? Should oth Further analysis along these lines should yield er international institutions move to match the G a richer empirical foundation for assessing the by having summits every year?

wisdom of the major policy recommendations offered to improve summit performance in the 4. Can international institutions assist more compliance and other domains. The major directly in the systematic monitoring of G8 com questions in regard to these recommendations pliance and implementation?

are as follows:

5. Would the greater involvement of civil soci 1. Would making Russia a greater participant ety representatives in, and more openness, trans in and full member of the OECD, IEA, WTO and parency and answerability from, the G8 and the similar institutions (as all other G8 members are) international institutions help?

help in the implementation of G8 commitments?

6. Would the creation of a G8 Secretariat, to 2. Should the OECD assume a stronger and more formal role of a particular sort as a secre- match and co-ordinate continuously with those of tariat for the G8, in some functions or overall? most other institutions, help compliance?

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Appendix A:

International Organizations at the Annual G7/8 Summit 1996 Lyon United Nations: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General International Monetary Fund: Michel Camdessus, Managing Director World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General 2001 Genoa United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General World Health Organization: Gro Har lem Brundtland, Director-General 2002 Kananaskis United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General 2003 Evian United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President International Monetary Fund: Horst Khler, Managing Director World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General 2005 Gleneagles Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director International Monetary Fund: Rodrigo de Rato y Figaredo, Managing Director United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General World Bank: Paul Wolfowitz, President World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General 2006 St. Petersburg Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair CIS: Nursultan Nazarbayev, Chairman-in-office International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director International Atomic Energy Agency: Mohammed ElBaradei, Director-General UNESCO: Koichiro Matsuura, Director-General World Health Organization: Dr. Anders Nordstrm, Acting Director-General United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General . 2006. Appendix B:

Analysis of International Institutions at the G8 Summit, 1989 Final Interim No. IOs UN Year compliance compliance IMF WB WTO NAM WHO IEA AU present present score score Overall Ave. 47.2 41.1 3 71% 43% 57% 57% 29% 14% 14% 14% Overall Ave. 47.8 41. with IOs Overall Ave. 46.8 40. without IOs 19962005 50.3 41. Ave. with IOs 19962005 43.6 40. Ave. without IOs 1989 +07.8 1** Yes 1990 14. 1991 00. 1992 +64. 1993 +75.0 1* Yes 1994 +100. 1995 +100. 1996 +36.2 4** Yes Yes Yes Yes 1997 +12. 1998 +31. 1999 +38. 2000 +81. 2001 +49.5 4*** Yes Yes Yes Yes 2002 +35.0 +29.8 1*** Yes 2003 +65.8 +47.1 4*** Yes Yes Yes Yes 2004 +54.0 +40. 2005 +65.0 +47.4 6*** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes * met with host only (proximity presence) ** met with all G7/8 leaders before or after summit (margins presence) *** met with all G7/8 leaders during summit (integral presence) Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis.

Compliance scores from 1996 to 2005 measure compliance with G8 Research Groups selected commitments.

The 2005 final compliance score is the preliminary (June 20, 2005) score.

Note: The NAM met with the G8 Foreign Ministers met in Cologne on June 10, 1999, before the leaders summit from 1820, 1999. They met again on July 13, 2000, before the July 2023, 2000 leaders summit.

Appendix C:

A Model of Agency, Institutionalization and Structure A. Agency: Compliance Catalysts 1. Priority placement 2. Target 3. Timetable 4. Remit mandate 5. Money mobilized 6. Agent 7. G8 body 8. International Institution B. Institutionalization 1. Re-mentions by the G7/8 Finance Ministers 2. Pre-mentions by the G7/8 Finance Ministers 3. Post-mentions by G7-centred Finance Ministerial Bodies 4. Recommitment by G7/8 Finance Ministers 5. Pre-commitment by G7/8 Finance Ministers 6. Post-affirmation by G7/8 Finance Ministers Structure Vulnerabilities 1. Percent change in price of Brent Crude Oil barrel (London) 2. Percent change in price of gold (London) 3. Percent change in global stock markets index 4. Average annual change in G7 economic confidence indicators Capabilities 5. Average G7 real GDP growth 6. US real GDP growth minus average G7 GDP growth 7. Average appreciation of USD vs. other G7 currencies Appendix D:

Finance Compliance Scores and Catalysts, 1996 Priority Remit G8-Cen- Intl Insti Commt Issue Area Issue Target Time-table Money Agent TTL Score Place-ment Mandate tered Body tution 1996-1/2 Macro-eco. Macro-eco.s yes - - - - - - - +1. 1996-35/36 Micro-eco. Micro-eco. yes - - - - - - - +0. 1996-39 Devt ODA - - - 0 0. 1996-48 IFI Reform UNCTAD yes - - - - - - yes +0. 1996-70 UN Reform I $ Obligations yes - - - - - - yes +0. 1996-116/117 UN Reform II Devt Agenda - - - - - yes - yes +0. 1997-55 Devt Africa yes - - - - yes - - 0. 1997-S146 Micro-eco. Employment - - - - - - - - +0. 1998-20 Debt HIPC - - - - - yes - yes 0. 1998-42/47 Micro-eco. Employment yes - - - - - - yes 0. 1999-1/2 Debt HIPC - yes - - - yes - +0. 1999-S53 Macro-eco. Macro-eco. - - - - - - - - +1. 1999-S54 Exch- Rate Exch- Rate - - - - - - - - 0. 1999-S55 Crime FATF - - - - - - yes - 0. 2000-31 Debt HIPC - - yes yes - 0. 4 1. 2000-32/33 Debt Decision Points - yes yes - - yes yes 2000-34 Debt HIPC - - - - - - - - 0. 2 1. 2001-5/6 IFI Reform IFI Reform - - - - - yes yes 2001-9 Debt HIPC - (d) - - - - - - +1. 2001-26 Health Global Fund - - yes - yes - yes yes +0. 2001-S59 Terrorism Terrorism - - - - - yes - - +1. 2 0. 2001-S60 Envt GEF yes - - - - - yes . 2006. Priority Remit G8-Cen- Intl Insti Commt Issue Area Issue Target Time-table Money Agent TTL Score Place-ment Mandate tered Body tution 2002-10 Africa ODA yes yes - - - - - - +0. 2002-11 Health Polio Yes yes yes - - - - - 0. 2002-69 Eco.growth Agri. Trade yes - - - - - - - +0. 2002-90 Debt HIPC yes - - - yes - yes - +0. 2003-5 World Eco. World Eco. yes - - - - - - - +0. 2003-10 Health Global Fund yes - yes - - yes yes - +0. 2003-13 Health Polio yes yes yes - - - - - +1. 2003-15 Devt ODA yes - yes - - yes yes - +0. 2003-16 Debt HIPC yes - yes - - yes - - +0. 2 -0. 2003-36 Crime Finance yes - - - - - - yes 2003-150 Terrorism Finance yes - yes - - - yes yes +1. 2004(1)-3-4 Devt Doha yes - yes - - yes - - +1. 2 1. 2004(2)-30 Devt Private - - - - - yes yes Entrepreneur 2004(7)-1 Africa Darfur yes - - - - - - - +0. 2004(11)-3 Health Polio yes - yes - - yes - - +0. 2004(12)- Crime Finance - - yes - - yes yes - +0. 5/6/7/8/9/10/ 2004(12)-16 Crime Finance yes - - - - yes - yes +0. 2004(13)-1/2/3 Debt HIPC yes yes yes yes yes - +1. 2004(14)-24 Africa Famine yes - - - - yes - - +0. 2004(S)-1 World Eco. World Eco. yes - - - - - - - +0. TOTAL 25/42 07/42 12/42 00/42 02/42 18/42 13/42 09/42 00% 05% 43% 31% 21% Average 60% 17% 29% . 2006. Appendix E:

Membership Overlap in the OECD EU members % of OECD % of OECD held by represented at G7/8 Compliance No. members Year held by G7/8 G7/8 countries + EU (excluding score in OECD countries members G7/8 members) 1975 (G6) 0 +57.1 24 25% 25% 1976 (G7) 0 +08.9 24 29% 29% 1977 (EU) 56 +08.4 24 29% 50% 1978 5 +36.3 24 29% 50% 1979 5 +82.3 24 29% 50% 1980 5 +07.6 24 29% 50% 1981 67 +26.6 24 29% 54.2% 1982 6 +84.0 24 29% 54.2% 1983 6 10.9 24 29% 54.2% 1984 6 +48.8 24 29% 54.2% 1985 6 +01.0 24 29% 54.2% 1986 88 +58.3 24 29% 62.5% 1987 8 +93.3 24 29% 62.5% 1988 8 47.8 24 29% 62.5% 1989 8 +07.8 24 29% 62.5% 1990 8 14.0 24 29% 62.5% 1991 8 00.0 24 29% 62.5% 1992 8 +64.0 24 29% 62.5% 1993 8 +75.0 24 29% 62.5% 1994 8 +100.0 259 28% 60% 1995 1110 +100.0 2611 27% 69.2% 1996 11 +36.2 2912 24% 62.1% 1997 (G8)* 11 +12.8 29 24% 62.1% 1998 11 +31.8 29 24% 62.1% 1999 11 +38.2 29 24% 62.1% 2000 11 +81.4 3013 23% 60% 2001 11 +49.5 30 23% 60% 2002 11 +35.0 30 23% 60% 2003 11 +65.8 30 23% 60% 2004 1614 +54.0 30 23% 76.7% 2005 16 +65.0 30 23% 76.7% * Russia is not a member of the OECD and therefore the addition of Russia does not affect the overall percentage the G8 holds within the OECD.

Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands.

Greece.

Portugal, Spain.

Mexico.

Austria, Finland, Sweden.

Czech Republic.

Hungary, Korea, Poland.

Slovak Republic Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia.

Appendix F:

Membership Overlap in the United Nations EU members represented % of UN held % of UN held by % UNSC P Compliance No. members Year at G7/8 by G7/8 G7/8 countries held by G7/ score in UN (excluding countries + EU members countries G7/8 members) 1975 (G6) 515 +57.1 144 4.2% 7.6% 60% 1976 (G7) 5 +08.9 147 4.7% 8.2% 60% 1977 5 +08.4 149 4.6% 8.1% 60% 1978 5 +36.3 151 4.6% 7.9% 60% 1979 5 +82.3 152 4.6% 7.9% 60% 1980 5 +07.6 154 4.5% 7.8% 60% 1981 616 +26.6 157 4.5% 8.3% 60% 1982 6 +84.0 157 4.5% 8.3% 60% 1983 6 10.9 158 4.4% 8.2% 60% 1984 6 +48.8 159 4.4% 8.2% 60% 1985 6 +01.0 159 4.4% 8.2% 60% 1986 817 +58.3 159 4.4% 9.4% 60% 1987 8 +93.3 159 4.4% 9.4% 60% 1988 8 47.8 159 4.4% 9.4% 60% 1989 8 +07.8 159 4.4% 9.4% 60% 1990 8 14.0 159 4.4% 9.4% 60% 1991 8 00.0 166 4.2% 9.0% 60% 1992 8 +64.0 179 3.9% 8.4% 60% 1993 8 +75.0 184 3.8% 8.2% 60% 1994 8 +100.0 185 3.8% 8.1% 60% 1995 1118 +100.0 185 3.8% 9.7% 60% 1996 11 +36.2 185 3.8% 9.7% 60% 1997 (G8) 11 +12.8 185 4.3% 10.3% 80% 1998 11 +31.8 185 4.3% 10.3% 80% 1999 11 +38.2 188 4.3% 10.1% 80% 2000 11 +81.4 189 4.2% 10.1% 80% 2001 11 +49.5 189 4.2% 10.1% 80% 2002 11 +35.0 191 4.2% 9.9% 80% 2003 11 +65.8 191 4.2% 9.9% 80% 2004 2119 +54.0 191 4.2% 15.2% 80% 2005 21 +65.0 191 4.2% 15.2% 80% Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands.

Greece.

Portugal, Spain.

Austria, Finland, Sweden.

Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.

. 2006. Appendix G:

International Institutional Experience of the Host Sherpa Compliance International Institutional International Institutional Year Sherpa score Experience before hosting Experience after hosting 1975 +57.1 Raymond Barre Prime Minister of France (19761981) 1976 +08.9 George P.

Shultz 1977 +08.4 John Hunt 1978 +36.3 Manfred Lahnstein 1979 +82.3 Hiromichi Miyazaki 1980 +07.6 Renato Italian Mission to the European WTO Director-General (19951999) Ruggiero Community (19691970s), spokesman for the President of the European Commission (19771978) 1981 +26.6 Allan Gotlieb delegate to the United Nations General Assembly (19671968) 1982 +84.0 Jacques Attali President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (19911993) 1983 10.9 W. Allen Wallis 1984 +48.8 Robert Armstrong 1985 +01.0 Hans Tietmeyer Chairman of the Bank for International Settlements (20032005), Governor of the Fund for Germany at the IMF (1998) 1986 +58.3 Reishi Teshima 1987 +93.3 Renato Italian Mission to the European WTO Director-General (19951999) Ruggiero Community (19691970s), spokesman for the President of the European Commission (19771978) 1988 47.8 Sylvia Ostry Head of the Economics and Statistics Department of the OECD (19791983) 1989 +07.8 Jacques Attali President of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (19911993) 1990 14.0 Richard T. 2001 McCormack 1991 00.0 Nigel Wicks Executive Director at the World Bank and the IMF (at some point between 1983 and 1985) 1992 +64.0 Horst Khler managing director of the International Monetary Fund (2000-2004) Compliance International Institutional International Institutional Year Sherpa score Experience before hosting Experience after hosting 1993 +75.0 Koichiro Chairperson of UNESCOs World Matsuura Heritage Committee (19981999);

Director-General of UNESCO (1999 2005) 1994 +100.0 Pietro Calamia 1995 +100.0 Gordon Smith Delegation to NATO (1968);

Permanent Representative and Ambassador to NATO (19851990) 1996 +36.2 Jean-David Counsellor at the Permanent Permanent Representative to the Levitte Mission of France to the United United Nations (20002002) Nations (1982-1985);

Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva (19881990) 1997 +12.8 Daniel K. Tarullo 1998 +31.8 John Holmes temporary duty at the British Mission to the UN (early 1970s) 1999 +38.2 Klaus Director-General, Economic Policy Gretschmann Directorate, Council of the European Union (2001present) 2000 +81.4 Yoshiji Nogami Ambassador to the OECD (19971999) 2001 +49.5 Francesco Permanent Representative to the Olivieri OECD (??2005) 2002 +35.0 Robert Fowler Ambassador to the UN (19952000) 2003 +65.8 Maurice Gourdault Montagne 2004 +54.0 Gary Edson 2005 +65.0 Michael Jay 2006 Igor Shuvalov Notes: excludes all positions in the sherpas national department of foreign or external affairs relating to international relations, trade, ambassadors to countries, etc. that are not explicitly involved with an international institution.

This list of experience is preliminary and may not include all international institutional experience.

Appendix H:

G8 Compliance Scores, 1996 Kanan- Kanan- Sea Sea Glen- Glen- Ave.

Evian Evian Lyon Den-ver Birmingham Cologne Okinawa Genoa askis askis Island Island eagles Eagles (final 200304 2003 19969720 19979821 19989922 19990023 20000124 20010225 200203 200203 200405 200405 200506 200506 scores (interim) 26 (final)27 (interim)28 (final) (interim)29 (final) (interim)30 (final) only) France 0.26 0 0.25 0.34 0.92 0.69 0.38 0.64 0.50 0.75 0.39 0.50 0.48 0.57 49.2% United 0.42 0.34 0.60 0.50 0.67 0.35 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.72 0.71 0.90 53.6% States United 0.42 0.50 0.75 0.50 1.0 0.69 0.42 0.55 0.58 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.95 65.3% Kingdom Germany 0.58 0.17 0.25 0.17 1.0 0.59 0.08 0.18 0.42 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.33 0.90 50.1% Japan 0.21 0.50 0.20 0.67 0.82 0.44 0.10 0.18 0.42 0.42 0.33 0.39 0.52 0.62 44.5% Italy 0.16 0.50 0.67 0.34 0.89 0.57 0.00 0.11 0.38 0.25 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.24 39.5% Canada 0.47 0.17 0.50 0.67 0.83 0.82 0.77 0.82 0.58 0.83 0.50 0.72 0.52 0.76 65.9% Russia N/A 0 0.34 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.42 0.33 0 0.06 -0.14 0.05 13.3% European N/A N/A N/A 0.17 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.50 0.72 0.75 0.90 59.7% Union Average 0.36 0.27 0.45 0.39 0.80 0.53 0.27 0.33 0.47 0.51 0.40 0.55 0.47 0.65 64.5% Applies to 19 priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

Applies to seven priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (human trafficking).

Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (terrorism).

Applies to 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (conflict prevention, arms control and terrorism).

Applies to nine priority issues, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (terrorism).

Applies to the 13 priority issues assessed in the first interim compliance report, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (arms control, conflict prevention and terrorism).

Applies to the 11 priority issues assessed in the final report, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (arms control, conflict prevention and terrorism). Excluded in the final report, which were assessed in the interim are debt of the poorest (HIPC) and ODA.

Applies to the 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (WMD, transport security and terrorism).

Applies to the 18 priority issues embracing world economy, energy, the environment, debt relief and infectious diseases.

Applies to the 21 priority issues, embracing peacekeeping, ODA, infectious diseases, renewable energy, climate change and Middle East reform.

. 2006. Appendix I:

Gleneagles Analysis International Institutions in 2005 Gleneagles Commitments, highest 10 scores Total Number Distribution Compliance number of of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned Debt Relief: Africa 1.00 3 3 World Bank IDA, 0 yes IMF, African Development Fund Middle East Reform 1.00 2 1 Quartets yes 0 Wolfensohn (x2) Debt Relief: Iraq 0.75 2 1 Paris Club (x2) 0 yes Sudan 0.89 2 2 African Union, yes 0 UNAMIS Terrorism 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 Non-proliferation 0.89 0 0 0 0 0 Transnational Crime 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 Renewable Energy 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 Climate Change 0.78 1 1 UN Climate 0 yes Change Conference Tsunami 1.00 1 1 UN yes 0 TOTAL 11 9 3 3 AVE. 93.1% 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.3 Institutions Quartet = Paris Club = UN = WB = IMF = ADF = AU = International Institutions in 2005 Gleneagles Commitments, lowest 11 scores Total Number of Distribution Compliance number of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned Peacekeeping 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 Good Governance 0.44 1 1 UN 0 yes Health: HIV/AIDS 0.33 1 1 UN Global Fund 0 yes Health: Polio 0.11 1 1 WHO Polio yes 0 Eradication Eradication Initiative ODA 0.22 1 1 OECD 0 0 yes Promoting Growth: 0.56 1 1 African Union 0 yes Africa . 2006. Total Number of Distribution Compliance number of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned Education: Africa 0.67 3 2 UNESCO yes 0 Education for All, World Bank Fast Track Initiative (x2) Trade: Africa 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 Trade: Export 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 Subsidies Trade: LDCs 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 Surface 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 Transportation TOTAL 8 7 2 3 AVE. 40.4% 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.3 0. Institutions UN = WB = WHO = OECD = AU = Summary (all 21 commitments) Total number of institutions mentioned Total number of distinct institutions mentioned Ave. number of institutions mentioned 0. Ave. number of distinct institutions mentioned 0. Rank of institutions (based on number of institutions UN = 6 (3+3) mentioned) WB = 3 (1+2) Quartet = 2 (2+0) Paris Club = 2 (2+0) AU = 2 (1+1) IMF = 1 (1+0) ADF = 1 (1+0) WHO = 1 (0+1) OECD = 1 (0+1) Appendix J:

International Institutions in 2005 Gleneagles Commitments, highest scores Total Number Distribution Compliance number of of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned Debt Relief: Africa 1.00 3 3 World Bank IDA, 0 yes IMF, African Development Fund Middle East Reform 1.00 2 1 Quartets yes 0 Wolfensohn (x2) Total Number Distribution Compliance number of of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned Terrorism 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 Transnational Crime 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 Renewable Energy 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 Tsunami 1.00 1 1 UN yes 0 TOTAL 6 5 2 1 AVE. 100% 1 0.8 0.3 0.2 Institutions Quartet = WB = IMF = ADF = UN = International Institutions in 2005 Gleneagles Commitments, lowest 6 scores Total Number Distribution Compliance number of of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned Health: Polio 0.11 1 1 WHO Polio yes 0 Eradication Eradication Initiative Trade: Export 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 Subsidies ODA 0.22 1 1 OECD 0 0 yes Health: HIV/AIDS 0.33 1 1 UN Global Fund 0 yes Trade: Africa 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 Trade: LDCs 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 3 3 1 1 AVE. 23.8% 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0. Institutions WHO = OECD = UN = Appendix K: Sea Island Analysis International Institutions in 2004 Sea Island Commitments, highest 8 scores Total Number Distribution Compliance number of of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned BMENA: Democracy 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 Assistance BMENA: Iraqi 0.89 0 0 0 0 0 Elections Trade: Doha 0.88 0 0 0 0 0 Environment 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 . 2006. Total Number Distribution Compliance number of of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned Debt Relief / HIPC 1.00 2 1 WB (HIPC x2) 0 yes Regional Security: 0.89 0 0 0 0 0 Darfur Energy 0.78 0 0 0 0 0 WMD 0.78 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 2 1 0 1 AVE. 90.3% 0.3 0.1 0 0.1 Institutions WB = International Institutions in 2004 Sea Island Commitments, lowest 10 scores Total Number Distribution Compliance number of of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned World Economy 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 Trade: Technical 0.56 0 0 0 0 0 Assistance Terrorist Financing 0.44 3 1 UN (TOC x2, 0 yes Office on Drugs) Transnational Crime 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 Transport Security 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 Financing -1.00 2 2 UN, WB 0 yes Development Infectious Diseases: 0.56 0 0 0 0 0 HIV/AIDS Infectious Diseases: 0.44 0 0 0 0 0 Polio Peacebuilding in 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 Africa Famine & Food 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 Security in Africa TOTAL 5 3 0 2 AVE. 26.7% 0.5 0.3 0 0.2 Institutions UN = WB = Summary (all 11 commitments) Total number of institutions mentioned Total number of distinct institutions mentioned Ave. number of institutions mentioned 0. Ave. number of distinct institutions mentioned 0. Rank of institutions (based on number of institutions UN = 4 (0+4) mentioned) WB = 3 (2+1) Appendix L:

Okinawa Analysis International Institutions in 2000 Okinawa Commitments, highest 5 scores Total Number of Distribution Compliance number of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned ICT / DOT Force 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 Health 1.00 2 2 WHO, UN 0 yes Trade 1.00 4 1 WTO (x4) 0 yes Crime and Drugs 0.88 2 1 UN (x2) 0 yes Arms Control 0.88 1 1 UN NPT 0 yes TOTAL 9 5 0 4 AVE. 95.2% 1.8 1.0 0 0.8 Institutions UN = WTO = WHO = International Institutions in 2000 Okinawa Commitments, Lowest 6 scores Total Number of Distribution Compliance number of different Institutions Issue Score institutions institutions mentioned Support Lead Note mentioned mentioned Cultural Diversity 0.63 0 0 0 0 0 Biotech 0.75 2 1 CODEX 0 0 yes alimentarius (FAO/WHO) Conflict Prevention 0.63 2 1 UN 0 yes Terrorism 0.40 0 0 0 0 0 World Economy 0.86 0 0 0 0 0 Aging 0.86 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 4 2 0 1 AVE. 68.8% 0.7 0.3 0 0.2 0. Institutions FAO/WHO = UN = Summary (all 11 commitments) Total number of institutions mentioned Total number of distinct institutions mentioned Ave. number of institutions mentioned 1. Ave. number of distinct institutions mentioned 0. Rank of institutions (based on number of institutions UN = 5 (4+1) mentioned) WTO = 4 (4+0) WHO = 2 (1+1) . 2006. General Notes:

This data uses the G8RG final compliance scores.

A mention of an international institution includes direct references to that institution and references to its programs, initiatives, conferences, special envoy representatives, etc. It does not include references to G8-centred institutions or bodies (such as the Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction). It does include references to G8+international institution-created bodies (such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria).

If the same institution is mentioned twice in the same commitment, it is counted twice.

Support means the G8 offers its support or endorsement of programs, initiatives, etc. already developed and generally led by the international institution.

Lead means the G8 will move forward or call on others to move forward on something along with an international institution or that an international institution has set out.

Note means the G8 simply mentions or refers to the international institution.

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